The foreign relations of the Turkish republic, 1923-1945 by Campagna, Gerard Laval
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1952
The foreign relations of the Turkish
republic, 1923-1945
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/30831
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL 
Dissertation 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC 
1923-1945 
By 
Gerard Laval Campagna 
(A.B., Assumption College, 1934; 
A.M., Columbia University, 1937) 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
1952 
APPROVED 
By 
First Reader . ~<;. ~.'\.. .. 
Professor of History 
~~ Second Reader .......................... . 
Professor of History 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
List of Maps 
List of Abbreviations 
Preface 
Previous Investigators 
Introduction 
PART I 
FROM ISOLATION TO LEAGUE MEMBERSHIP, 1923-1932 
Chapter 1. Forced Isolation, 1923-28 
a. The Mosul Question 
b. Turkey and the Soviets' Asiatic Policy 
c. France and Syria 
d. The Exchange of Populations 
Chapter 2. Towards a Western Policy, 1928-30 
a. Fascist Diplomacy 
b. Turkey and the Middle East 
c. The End of the Greco-Turkish Feud 
Chapter 3· Towards Collective Security, 1930-33 
a. The Balkan Conferences 
b. League Membership 
PART II 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE LEAGUE, 1933-1939 
Chapter 1. Regional Security, 1933-36 
a. The Soviet Diplomatic Revolution 
b. The Balkan Entente 
c. The Middle Eastern Bloc 
i 
Page 
iii 
iv 
v 
vii 
1 
18 
36 
53 
62 
77 
84 
87 
95 
108 
122 
127 
137 
Chapter 2. The Break-up or the Security Structure, 
1936-39 
a. The Montreux Convention 
b. Turkey and the Axis 
c. The Fate or the Balkan Entente 
d. The Question or Alexandretta 
PART III 
THE WAR YEARS, 1939-1945 
Chapter 1. The Realignment or 1939 
a. Divisible Peace 
b. The Turkish Alliance with the West 
Chapter 2. Non-Belligerency, 1939-41 
a. The War in the West 
b. The Axis Seizure or the Balkans 
c. The Pact with Germany 
Chapter 3· Neutrality, 1941-45 
a. The Axis Tide 
b. Allied Pressure 
c. The End or an Epoch 
Epilogu~: Turkish Foreign Policy 
Bibliography 
Abstract 
Autobiography 
ii 
Page 
142 
163 
176 
188 
204 
216 
227 
240 
256 
265 
275 
293 
298 
308 
iii 
LIST OF MAPS 
After page 
1. THE PASSING OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 15 
2. THE MOSUL VILAYET 35 
3. THE TURCO-SYRIAN BORDER 56 
4. THE EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS 75 
5· MARE NOSTRUM, 1923-1930 83 
6. NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1930 107 
7· THE TURKISH STRAITS 162 
8. THE SANJAK OF ALEXANDRETTA 201 
9. THE NEAR EASTERN SITUATION, MAY 15, 1941 255 
10. THE WAR IN EUROPE, SEPTEMBER 1942 274 
11. EUROPE IN 1945 296 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
resse 
French 
Cmd •. 1814: Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 
1922-1923. Records or Proceedings and Draft Terms 
of Peace (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 
1923) Cmd. 1814. 
Documents for ••. : Documents on International Affairs 
(London, yearly, 1928 ••. ) Published by the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. 
1!Ql: League of Nations Official Journal (Geneva) 
LNTS: League of Nations Treaty Series (Geneva) 
Recueil des Actes, Lausanne: Recueil des Actes de la Con-
tdrence de Lausanne (Paris, 1923) 
Survey for .•• : A· J. Toynbee, Survey of International 
Affairs (London, yearly, 1920 ..• ) 
iv 
v 
PREFACE 
The quick transformation of the Turkish people into a 
modern nation in the Western manner is well known to every-
one. Countless travelers and reporters, always in quest of 
the picturesque, have described the change and contrasted 
"the old and the new." The history of the Republic's foreign 
relations is less well known, although it represents a simi-
lar change from the days of Ottoman diplomacy. 
The interest of the United States in Turkish foreign 
affairs is recent. In 1941 American diplomacy began to be 
active at Ankara, and it has remained so to the present day. 
Until 1947, however, the State Department left the initia-
tive to the British Foreign Office. Our Ambassador sup-
ported his British colleague in his dealings with the Turks 
during the war and the immediate post-war years. In March 
1947 the United States Government assumed in Greece and Tur-
key the burden which the British were no longer able to carry. 
We have contributed military and economic aid, and, at the 
present time, Turkey is about to become a key member in the 
alliance of the democratic states. 
The American people are now debating the reliability 
of their present host of allies. We are told that the Turks 
are the most dependable allies we could possibly find in the 
Near and Middle East. There is no way of ascertaining the 
future, but the best indication of probable future conduct 
is the record of the past. The history of Turkey's 
vi 
international conduct since the founding of the Republic re-
veals certain patterns of behavior within which the Turkish 
Government can be expected to operate. To know these pat-
terns may enable us to determine what the Turks will do and 
how we can best assure their continued cooperation. 
The present work is essentially diplomatic. Factors 
of internal politics, of economic activity or of social evo-
lution were introduced, without pretence at completeness, 
when they helped to explain the conduct of foreign relations. 
On the other hand, while the object of this study is the 
Turkish Republic, it was necessary in the later parts to 
describe developments in wider and wider areas of Europe, 
as the rate of more and more nations became locked in one 
gigantic struggle. 
The story of Turkish foreign relations is told with 
a minimum of interpretation. In the epilogue, however, an 
attempt is made to derive from the narrative the basic prin-
ciples of foreign policy. 
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PREVIOUS INVESTIGATORS 
To the writer's knowledge, there exists no history of 
TurkiJh foreign relations for this period. There are short 
partial accounts and important monographs; in addition, one 
comprehensive history of international relations deals with 
those Turkish questions which have had wide international 
significance. These three types of secondary sources will 
be discussed in turn. The innumerable books which have 
attempted to explain "the new Turkey" to the Western World in 
the last twenty-five years usually contain a chapter on foreign 
relations; but they usually repeat the same few well-known 
facts, and will not be mentioned here. Some of the better 
ones are listed in the bibliography. 
The Turks themselves have produced an abundant litera-
ture on their war of liberation and the social and economic 
revolution which followed; until now, they have written very 
little about their foreign relations after the Lausanne Con-
ference. However, the Turkish Historical Society is very 
active, and it is hoped that it will turn its attention in-
creasingly to the foreign affairs of the Republic. 
I. Partial Accounts 
( ) 
II r-1. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur , Yeni Turkiye Devletinin Harici 
Siyaseti {The Foreign Policy of the New Turkish State) 
(Istanbul, 1934), 163 p. 
Parts I and II cover the diplomacy of the Greek War 
and the Lausanne Conference. Part III, which interests us, 
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has only 25 pages, of which ten are devoted to the Mosul 
question, with all the Turkish arguments well arrayed. There 
is also mention of the principal treaties negotiated by Tur-
key, and brief notes on secondary topics such as the Aga 
Khan's letter and the flag of the Straits Commission. When 
Hikmet's book was reprinted in 1938, an analysis of the Mon-
treux Convention was added to the contents. 
0 • It " 2. Ali Kema~ Meram, Ismet Inonu ve Ikinci Cihan Harbi, Bu 
Harpte Turk Siyaseti (Ismet In~nn and the Second World 
War, Turkish Policy in this War) {Istanbul, 1945), 144 p. 
Meram's account is superficial, but his book is valu-
able because he inserted many of the Turkish President's war-
time speeches on foreign relations. 
II tt tt tt 3· Tevfik Ru,tu Aras, Goru,lerim (My Views) (Istanbul, 1945), 
152 P· 
Dr. Aras was the Turkish Foreign Minister from 1925 to 
1938. One used to Western ways would expect his views to be 
argued on the basis of events as he saw them. Instead we have 
an abstract discourse on peace and collective security which 
reveals very little. The Turks have yet to learn the profit-
able art of writing an "I-Was-There'' book after they have 
occupied an important post. 
4. ismet fnonu, article "Turkey," 10 Eventful Years, A Record 
of Events of the Years Preceding, Including and Following 
World War II, 1937 through 1946 (University of Chicago, 
1947), vol. IV, PP· 374-9. 
The Turkish President gives a brief but excellent 
factual account of his government's foreign relations during 
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this ten-year period. . " " President Inonu touches upon all the 
important topics, even those which may have been a source of 
embarrassment, and states the Turkish viewpoint. 
" " 5· Hans w. Hartmann, Die auswartige Politik der Turkei, 
1923-40 (Zurich, 1941}, 64·p. 
Unfortunately this work of the Swiss historian con-
tains less than fifty pages of text. It is a long essay 
rather than a history and deals in general terms with the 
National Pact, Lausanne, the Balkan and Middle Eastern En-
tentes, and the Montreux Convention. 
6. Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey, A Diplomatic 
History, 1913-1923 (University of Oklahoma, 1931), 486 p. 
In spite of the sub-title, Mr. Howard sketches the 
major developments which followed the Lausanne Treaty until 
1928. It is unfortunate that he did not write a sequel to 
this excellent work. 
" " 7· Gotthard Jaschke, Die Turkei in den Jahren 19 -1 41, ge-
schichtskalender mit personen- und sachregister Leipzig, 
1943), 194 P· 
" Jaschke's chronology is an exhaustive list ~f events 
affecting Turkey in every domain, at home and abroad. It 
contains source references and provides innumerable leads. 
II. Monographs 
1. Pieter E. J. Bomli, L'affaire de Mossoul (Amsterdam, 1929), 
252 P· 
Bomli reviews the whole Mosul case, as handled by the 
League Council, from the strictly juridical point of view. 
At the same time that he relates the developments of the 
case, he introduces the pertinent aspects of international 
law in connection with arbitration. He concludes that the 
League Council had no power to arbitrate, and that the Coun-
cil's decision was null and void. 
2. Stephen p. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, 
Greece and Turkey (New York, 1932), 849 p. 
This is probably the definitive work on the subject. 
Ladas' Greek sympathies appear in many places, but they do 
not prevent him from presenting all the facts available. 
The research is thorough, but the presentation might have 
been organized with more clarity. 
3· Theodore I. Geshkoff, Balkan Union, A Road to Peace in 
Southeastern Europe (New York, 1940), 345 p. 
Geshkoff tells the history of the Balkan Conferences, 
1930-34, and of the Balkan Entente during its first years. 
His sympathy for Bulgaria does not distort his viewpoint. 
X 
The materials have been well organized and are admirably pre-
sented. 
4. Robert J. Kerner and Harry N. Howard, The Balkan Confer-
ences and the Balkan Entente (University of California, 
1936), 271 P• 
This is a faithful but uncritical record of the Bal-
kan Conferences, leading to the formation of the Balkan En-
tente. The order of presentation is strictly chronological, 
and as a result the narrative is sometimes confused. 
5· South-eastern Europe, A Political and Economic Survey 
(2nd ed. London, 1939), 203 P· 
This is a study, by the Royal Institute of Interna-
xi 
tional Affairs, of the German political and economic penetra-
tion of the Balkan Peninsula. Each country is considered 
separately, and the amount of success in each is evaluated. 
III. Comprehensive Works 
1. Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs (Lon-
don) 
Toynbee deals brilliantly, in his monumental work, 
with some questions of interest to Turkey, such as the Lau-
sanne Conference, Russo-Turkish relations, the Balkan and 
Middle Eastern Ententes. The chapter on the Montreux Con-
vention is by D. A. Routh. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
THE LAUSANNE SETTLEMENT 
The World War of 1914-1918 reduced the Ottoman Empire 
to a Turkish national state. More than two-thirds of the 
former empire was amputated, leaving an area of less than 
300,000 square miles. A population of some 40,000,000 in-
habitants was reduced in the same ratio to about 12,000,000 
people. Furthermore, Turkish sovereignty in the remaining 
territory was curtailed more sharply than in the case of 
the other vanquished powers. The capitulations were re-
affirmed and extended. Great Britain, France and Italy 
awarded themselves zones of influence covering more than 
half of Anatolia; Greece was to administer the Smyrna area 
for five years, after which a plebiscite would decide whether 
it would become Greek, or revert to Turkey. The capital city 
of Constantinople was to remain under the nominal sovereignty 
of the Turks, provided they carried out the provisions of 
' the Sevres settlement to the satisfaction of the Allies. 
Of all the defeated powers Turkey alone challenged 
the peace terms that were being imposed on her at Paris. A 
1 
ttNational Pact, 11 prepared by Mustapha Kemal and his follow-
ers at Angora in 1919, and approved by the Constantinople 
1. Tarih (Istanbul, 1931), vol. IV, pp. 45-6; H. M. Davis, 
Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the 
Near and Middle East (Duke University, 1947), pp. 357-8. 
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Assembly in January 1920, outlined "the maximum of sacrifice" 
which was compatible with the survival of the Turkish nation. 
Kemal's goal was not the recovery of the lost territories, 
but the achievement of complete independence within the re-
maining Turkish state. Divisions among the Allied Powers, 
and a successful two-year war of liberation against the 
Greeks, 'enabled him to negotiate a new peace settlement at 
Lausanne in 1922-1923. The Treaty of Lausanne recognized 
the sovereignty of the Angora government within the national 
boundaries, with but a few minor limitations. 
Once independence was achieved at Lausanne, Kemal set 
out to organize his government and to transform his people 
along western lines. Angorabecame the official capital on 
October 13, 1923; the Republic was proclaimed October 29, 
and its constitution was adopted the following April. The 
caliphate was abolished in March 1924, and the house of Os-
man went into exile; this was but a prelude to the abolition 
of the religious orders in 1925, and to the separation of 
Church and State in 1928. New law codes, modelled on those 
of Western Europe, replaced the Koranic law in 1926. The 
Gregorian calendar was introduced in 1927. A campaign 
against illiteracy was sparked in 1928 by the adoption of 
the Latin alphabet. 
The Turks gained de jure sovereignty at Lausanne, but 
time and effort would be required to translate it into actual 
fact. Large -enterprises would have to be purchased from 
their foreign owners, and a national banking system would 
have to be developed. The trade balance, chronically un-
favorable by a ratio of almost two to one in the days of 
3 
the Ottoman Empire, had been further dislocated by the Greek 
war; in 1920-22, the value of imports was almost four times 
that of exports. The required financial and commercial 
restoration would have to be carried out by the Turkish 
people themselves, and not, as in Ottoman days, by European 
financiers and by the Empire's Greek, Armenian and Jewish 
minorities. 
What Kemal envisaged in 1923 was nothing less than 
the political, economic and social transformation of his 
country. The way to such a revolution was opened by the 
Treaty of Lausanne, which the Angora Government considered 
a fitting diplomatic complement to the war of liberation. 
As one of the Turkish advisers at Lausanne later wrote, 
nthis Treaty realized .... the principles laid down by Mustapha 
Kamal as early as 1919, and embodied in the National Pact 
which the Representative Assembly adopted at the beginning 
1 
of 1920." Let us now examine the international status 
which Turkey acquired at Lausanne. 
Actually, in the hard bargaining that went on at 
Lausanne for more than five months, the Turkish delegation 
yielded on certain points of the National Pact, in order to 
1. Y. Hikmet (Bayur), Yeni Turkiye Devletinin Haric1 
Siyaseti {Istanbul, 1934), p. 136. 
have its way in the fundamental question of the capitula-
tions. No plebiscites were held in Western Thrace and in 
the Arab regions of the former Ottoman Empire. When the 
Straits were demilitarized, the security of Constantinople 
was not effectively assured. Nevertheless, the Treaty of 
1 
Lausanne realized the two broad objectives of the National 
Pact: recovery of the ttottoman-Moslem" core of the former 
4 
Empire, and international recognition of full Turkish sover-
eignty within this national territory. 
All Anatolia was recovered: the Treaty made no men-
tion of an independent Armenia around Erzurum, of an inde-
pendent Kurdistan in the southeast, of a Greek administrative 
zone around Smyrna. The French and Italian zones of influ-
' ence, carved out at Sevres, were no more. Constantinople 
was recovered unconditionally, and the European boundary of 
Turkey was moved back to the Maritza. 
One territorial question, however, was left pending --
that of the Mosul Vilayet (province) in the Kurdish lands of 
the upper Tigris. During the first phase of the Lausanne 
Conference, Lord Curzon had claimed Mosul for the Kingdom of 
Iraq, while Ismet Pasha contended that it was still an in-
tegral part of Turkey. Both based their claims on political, 
historical, economic and ethnic arguments, supported by suit-
able sets of statistics. ''The British Government," added 
Lord Curzon, " .... defeated the Turkish forces and expelled 
1. Text: Recueil des Actes, Lausanne; Treaty proper, LNTS, 
XXVIII, pp. 12-113. 
1 
them from the entire area of Iraq and far beyond. 11 Inci-
dentally, he noted, "it is both a novel and a startling 
pretension that a Power which has been vanquished in war 
should dictate to the victors the manner in which they are 
to dispose of the territories which they have wrested from 
2 
the former. !I Ismet Pasha retorted that the Mosul Vilayet 
"was preserved from foreign military occupation until the 
conclusion of the armistice, and was, without any right, 
5 
partially occupied, like many other regions of Turkey, only 
3 
after the suspension of hostilities. 11 He demanded a pleb-
iscite in the disputed province. 
At the Conference session of January 23, 1923, it was 
obvious that the two points of view were irreconcilable. 
Lord Curzon wrote to the Secretary-General of the League of 
Nations on January 25, informing him that the dispute over 
the Turco-Iraqi border constituted a threat to peace. When 
the over-all negotiations neared the breaking point, on Feb-
ruary 4, the Turkish delegation reviewed its position in a 
memorandum to the principal Allied delegations: 
As regards the question of Mosul, we consider that it 
would be fitting for the sole purpose of assuring that 
this question shall not become an obstacle to the con-
clusion of peace, to exclude it from the programme of 
1. "Note to Ismet Pasha," Dec. 26, 1922, Cmd. 1814, p. 380. 
2. "Memorandum on Mosul," Dec. 14, 1922, Cmd. 1814, p. 370. 
3· "Reply to the British Memorandum regarding the Mosul ques-
tion," Dec. 23, 1922, Cmd. 1814, p. 379· When the Mudros 
Armistice was signed on October 30, 1918, the British 
forces occupied only the southern extremity of the Vilayet; 
subsequent occupation of the remainder could be justified 
by Art. 7, the security clause of the Armistice Agreement. 
the Conference, in order that it may, within the period 
of one year, be settled by common agreement between 
Great Britain and Turkey.l 
Lord Curzon agreed 11 to suspend the result of his appeal to 
2 
the League of Nations for a period of one year." 
After the break-up of the Conference on February 4, 
the Turkish National Assembly was convened to assess the 
situation and to give the Government further instructions. 
Mustapha Kemal told the Assembly: 
6 
It is essential not to discuss the temporary suspension 
of the Mosul question; we must obtain, surely and com-
pletely, the rights and the independence of the nation 
and the country in the administratiye, political, finan-
cial, economic and other questions.j 
4 
The official communique of March 6 defined the Ghazi's --
and the Assembly's -- policy: the Government was instructed 
to resume negotiations, to treat the Mosul question separ-
ately, and to press for recognition of Turkey's financial, 
economic and administrative independence in the forthcoming 
treaty. 
The Lausanne Conference reconvened on April 23, 1923, 
and during the second phase, the substantive question of 
Mosul was not discussed. Yet the wording of the article 
which was to be the basis for post-treaty negotiations was 
1. "Memorandum to the Presidents of the Britishl French and 
Italian delegations," Feb. 4, 1923, Cmd. 181LJ., p. 838. 
2. "British Secretary's Notes of Meeting'' Feb. 4, 1923, Cmd. 
1814, p. 843. 
3· M. Kemal, Nutuk, II, p. 209. 
4. Bulletin periodique, No. 26, p. 3· 
7 
cautiously debated for two months by the British and Turkish 
delegations. Article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne reads 
as follows: 
With Iraq: 
The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down 
in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey 
and Great Britain within nine months. 
In the event of no agreement being reached between the 
two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute 
shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. 
The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally under-
take that, pending the decision to be reached on the 
subject of the frontier, no military or other movement 
shall take place which might modify in any way the pres-
ent state of the territories of which the final fate 
will depend upon that decision."l 
On July 11, it was further agreed that the nine-month 
period allowed for bilateral negotiations would begin after 
the evacuation of Turkish territory by the Allied troops had 
been completed. 
The negotiators at Lausanne were aware that Balkan 
frontiers are apt to be considered as provisional by both 
neighbors. Wherever the line is drawn, important minorities 
remain on both sides, and these give rise to irredentist 
claims and border incidents. This is especially the case in 
Macedonia and Thrace. The problem of the Greek and Turkish 
populations was magnified by the presence of large minori-
ties far from the Thracian border, such as the Moslems of 
Macedonia and Epirus, and the Greek Orthodox of Constanti-
nople and Asia Minor. The Turks were especially anxious to 
remove all ethnographic basis for the rebirth of the Greek 
1. LNTS, XXVIII, p. 17; Recueil des Actes,Lausanne, p. 7· 
megali idea in Asia Minor. 
On January 30, 1923, the Turkish and Greek delega-
tions signed a "Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek 
1 
and Turkish Populations." Inasmuch as religion had been 
8 
the sole criterion of nationality in the Ottoman Empire, the 
Convention provided that "Turkish nationals of the Greek 
Orthodox religion" would be transferred to Greece, while 
"Greek nationals of the Moslem religion" would be removed to 
Turkey. Two groups were excepted: the Greek Orthodox es-
tablished in Constantinople before October 30, 1918, and the 
Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace. A mixed commission of 
four Greek, four Turkish and three neutral members would be 
created to supervise the transfer and settle property ques-
tions. A separate nDeclaration relating to Moslem Property 
2 
in Greece," extended the property settlement to Turkish 
and Greek nationals not included in the transfer. 
There was a recent precedent for a population ex-
change; in 1919, Greece and Bulgaria had negotiated a con-
vention which provided for a similar migration. But the 
Greco-Bulgarian transfer had been optional; some 30,000 
Greeks and 50,000 Bulgarians had elected to migrate, and the 
minority problem remained. The Lausanne Convention called 
for a compulsory exchange. Such a mass transplantation of 
people was sharply criticized at the time on humanitarian 
1. LNTS, XXXII, pp. 75-87; Recueil des Actes Lausanne, pp. 
99-105. 
2. Recueil des Aetas, Lausanne, pp. 115-16. 
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grounds; the leaders at Athens and Angora hoped that it 
might be a humanitarian measure in the long· run, if it only 
helped to end the long-standing Greco-Turkish feud. 
The Lausanne settlement reached back beyond the war 
period, 'tlhich for Turkey had begun in 1911. "Centuries-old 
accounts were examined," remarked Kamal; "to find our way 
through such old, disordered and dusty accounts was certainly 
1 
no simple and easy matter... One centuries-old account was 
the capitulations. Article 6 of the National Pact ends with 
a sweeping demand, and an implied promise:: "We are opposed 
to restrictions inimical to our development in political, 
judicial, financial, and other matters. The conditions of 
the settlement of our proved debts shall likewise not be 
contrary to these principles." The abolition of all capitu-
lations, the most emphatic demand of the Turkish delegation 
at Lausanne, was made more palatable to the capitulatory 
Powers by a general acknowledgment of responsibility for 
the debts of the Ottoman regime. 
During the last year of the World War, Germany had 
promised her Ottoman ally that she would "not sign a peace 
treaty which reintroduced the capitulations," if she and 
her allies were victorious and "in a position to impose 
2 
their terms on the belligerents." The Treaty of Sevres not 
only restored the capitulatory regime, but it extended it to 
1. M. Kemal, Nutuk, II, p. 194. 
2. Text: L'Europe Nouvelle, August 17, 1929, p. xxv. 
10 
the Allied Powers which had not previously enjoyed capitula-
tory privileges in the Ottoman Empire. 
The paramount importance which Mustapha Kemal attached 
to the question of the capitulations is revealed throughout 
the Lausanne negotiations; as we have already noted, even 
the Mosul question was considered secondary in comparison. 
As the Ghazi later explained, the draft treaty presented to 
Ismet Pasha on January 30, 1923, with a four-day ultimatum, 
was rejected because "it contained conditions which, liter-
ally and by inference, were contrary to our independence. 
The judicial, financial and economic clauses, especially, 
I 
were inacceptable.n And the official communique of March 6, 
1923, ·maintained, as a basis for further negotiations, "the 
complete and sure recognition of the vital and autonomous 
rights of the nation and the country in financial, economic 
2 
and administrative matters." 
Article 28 of the Treaty of Lausanne met the Turkish 
demand completely: ''Each of the High Contracting Parties 
hereby accepts, in so far as it is concerned, the complete 
3 
abolition of the Capitulations in Turkey in every respect." 
Three temporary restrictions to this full sovereignty, how-
ever, were introduced in annexed acts. Two were judicial in 
nature: foreign tribunals would continue to have jurisdiction 
1. M. Kemal, Nutuk, II, P• 207. 
2. Bulletin periodique, No. 26, p. 3· 
3· LNTS, XXVIII, p. 27; Recueil des Actes,Lausanne, p. 12. 
11 
over their respective non-Moslem nationals, "in matters of 
personal status, succession and family law in general," for 
1 
a period of seven years, by which time the Turkish courts 
were expected to be in step with modern civil law; and the 
Minister of Justice was compelled to take foreign legal ex-
perts, in an advisory capacity only, for a period of five 
2 
years. The third limitation was economic: Turkey was to 
apply to imports from the countries of the other signatory 
Powers, for a period of five years, "the tariff rates which 
3 
came into operation on the 1st September, 1916." After the 
lapse of these three agreements, Turkish judicial and econo-
mic independence would be complete. 
Another 11 dusty" account examined at Lausanne was the 
Ottoman Public Debt. The Debt had been a distinctive fea-
ture of Ottoman and European politics since the Crimean war, 
and a matter of international control since the Muharrem De-
cree of 1881. In 1875, the interest on the Debt had amounted 
to 75% of the normal annual income of the Ottoman Empire. 
The Ottoman Debt Administration had become a sizable, if not 
productive, institution; in 1911, it numbered 8,931 employ-
4 
ees, as compared with 5,472 for the Ministry of Finance. 
1. "Convention respecting Conditions of Residence and Business 
and Jurisdiction," LNTS, XXVIII, pp. 151-69 
2. "Declaration relating to the Administration of Justice," 
LNTS, XXXVI, pp. 161-65. 
3· "Commercial Convention," 1!IT§.., XXVIII, pp. 171-95· 
4. L'intervention de l'Etat dans 1 1Economie 
Notes docurnen aires et tudes. No. 9 5· 
12 
Much of the State revenue -- taxes on tobacco and salt, a 
part of the customs receipts -- was mortgaged for payments, 
and collected directly by the foreign-staffed Debt Commission. 
The Angora Government was willing to negotiate payment of the 
Debt, as a means of obtaining the removal of foreign economic 
control. 
1 
The Treaty of Lausanne reaffirmed the principle, em-
bodied in Article 240 of the Treaty of Sevres, that the 
States which had acquired sovereignty over portions of former 
Ottoman territory after October 17, 1912, were responsible 
for a corresponding share of the Ottoman Public Debt as it 
2 
existed prior to the wars which resulted in that acquisition. 
The extent of each State's liability was to be determined by 
the value of the territory it had acquired in terms of the 
state revenue it had yielded in proportion to the total re-
venue of the Empire; the financial years 1910-11 and 1911-12 
were to be used as a norm. Within three months from the com-
ing into force of the Treaty, a Council of the Ottoman Public 
Debt was to determine the annual charges payable by each 
State. Once the annuities were determined, the Ottoman Debt 
Commission would undertake the more involved task of deter-
mining the amount of the Debt still outstanding, which it was 
to distribute among the States according to the same ratios. 
The general principles agreed upon at Lausanne pro-
vided a basis for the eventual settlement of the Ottoman 
1. Articles 46-57 pertain to the Ottoman Debt: LNTS, XXVIII, 
pp. 36-51; Recueil des Actes, pp. 17 sq. 
2. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes disclaimed 
responsibility, and did not sign the Treaty. 
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Public Debt; their application, however, was to require much 
hard bargaining between Turkey, the major debtor, and the 
representatives of the creditors. Nevertheless, the attitude 
of the Angora Government, which contrasted with that of its 
Soviet friend, promoted a certain measure of good-will in 
Western Europe, and strengthened the position of the Turkish 
Delegation in the overall negotiation of the Treaty. 
The question of the Turkish Straits was settled to the 
1 
full satisfaction of Great Britain. The area was demilitar-
ized, and new regulations governing traffic were to be enforced 
by an international Straits Commission: freedom of navigation, 
and the security of the demilitarized zones, were guaranteed 
by the signatory Powers, and specifically by France, Great 
Britain, Italy and Japan. Commercial ships could pass freely, 
Turkey having the right to search neutral ships only in time 
of war, and if she herself were a belligerent. Warships also 
had free access to the Black Sea: any power could send into 
the latter a fleet equal to the largest Black Sea Power. In 
time of war, Turkey being neutral, these limitations did not 
apply to belligerents, who had full belligerent rights in 
the Black Sea, though there were to be no hostilities in the 
Straits Area. Of course, if Turkey were a belligerent, she 
could apply any measures she wished against enemy ships, but 
neutral warships had the same rights as in peacetime. 
1. "Convention relating to the Regime of the Straits," LNTS, 
XXVIII, pp. 115-137; Recueil des Aetas Lausanne, pp. 59-70. 
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The Lausanne Straits Convention was an endorsement of 
the British view that the Straits are an international water-
way, and the Black Sea a part of the high seas. The Soviet 
delegates had upheld the sovereign rights of Turkey over the 
Straits, and the special interests of the littoral Powers of 
the Black Sea. Russia, whose Black Sea power had disappeared 
as a result of war, revolution and intervention, wanted the 
Straits closed at all times to all but Turkish warships; 
Allied support of Denikin and Wrangel was a matter of recent 
memory. The Western naval Powers, on the other hand, did 
not want the Black Sea eventually to become a Russian lake, 
while Rumania and Bulgaria wanted Western fleets around as a 
protection against Russia. 
When the Turkish Delegation accepted the British 
draft convention, the Russians may well have been discon-
certed: in Article 5 of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of 1921, 
the Angora Government had agreed "to entrust the final elabo-
ration of an international agreement concerning the Black Sea 
1 
to a conference composed of delegates of the littoral States." 
Russian Foreign Minister Chicherin protested that the Conven-
tion was being "imposed, n and he warned: "Under these con-
ditions there cannot be any decision in the Straits question. 
There is none and there will not be any without Russia, the 
Ukraine and Georgia. If the Convention is signed without 
Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia, the latter will retain an 
1. H. M. Davis, Constitutions, pp. 371-72. 
1 
entirely free hand and complete liberty of action.'·' The 
U.s.s.R. never ratified the Lausanne Convention. 
The British were doubly pleased with the Straits 
settlement. They had "achieved their own solution of that 
2 
15 
world problem," and they were confident that they had drawn 
Turkey out of the I\ us sian orbit. "The incident, '1 wrote 
A. J. Toynbee, " .... was an indication that relations between 
3 
Russia and Turkey were returning to their traditional lines .. , 
But there was still the Mosul question. 
1. Cmd. 1814, p. 456. 
2. H. N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey (u. of Oklahoma, 
1931), P· 345. 
3· Survey for 1920-1923, p. 376. 
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PART I 
FROM ISOLATION TO LEAGUE MEMBERSHIP 
1923-1932 
CHAPTER 1 
FORCED ISOLATION, 1923-28 
a. The Mosul Question 
b. Turkey and the Soviets' Asiatic Policy 
c. France and Syria 
d. The Exchange of Populations 
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a. THE MOSUL QUESTION 
Immediately after the Allied evacuation of Con-
stantinople, in October 1923, the Turkish and British 
Governments opened direct negotiations, through their 
regular diplomatic representatives, to arrive at an ami-
cable settlement of the Mosul question. Seven months later, 
no progress had been made; it was decided to hold a confer-
ence, in order to reach an agreement before the stipulated 
nine-month period. 
The conference met for the first time at Constanti-
nople, on May 19, 1924. If the Turks expected the British 
delegation, representing a Labor government, to be more 
conciliatory than the Conservative Lord Curzon had been at 
Lausanne, they were in for an unpleasant surprise. Sir 
Percy Cox claimed for Iraq, not only the entire Mosul dis-
trict, but also part of the Hakkari Vilayet to the North. 
Since the negotiations were interrupted at Lausanne, 
a problem which has gained greatly in importance in the 
eyes of Hfs Majesty's Government, is the future of the 
Assyrians other than those of Persian origin ... They 
have made a strong appeal, which His Majesty's Govern-
ment cannot view with indifference, to be settled in 
their ancient home under a British protectorate."2 
The Turkish delegate, Fethi Bey, was unwilling and unauthor-
ized to discuss this additional British claim; he pointed 
1. The name "Assyrian" was used after the World War to 
designate the Nestorian Christians settled in Kurdistan, 
north of ancient Assyria. 
2. La question de Mossoul (Constantinople, 1925), p. 183. 
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out that the concern of the British Government for a Chris-
tian minority should not prejudice the interests of the 
Moslem majority. Trying to bring back the discussion to the 
single issue of Mosul, he reaffirmed Ismet's stand at Lau-
sanne that "the Mosul Vilayet, although under the provisional 
1 
occupation of Great Britain, is juridically a part of Turkey.u 
The contending parties were farther apart than ever. 
The Turkish delegate expressed doubt that the provisions of 
Article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne still applied as a 
basis for settlement. When Sir Percy Cox declared, on June 
5, that he would refer the question to the League Council 
immediately upon expiration of the nine-month period, Fethi 
Bey stated that 
when she agreed to submit the dispute to the arbitration 
of the League of Nations, Turkey never undertook to be 
exposed to unlimited territorial claims. Therefore, she 
could not agree to discussion, in the midst of the 
League of Nations, of any question ~hich was not en-
visaged by Article 3 of the Treaty. 
The conference broke up the same day. 
Great Britain's unusual intractability was not due 
only to the potential oil resources of the disputed vilayet, 
nor to its strategic value in relation to Soviet Russia. 
The Mosul question had become a test of Britain's fidelity 
to the interests of the Arab Middle East, which she now 
controlled. British authority in Iraq itself had been 
1. La question de Mossoul, (Constantinople, 1925), pp. 187, 
194. 
2. Ibid., p. 194. 
seriously challenged by the insurrection of 1920. The 
treaty of alliance of October 10, 1922 had been overwhelm-
20 
ingly rejected by the Iraqis; and now, belatedly, on June 
10, 1924, the Iraqi Constituent Assembly ratified the same 
treaty, with the specific reservation that the ratification 
would be invalid if Britain failed "to safeguard the rights 
of Iraq in the Mosul Vilayet in its entirety." 1 
On August 6, 1924, one month after the expiration of 
the nine-month period stipulated for direct negotiations, 
the British Government asked the Secretary-General of the 
League of Nations to enter the following item on the League 
Council's agenda for the next session: 11Frontier of Iraq. 
Article 3 (2) of the Treaty signed at Lausanne, on 24 July 
2 
1923. ,, 
The Council first considered the question at its 30th 
session, on September 20. Both sides stated their cases 
briefly, and it was apparent, as it had been at Constanti-
nople, that they disagreed as to the extent of the disputed 
territory. The British delegate, Lord Parrnoor, contended 
that the Council was called upon to determine the northern 
frontier of Iraq, regardless of the traditional boundaries 
of the Mosul Vilayet; the latter belonged to Iraq and was 
not even mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne; the line could 
be drawn well to the north. Fethi Bey, the Turkish 
1. Quoted by A. J. Toynbee, Survey for 1925, vol. I, p. 469. 
2. LNOJ, October 1924, p. 1465. 
representative, maintained that the Vilayet alone was at 
stake; the minutes of the Lausanne conference mentioned no 
1 
other territory. At the next meeting, on September 25, 
21 
the issue was further entangled with a procedural disagree-
ment: Lord Parmoor pledged his Government to acceptance of 
the Council's decision, which would be an arbitral sentence; 
according to Fethi Bey, the dispute was being referred to 
the League Council in terms of Article 15 of the League 
Covenant, which outlines the conciliatory procedures to be 
2 
followed by the Council. 
The rapporteur, Mr. Branting, mediated, and by Sep-
tember 30, the Turkish delegate had been won over to the 
British point of view. That day, Fethi Bey stated before 
the Council: 
The British Government does in fact bind itself to recog-
nize the right of the Council to draw the frontier be-
tween Turkey and Iraq on any line that it thinks fit to 
adopt. Under these conditions, I agree that the question 
should be laid before the Council in the form just in-
dicated by Lord Parmoor. 
Mr. Branting's motion, which was accepted by Fethi Bey, and 
voted by the Council, referred to 
the statements of the representatives of the British 
and Turkish Governments, who undertook on behalf of 
their respective Governments to accept in advance the 3 decision of the Council on the question referred to it. 
1. LNOJ, October 1924, pp. 1318-24. 
2. Ibid., pp. 1337-39· 
3· Ibid., pp. 1359-60. 
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Mr. Branting's motion also called upon the Council to 
appoint a three-man commission of inquiry. This special 
commission was to 
lay before the Council all information and all sugges-
tions which may be of a nature to assist it in reaching 
a decision. It shall give due consideration to the 
existing documents and to the views expressed by the 
interested parties both as regards the procedure and 
as regards the substance of the question ... It may pro-
ceed to investigations on the spot ... 
The parties in dispute were again pledged to observe the 
1 
status quo. 
Meanwhile the status quo was the object of conflict-
ing interpretations by the border troops themselves. The 
Turkish authorities maintained their contention that the 
Mosul Vilayet alone was being disputed, and Turkish troops 
moved into villages to the North of the Vilayet which until 
now had not been occupied by either side. The British com-
mander, charging a violation of the status quo, issued a 
48-hour ultimatum on October 9· Hostilities were avoided, 
however, and an extraordinary session of the League Council 
was called at Brussels to deal with the problem. 
A new question had arisen: What was the status quo· 
that both sides had agreed to respect? The information vol-
unteered by the contending parties was conflicting, and it 
would have been impossible to determine the frontier condi-
tions as they had been when the Treaty of Lausanne was 
signed. The Council, on October 29, drew a provisional line, 
1. LNOJ, October 1924, p. 1360. 
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the '1Brussels Line, 11 which represented a compromise between 
the rival claims. Mr. Branting's report stressed the provi-
sional character of the line: 
It must be clearly understood ... that the object of this 
decision is merely to regulate a provisional situation 
so that order and peace may be maintained during an in-
terim period. Neither the solution of the problem of 
the final frontier between Turkey and Iraq nor the pro-
cedure by which the solution is to be reached should be 
in any way affected thereby. I would propose that the 
special Commission which is to report to the Council on 
the main question should be given explicit instructions 
on this point.l 
Once again, both sides agreed to observe the status quo. 
The Commission appointed October 31, 1924 by the Coun-
cil, comprised Mr. E. de Wirsen, of Sweden, Count Paul Teleki, 
of Hungary, and Colonel A. Paulis, of Belgium. It gathered 
documentary evidence at Geneva, London, Angora and Bagdad, 
then spent six weeks in the Mosul area in February and March, 
2 
1925. Its report was presented to the League Secretariat 
on July 16, 1925. 
The Commission agreed with the British view that a 
plebiscite in this particular area was out of the question. 
After reviewing the juridical and political aspects of the 
question, it offered the following conclusions: 
1. Juridically, the disputed territory must be consid-
ered as an integral part of Turkey, as lon~ as the 
latter power does not renounce its rights {part VI). 
1. LNOJ, November 1924, p. 1659· 
2. Report submitted to the Council 
tuted b the Council R~solution 
League of Nations Document, c. 
2. Considering only the interests of the inhabitants, 
it appears advisable not to partition the territory 
(part VII). 
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3· Certain important factors, especially economic and 
geographic, would make it advisable to award to Iraq 
all terri tory south of the 'Brussels Line,' provided: 
1) the League Mandate is continued for the period of 
25 years; 2) some administrative and cultural auton-
omy is granted the Kurdish element (part VII). 
4. If these two conditions are not fulfilled, it would 
be better that the area remain under Turkish sover-
eignty. In this case, however, the Diala region in 
the far south should go to Iraq, being necessary for 
the latter's water supply (part VII). 
The Commission deemed that "it was not competent to 
evaluate the juridical factor; it will be up to the Council 
to determine its importance." (Part VI.) It did not feel 
called upon to recommend one single conclusion, but to offer 
the Council a choice of possible solutions. 
In this way, the Commission's report furnished each 
contending party with its future line of argument. The new 
Turkish Foreign Minister, Dr. Tevfik Ru~tu, stood on the 
Commission's clear juridical conclusion: Turkish sovereignty 
over Mosul had never ceased, and it could not cease unless 
Turkey voluntarily ceded the vilayet. The British Under-
Secretary for Colonies, Mr. Amery, on the other hand, stressed 
the interest of the population concerned in the continuation 
of British protection. 
At the 35th session of the League Council, on Septem-
ber 3, 1924, Mr. Amery declared: 
His Majesty's Government is prepared bef.ore the expira-
tion in 1928 of the present (British-Iraqi) Treaty, which 
was formally approved last year by the Council, to give 
effect to the provision contained in the Protocol of 
25 
that Treaty by replacing it by a treaty of longer dura-
tion, which will safeguard throughout the Kingdom of 
Iraq those conditions of stable government and reason-
able consideration for local interests subject to which 
the Commissioners consider that the territory south of 
the 'Brussels Line' should continue in its present union 
with Iraq. In this matter, His Majesty's Government 
can speak not only for itself but for the Parliament 
and Government of Iraq, from whose Prime Minister I 
have, in the last twenty-four hours, received the follow-
ing resolution: 'The Iraqi nation, represented by its 
Chamber of Deputies, declares its strong friendship for 
Great Britain, and expresses its desire to remain her 
ally after the present treaty expires.' 
Conceding that pending the Council's decision, legal sover-
eignty over the disputed territory, 11 in the strictly tech-
nical sense, rt might remain Turkish, Mr. Amery contended that 
the Treaty of Lausanne, and Turkish acceptance of arbitra-
tion on September 30, 1924, gave the Council power to trans-
1 
fer that legal sovereignty. 
The following day, on September 4, a special commit-
tee was appointed to study the report, in conjunction with 
the British and Turkish delegates, and to propose a final 
solution. Dr. Ru~tu offered to propose to his Government 
the cession of the Diala region to Iraq, as recommended by 
the Commission, if the Mosul vilayet were to remain Turkish. 
When the British rejected the offer, the Turkish representa-
tive indicated that Turkey might not accept the Council's 
decision. His stand was categorical at the Council session 
of September 19: 
My view as to the task undertaken by the Council is per-
fectly clear. At the time of the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Lausanne, the questions on which powers were 
relegated to the Council irrespective of its powers under 
1. LNOJ, October 1925, pp. 1311-14. 
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the Covenant have been clearly indicated in the relevant 
articles of the Treaty --Articles 44, 48 and 107. 
As for the Mosul Question, the statements made by Lord Cur-
zon at Lausanne were inconsistent with an arbitral sentence 
1 
by the Council. 
The procedural question of the Council's powers 
would have to be clarified once more. On a motion presented 
by the Chairman of the Special Committee, Mr. Unden, the 
Council voted to ask the Permanent Court of International 
Justice for an opinion on the following questions: 
1. What is the character of the decision to be taken by 
the Council, in virtue of Article 3, paragraph 2, of 
the Treaty of Lausanne -- is it an arbitral award, 
a recommendation, or a simple mediation? 
2. Must the decision be unanimous or may it be taken by 
a majority? May the representatives of the inter-
ested parties take part in the vote?2 
The Court met in extraordinary session in October, 
and invited both parties to be represented. The Turkish 
Foreign Minister refused in the following terms: 
... the powers conferred upon the Council in the Mosul 
dispute by the definitive text of Article 3 of the 
Treaty of Lausanne, and by the previous statements of 
the late Lord Curzon, which led Turkey to accept this 
Article, preclude all possibility of arbitration.3 
1. LNOJ, October 1925, p. 1380. At Lausanne, Lord Curzon 
had urged the Turks to submit the Mosul dispute to the 
League Council; he had tried to dispel their suspicions 
with the statement that "Article 5 of the Covenant pro-
vides that the decision of the Council upon which the 
Turkish Government will be represented will have to be 
unanimous, so that no decision can be arrived at without 
its consent. 11 Session of Jan. 23, 1923, Cmd 1814, p. 401. 
2. Ibid., p. 1377· 
3· Telegram sent October 8, 1925. Text: 
November 28, 1925, p. 1608. 
L'Europe Nouvelle, 
The Turkish Government furnished the Court with documents; 
but its participation in the Court's, and the League Coun-
cil's, activities until the final outcome was no longer 
active. The Turkish attitude appears to have been that 
Turkish sovereignty over Mosul being generally recognized, 
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active participation in future debates would be interpreted 
as an admission that their rights over Mosul could be open 
to question. In retrospect, this attitude appears to have 
prejudiced their cause; at the Hague and at Geneva, the 
British point of view will be practically unopposed. 
On November 21, the Court announced its opinion: 
1. That the 'decision to be taken' by the Council of the 
League of Nations in virtue of Article 3, paragraph 
2, of the Treaty of Lausanne will be binding on the 
parties and will constitute a definitive determina-
tion of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq; 
2. That the 'decision to be taken' must be taken by a 
unanimous vote, the representatives of the Parties 
taking part in the voting, but their votes not bein! 
counted in ascertaining whether there is unanimity. 
The Court's opinion was considered by the League 
Council on December 8, and adopted. Mr. Amery reaffirmed 
his Government's acceptance of the Council's arbitration. 
Foreign Minister RU~tU stayed away from the meeting; his 
deput~Munir Bey, stated that the Council's assumption of 
an arbitral function brought the powers of the Turkish Dele-
gation to an end, and that the matter now lay with the Turk-
2 
ish National Assembly. 
1. LNOJ, February 1926, p. 121. 
2. Ibid., p. 128. 
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Despite the abstention of the Turkish Delegation, the 
Council was having difficulty in attaining the required 
unanimity. The London Times reflected the impatience of the 
British Government: 
There are constant private meetings and discussions be-
tween the three members of the Iraq Sub-Committee and 
other members of the Council. Occasionally Mr. Amery 
appears before the Sub-Committee, but the Turkish dele-
gates have steadily refused to do so. There are no new 
arguments and unceasing discussions seem only to induce 
irresolution.l 
There was a new argument, however, presented in the 
Laidoner Report and the Laidoner Memorandum. General 
Laidoner, an Esthonian, was the head of a League Commission 
of Inquiry which had investigated conditions along the Brus-
sels Line during the month of November. His investigation 
had been confined to the Iraqi side of the line, the Turkish 
Government having refused to permit an inquiry to the north, 
that territory, in their view, being outside the disputed 
zone. In his Report, presented December 10, General Laidoner 
dismissed the charges and counter-charges of border viola-
tion, but, he added, 
the question of the deportation of Christians is infin-
itely more important, for these deportations are causing 
fairly serious and easily comprehensible agitation and 
nervousness among the Christian population living south 
of the Brussels Line and in the Vilayet of Mosul, and 
also among the Moslem population of Mosul which favours 
the claims of Iraq.2 
The Turkish authorities were charged with the mass deportation 
1. The Times, December 15, 1925. 
2. Text: LNOJ, February 1926, pp. 302-5. 
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towards the interior of the Assyrian-Christian population 
settled near the border, in anticipation of hostilities over 
1 
Mosul. A supplementary Memorandum, forwarded to the League 
Council on December 14, was a still more damaging indictment: 
it was a detailed account, gathered from the refugees con-
centrated in Iraq, of atrocities committed across the border. 
The argument had lost none of its effectiveness since the 
days of Gladstone; the Council attained unanimity. 
The following day, December 15, Sir Austen Chamberlain 
read to the Council a telegram stating that the British Gov-
ernment was ready to extend its Iraq mandate for a period of 
25 years, and to conclude with Turkey the economic agreements 
2 
which the Council was to recommend. Mr. Amery assured the 
Council that the new Iraqi treaty could be negotiated within 
six months. 
The Council's decision was rendered December 16. The 
rapporteur, Mr. Unden, reviewed the political conclusions of 
the Commission's report; the juridical conclusion was not 
mentioned. He then proposed the following motion: that the 
Brussels Line be declared the frontier between Turkey and 
Iraq; that Great Britain be invited to submit to the Council, 
within six months, a new treaty with Iraq, extending the man-
date for 25 years; that the Council be advised of the measures 
1. Text: LNOJ, February 1926, pp. 305-8. 
2. Le Temps (Paris), December 17, 1925. 
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taken to provide the Kurds with administrative autonomy; 
and finally, that Great Britain take into account the sug-
gestions made by the Commission, and designed to appease 
the various racial elements of the vilayet. The motion was 
1 
voted unanimously. 
The Turkish Delegation stayed away from this final 
meeting, but in a message to the President of the Council, 
Tevfik RUstu reaffirmed his stand: he stated that 
J 
the sovereign rights of a state over a territory can 
only come to an end with its consent, and that there-
fore our sovereign rights over the whole of the Vilayet 
of Mosul remain intact.2 
He left immediately for Paris where Chicherin awaited him. 
On January 15, 1926, Great Britain and Iraq concluded 
3 
a new treaty which prolonged the mandate for 25 years, un-
less Iraq were admitted to League membership in the meantime; 
the Treaty was ratified by the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies 
on January 18, and by the British House of Commons one month 
later. On March 11, the British Government submitted the 
Treaty to the League Council's approval, and presented a 
memorandum on the status of Kurdish administrative autonomy. 
The Council declared its decision of December 16, 1925 to be 
definitive. Again refusing to attend the Council meeting, 
the Turkish Foreign Minister had wired that "the question 
1. LNOJ, February 1926, pp. 191-2. 
2 .. l.t"trl91 , p. 187• 
3· LNTS, XiLVII, pp. 420-430. 
1 
was not merely not decided but was left open." 
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The debate was over, and the question now was whether 
the Turkish Government would try to take Mosul by force. 
The Turkish press had repeatedly threatened that an adverse 
decision would mean war. The London Times considered hos-
tilities possible, if not probable: 
with every allowance for 'bluff' and for the exaggera-
tion of Oriental rumour, there are grounds for the 
belief that military preparations have been made which 
suggest some intention of forcibly challenging an un-
favorable arbitration.2 
The Turkish Budget presented to the National Assembly on 
March. 1, 1926, provided for a 47% increase for National De-
3 
fence over the preceding year. 
Mr. Amery doubted that Turkey would go to war for 
Mosul: "Turkey needs peace as much as we do. The Angora 
Government has thus far followed a systematic policy de-
signed to modernize Turkey, and another war would be disas-
4 
trous." He was right. During the Lausanne Conference, 
Mustapha Kemal had not allowed discussion of the Mosul ques-
tion to jeopardize the settlement of the more vital issues; 
it was unlikely that, at this time, he would throw the hard-
won Treaty of Lausanne into the balance even for Mosul. 
Furthermore, the prospects of a Turkish victory were not 
bright in the winter of 1925-6; Turkey's diplomatic situation 
1. LNOJ, April 1926, p. 503, note 1. 
2. The Times, December 3, 1925. 
3· Bulletin S6riodique, no. 46, p. 14. 
£T43,058, 74 ( 1925) and {T63,616,605 
4. Le Temps (Paris), December 13, 1925. 
The amounts were 
( 1926) . 
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was worse than it had been since 1921. The new French High-
Commissioner in Syria, Mr. Henri de Jouvenel, had visited 
London in November; the Times had reported: 
A complete agreement has been reached between the Brit-
ish and French Governments on the policy to be pursued 
in the mandated territories in the Near East ... On 
questions concerning the mandated territories, the two 
Governments will present a common front. The phrase is 
now current in French Circles that 'there will be no 
more Chanaks. 11 
Italy was collaborating with Great Britain in Ethiopia; 
Italian naval manoeuvres off the island of Rhodes were omin-
ous, and in the event of war between Turkey and Great Brit-
ain, Mussolini might try another ucorfu.n Greece was still 
smarting under the expulsion of the Patriarch, and the Pan-
gales regime was openly hostile. The Allied coalition, 
whose break-up had served the Kemalist regime so well, 
showed signs of reforming. Finally, Great Britain had the 
advantage of occupying the disputed territory; it would take 
an invasion to dislodge her, and that invasion would cer-
2 
tainly be declared an aggression by the League of Nations. 
At the last League Council meeting on Mosul, immedi-
ately after the award, the President recommended that the 
1. The Times, December 4, 1925. "Chanak11 was a reference to 
the precarious position of the Allied occupation troops 
when the Turkish Nationalist army advanced towards the 
Straits in September 1922, after the Greek rout. 11 Chanak 11 
had been made possible by the lack of solidarity among 
the British, French, Italian and Greek Governments. 
2. The League's prestige was probably at its height in De-
cember 1925; the Council had arbitrated the Greek-Bul-
garian conflict on December 14, and the Mosul question 
two days later. 
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two Parties "reach friendly agreements in order to put an 
end to the regrettable state of tension existing between them 
owing to the dispute." Sir Austen Chamberlain assured the 
Council that the British Government wished very much to en-
tertain peaceful and friendly relations with the Turkish 
Government: 
The Council having given its decision, His Majesty's 
Government will gladly lend themselves to conversations 
with the Government of the Republic of Turkey in order 
to see whether while taking due account of the Council's 
decision, it may not be possible to render the relations 
between our two countries easier and safer. 
On December 22, Prime Minister Baldwin made the first 
gesture by having a conversation with the Turkish Ambassa-
dor. In January 1926, the negotiations proper began between 
the British Ambassador in Angora, Sir Ronald Lindsey, and 
2 
the Turkish Foreign Minister. The Treaty of June 5, 1926, 
signed by Iraq as well as Great Britain, shows to what extent 
Turkey desired to liquidate the Mosul issue, and to have 
peace on the Iraqi border. In return for slight modifica-
tions of the Brussels Line in her favor, and 10% of the roy-
alties derived from the Mosul oil production for 25 years --
or a cash settlement of £500,000 sterling -- she recognized 
the frontier line as "definitive and inviolable,tt and under-
took "to make no attempt to alter it." The Treaty estab-
lished a mixed Permanent Border Commission intended to prevent 
1. LNOJ, February 1926, p. 193· 
2. LNTS, LXIV, PP· 379-395· 
those frontier incidents which perennially plagued the rela-
tions between the Middle Eastern States. In submitting the 
Treaty for ratification to a glum National Assembly on June 
7, Foreign Minister Rli~tU explained that Turkey accepted 
the loss of Mosul in order to "secure the peace of the Near 
East, to contribute to the welfare of Iraq, and to resume 
1 
normal relations with Britain. 11 
The Mosul question was closed. While the political 
leaders of the West hailed the Council's decision as a vic-
tory for the League of Nations, international jurists ques-
tioned its validity. Pro~essor Louis Lefur, of the Paris 
Faculty of Law, notes a major contradiction throughout the 
League's treatment of the substantive question: the special 
Commission recognized the persistence of Turkish sovereignty 
over Mosul, declared that this sovereignty could not cease 
unless renounced by Turkey, yet it recommended, among other 
solutions, the transfer of that sovereignty by Council ac-
tion. This contradictory view was adopted in turn by the 
2 
special Committee, and by the League Council. The Dutch 
jurist, Pieter E. J. Bomli, believes that from the point of 
view of law, 
the Council's decision, considered as an arbitral sen-
tence, is null and void ... In that case, the present 
territorial sovereignty of Iraq over the Mosul vilayet 
1. L'Asie Fran9aise, June-July 1926, p. 225. 
2. L. Lefur, L'affaire de Mossoul (Paris, 1927), pp. 48-
49. 
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1 
rests solely on the treaty of cession of June 5, 1926. 
The relations of the Turkish Government with Great 
Britain, after the June Treaty, were correct, but not cor-
dial. The Turkish press, on the other hand, reflected the 
distrust and resentment reserved for a major enemy. Britain 
had seized the major portion of the Ottoman Empire's Asiatic 
possessions; she had supported the Greek invasion; she had 
obtained practical control of the Straits -- and now Mosul! 
The anti-British feeling was sometimes couched in Soviet 
terminology, and Britain was represented as "the champion 
of imperialism and capitalism against the rights of peoples 
2 
and the just claims of the proletariat." Yet the success 
of British imperialism also commanded admiration: "Really, 
England is the only country capable of bringing this kind 
of business to a successful conclusion, with tact and a 
3 
marvelous ability. 11 
1. P. E. J. Bomli, L'affaire de Mossoul (Amsterdam, 1929), 
P· 245. 
2. Bulletin periodique, No. 52, p. 8. 
3· Curnhuriyet, June 6, 1927, quoted in Bulletin periodique, 
No. 53, p. 11. 
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b. TURKEY AND THE SOVIETS 1 ASIATIC POLICY 
In 1920, the revolutionary governments of Moscow and 
Angora had a common enemy, the Western interventionists. It 
was inevitable that they should make common cause. The de-
feat of the Turkish nationalists would enable the Allies to 
support more effectively Wrangel's counter-revolutionary 
operations in the Ukraine; a military agreement was concluded 
by the Kremlin with the Kemalist regime as early as April 
1920. But the long stay b£ Bekir Sami Bey in Moscow did 
not result in a permanent treaty. 
The first months of 1921 brought about a change in 
Soviet policy. The Moscow treaties of February and March 
with Persia, Afghanistan and Turkey, along with the New Econ-
omic Policy introduced at the same time, represent a first 
pause on the road to world communism. The Russo-Turkish 
1 
Treaty of March 16 is a pledge to the friendly coexistence 
of two states having sharply opposed conceptions of domestic 
policy: each party undertook not to tolerate within its 
respective territory any activities directed against the 
other party's regime. All treaties inherited from the Tsar-
1st regime, including the capitulatory agreements, were de-
clared null and void. Russia recognized the retrocession to 
Turkey of the Vilayets of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, except 
for the city of Batum. And Russo-Turkish solidarity was 
1. H. M. Davis, Constitutions, pp. 370-3. 
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nowhere more apparent than in Article 5, concerning the 
Straits, in which the contracting parties agreed "to entrust 
the final elaboration of an international agreement concern-
ing the Black Sea to a conference composed of delegates of 
the littoral States.tt At such a conference, Russia would 
surely have a commanding voice. 
The 1921 Agreements with Italy and France raised the 
possibility that the Angora Government's early friendship 
for Russia would not remain exclusive. The following year, 
the attitude of the Turkish Delegation towards the Straits 
question at Lausanne indicates the orientation which the 
Turkish Government wished to give its policy in relation to 
Russia and the Western Powers. The Allies were unwilling to 
engage in any unnecessary contacts with the Bolsheviks; the 
Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian delegates were allowed to 
take part only in the. general discussion of the Straits 
question. Ismet Pasha's declarations of solidarity with 
the Soviet delegations were mere gestures. 
The debate over the Straits was opened on December 4, 
1922. While reserving their right to submit detailed pro-
posals later, the various delegations made brief statements 
of their respective views. Chicherin made the Soviet posi-
tion clear: 
The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus must be permanently 
closed both in peace and in war to warships, armed ves-
sels and military aircraft of all countries except Turkey. 
The Russian Government and its allies, basing their argu-
ment on the fact that the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus 
belong to Turkey, and respecting as they do the sover-
eignty of each people, insist on the reestablishment and 
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full maintenance of the rights of the Turkish people 
over Turkish territory and waters. The Russian Govern-
ment and its allies insist further on the fact that the 
Turkish Government will only be in a position to defend 
the Straits and the Sea of Marmora effectively against 
all attacks if it receives express recognition of its 
right to fortify and arm its coasts, to possess a war 
fleet and to apply to the defence of the Straits and of 
the Sea of Mirmora all the technical accessories of mod-
ern warfare. 
Ismet Pasha commented that 
only one statement -- that of M. Chicherin -- correspon-
ded with the general point of view of the Turkish dele-
gation as regards the opening of the Straits to inter-
national communications, when it took into account the 
necessity of assuring the safety of Constantinople and 
of the basin of the Sea of Marmora.2 
Two days later, Lord Curzon presented a British draft 
convention which proposed the continued demilitarization of 
the Straits, a wide freedom of access to the Black Sea for 
the warships of all powers, and control of naval traffic by 
an international commission. On December 8, Ismet implied 
acceptance in principle of the British draft, with reserva-
tions pertaining to the security of Constantinople and to 
the transit of Turkish troops through the demilitarized zone. 
Chicherin was left alone to defend Turkish sovereignty. The 
Conference paid slight attention to him, and the details of 
the Convention were worked out by the Allied and Turkish 
delegations. 
When he denounced the Draft Convention, on February 1, 
1. Cmd 1814, p. 129. 
2. Ibid., P• 134. 
3· Ibid., PP· 156-9. 
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1923, Chicherin charged that it was tithe product of clan-
1 
destine negotiations 11 ; the Soviets were convinced that the 
Turks had been forced to bargain their sovereignty over the 
Straits in return for concessions in the capitulatory ques-
tions, and they were right. But the haste with which Ismet 
Pasha rallied to the British plan reveals that the bargain 
was not so distasteful to the Turks as Chicherin would have 
it appear. The Turkish Government preferred international 
control of the Straits, with a balance of forces in the 
Black Sea, to the prospect of exclusive Soviet domination in 
that area, and a possible renewal of Russian pressure on 
Constantinople. At the Lausanne Conference, and during the 
following year, Turkey gravitated towards the Western Powers, 
while remaining on friendly term~ with Soviet Russia. 
During the fifteen months when the Mosul question was 
under consideration by the League Council, the Soviet Union 
repeatedly declared its full support of the Turkish claim. 
The Russian stand was based on sympathy for Turkey and a 
greater antipathy towards Great Britain. Furthermore, the 
Soviets were directly concerned with the outcome of the Mosul 
dispute. Sir Percy Cox had stated quite candidly at the Con-
ference of Constantinople: 
It is quite true that, during the first years of the War, 
Great Britain and France contemplated the cession of the 
Mosul Vilayet to France, and of the Basra and Bagdad 
Vilayets to Great Britain. It is important to remember, 
however, that this proposal was considered by two closely 
1. Cmd 1814, p. 450. 
allied Powers, at a time when it was expected that a 
third Allied Power, Russia, would be their northern 
neighbor.l 
In 1920, the Russian expansion south of the Caucasus not 
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having materialized, a French buffer zone between Russia 
and the British Middle East was no longer necessary; at San 
Remo, the French agreed to the inclusion of Mosul with Iraq, 
instead of Syria. 
During the last months of 1925, Turkey and the Soviet 
Union were again forced to draw closer together. At Locarno, 
in October, Austen Chamberlain and Aristide Briand nego-
tiated with Mussolini and Stresemann a series of agreements 
intended to pull Germany out of the Russian orbit back into 
the Western camp; the Russians were convinced that the Lo-
carno guarantees of peace in the West concealed "an anti-
2 
soviet sword," Germany's implied freedom of action in the 
East. Two months later, at Geneva, the Council of the 
League of Nations, presided over by the same Mr. Briand, 
handed over Mosul to the same Mr. Chamberlain. The Cum-
huriyet had both Locarno and Mosul in mind when it remarked: 
The Baldwin Government, representing that state of mind 
which consists in establishing peace in Europe, but only 
in Europe, and in pursuing its policy of rapine outside 
of Europe, could not but promote the solidarity and co-
operation of the peoples of the Orient.3 
1. La Question de Mossoul, p. 196. 
2. v. Potiemkine, Histoire de la Diplomatie, III (Paris, 
1947), p. 8. 
3· Cumhuriyet, November 22, 1925, in Bulletin periodique, 
No. 44, p. 4. 
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When the Turkish Government was faced with the pros-
pect of hostilities with Great Britain, in the event of an 
adverse decision in the Mosul question, Angora and Moscow 
maintained close contact, and Foreign Ministers Rustu and 
1 
Chicherin met twice in Paris. The Paris Treaty of December 
17, 1925, redefined Turco-Soviet relations, and indicated 
the extent of the Russian commitment. 
In case of armed attack against one of the Contracting 
Parties by one or many other powers, the other Contract-
ing Party undertakes to maintain neutrality towards the 
first (Article 1). Each of the Contracting Parties un-
dertakes to abstain from all attacks against the other. 
Furthermore, each of the Contracting Parties undertakes 
not to participate in any hostile act against the other 
Party by one or many Powers (Article 2). 
The U.s.s.R. promised neutrality and non-aggression, nothing 
more: in 1925, Turkey could not rely on active assistance 
such as she had received in 1920. Soviet global policy was 
being reoriented; the militant internationalists Trotsky, 
Zinoviev and Kamenev were on the way out, while Stalin's in-
creasing power was used to secure and strengthen the homeland 
of communism. The fate of the lone communist citadel could 
not be risked in uncertain adventures. 
While military cooperation was ruled out, however, 
the Turks and the Soviets agreed to harmonize their foreign 
policies. "Each of the Contracting Parties ..• undertakes not 
to contract with one or many Powers an alliance or a political 
understanding directed against the other Party ••. " (Article 2). 
1. ttTreaty of Friendship and Neutral! ty," LNTS, CLVII, pp. 353-
Davis, Constitutions, pp. 374-5. 
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A Protocol annexed to the Treaty extended this mutual pledge 
to financial and economic agreements. The Treaty was con-
eluded for three years, and renewable automatically for one 
year periods, an indication of uncertainty on the part of 
one or both parties; but it was to be the basis of Turco-
Soviet relations for the next twenty years. 
The commercial relations between Turkey and the So-
viet Union were more difficult to harmonize, due to the 
rigid regimentation of the Russian economy. A Soviet dele-
gation began negotiations at Angora, on April 2, 1926, 
towards the conclusion of a commercial treaty, a customs 
1 
agreement, and a convention of business and residence. The 
negotiations dragged on for ten months, to the irritation of 
the Turks. The Cumhuriyet exclaimed impatiently: "Let's 
get this commercial treaty over with, if one is wanted; if 
2 
not, let's stop discussing it once and for all." The So-
viets proved especially exacting in the numerous exceptions 
they made to the most favored nation principle, and in their 
insistence that Russian trade representatives in Turkey be 
granted diplomatic immunity. 
One phase of the commercial talks caused considerable 
anxious speculation in London and Paris. The Angora negotia-
tions had reached an impasse, and Foreign Minister Rustu left 
for Odessa on November 11, on a well-publicized 'tmysteryt1 
1. L'Asie Fran9aise, May 1926, p. 204. 
2. Cumhuri~et, January 1, 1927, in Bulletin periodique, No. 
49, P· · 
1 
mission, for conversations with Chicherin. The subject of 
their discussions was simply the commercial treaty, but the 
evening toasts paid tribute to the armed might of Turkey and 
the Soviet Union. Only recently, Turkish diplomacy had been 
reported unusually active in Egypt and Arabia, while repre-
sentatives of Persia, China and Afghanistan had met at An-
gora. It was feared in the West that Rustu, at Odessa, was 
acting as a go-between in the preparation of an Oriental 
League of Nations under the aegis of Russia. Senator Henry 
de Jouvenel, of France, predicted: "A League of Oriental 
Nations was perhaps not founded at Odessa. But it is in 
the process of formation, and we may well find out one day 
that it has become a fact, without our having previously 
2 
noticed it." The Turks did not try to dispel this suspi-
cion; when Mahmut Bey, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Com-
mission in the Turkish National Assembly, was asked if Turkey 
made common cause with Europe or with Persia and the U.s.s.R., 
he replied: 
Due to the hostility which European conferences too often 
show towards Turkey, and the difficulty she experiences 
in securing in the League of Nations a place worthy of 
her, she must seek, wherever they may be, the guarantees 
necessary to her security. Forming with Persia and the 
U.S.S.R. an indissoluble bloc, Turkey therefore pursues 
an Oriental policy. 
There were certain resemblances between the Russian 
and Turkish regimes. Both had the forms of democratic 
1. The Times, London, November 12, 1926. 
2. "Une Societe des Nations Asia tiques., n L 'Europe Nouvelle, 
November 20, 1926, p. 1589. 
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representative government, while the real power was exer-
cised by their respective dictators (except for the U.s.s.R. 
during the inter-regnum which followed Lenin's death). Both 
states had a single-party political system; general policy 
was laid down at Party congresses before being enacted into 
law by the representative institutions. In the economic 
field, both countries provisionally adopted state capital-
ism, and created large state enterprises. And when the Gov-
ernment of the U.s.s.R. promoted the linguistic progress of 
its Turkish-speaking peoples, the Turkish Government showed 
sympathetic interest; an observer from Angora attended the 
Turcological Congress of Baku, in February and March 1926, 
where it was decided that the Latin alphabet already in use 
in the Azerbaijan Republic would be introduced into other 
1 
Turkish-speaking regions of the U.s.s.R. 
But the fundamental differences between the Turkish 
and Soviet regimes far outweighed their superficial similari-
ties. The Soviets were committed to world revolution and 
to the eventual communization of property; the Kemalist 
regime was dedicated to the creation of a national state, 
2 
with an economy based on free competition. Turkey and the 
Soviet Union faithfully abided by the terms of Article 8 of 
the Treaty of 1921; they did not support within their own 
1. Turkey adopted a different system of Latin characters in 
1928. 
2. Program adopted by the Congress of Smyrna in 1924, L'inter-
ventiori de l'Etat dans l'Economie de la Tur uie, Notes 
documentaires et tudes, No. 9 Paris, 19 , p. 6. 
borders the activities of groups that were plotting against 
the other party's regime. The Angora Government dealt firmly 
with the pan-turanians as it did with the communists. The 
Turco-Soviet relation was not one of natural sympathy; it 
was a useful, and even necessary partnership in the immedi-
ate post-war years, when neither party had any latitude in 
the choice of friends. It remained to be seen how that rela-
tion would stand when Turkey established friendly relations 
with other Great Powers. 
The reconciliation of Russia and Turkey in 1920, 
after centuries of enmity, had taken place during their com-
mon struggle against the West. But there was another factor: 
Turkey fitted into the Soviet's new Asiatic policy. vlhile 
the Tsars had fought British imperialism in Asia with their 
own Russian imperialism, the Soviets opposed it in the name 
of liberation and self-determination. At the Congress of 
Baku, in September 1920, the Bolsheviks collected some 1800 
Turkish, Kurdish, Persian and Tartar delegates, representing 
"the oppressed peoples of the Orient." The high priest of 
world revolution,Zinoviev, declared "a holy war against the 
1 
English and French robber-capitalists . 11 
The Soviet appeal could easily find supporting argu-
ments. In the power vacuum left behind in Asia by the Rus-
sian Revolution and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, British 
1. The Times (London), September 23, 1920; G. Lenczowski, 
Russia and the West in Iran, p. 7· 
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imperialism had had a field day. Most of the Arab portion 
of the Ottoman Empire had passed under British control. 
British troops had over-run Persia and temporarily occupied 
the Caucasus; the Anglo-Persian Agreement of August 9, 1919 
had brought all of Persia into the British sphere. And the 
British occupation forces ruled Constantinople. 
Soviet policy in Asia was calculated to be in sharp 
contrast with British imperialism, as well as with the ex-
pansionist policy of the Tsars. In the Treaties of 1921, 
the Soviets retroceded to Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan 
border territories which had been 11 stolen" by the Tsars. 
They emphatically renounced their capitulatory privileges 
in Turkey and Persia in 1921, and in China in 1924. The 
1 
Russo-Persian Treaty of February 26, 1921 offers a clear 
expression of their Asiatic policy, and a good example of 
their new diplomatic language: 
The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. renounced the policy of 
force towards Persia pursued by the imperialist govern-
ments of Russia which were overthrown by the will of her 
workers and peasants (Article 1) .•. The Government of 
the R.S.F.S.R. completely repudiates this criminal policy 
as a violation of the sovereignty of the Asiatic States, 
and a help to the organization of acts of brutal violence 
perpetrated by the European bandits against the peoples 
of the Orient (Article 2). 
While the Soviets negotiated simultaneously at Moscow 
with Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, in February and March 
1921, they urged their southern neighbors to conclude similar 
treaties among themselves, in order to render their own 
1. L'Europe Nouvelle, August 17, 1929, pp. XXII-XXIV. 
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southern glacis more secure: they even obtained from Persia 
the right to intervene militarily in the event of armed 
operations in Persia by a foreign power. Soviet inspira-
tion is apparent in the Turco-Afghan Treaty of March 1, 1921; 
each party recognized the emancipation of all Oriental na-
tions, and would consider as "an offence against itself any 
action against the other, by an imperialist state which fol-
lows the policy of invading and exploiting the East. 11 
The Turco-Afghan treaty reveals another weapon which 
Russia intended to use against Britain in the battle for 
Asia-Moslem solidarity. The year before, at the Baku Con-
gress, the Moslem delegates had drawn tneir swords in ac-
ceptance of the Jihad, or Holy War, and the Pan-Islamic 
Enver Pasha had assumed the title of "Commander in Chief of 
1 
the Bolshevist forces marching on India." And now the Af-
ghan Treaty recognized Turkey as "the Guide of Islam 11 (Ar-
ticle 3). The Turkish Government, however, soon renounced 
this spiritual leadership by abolishing the caliphate. 
The abolition of the sultanate in November 1922, and 
of the caliphate in March 1924, provoked a serious schism 
within the Angora regime. Some Nationalist leaders, unlike 
Kemal, were firm believers; many more retained the Young-Turk 
belief that Turkey's international prestige depended on the 
moral authority of her Sultan-Caliph. After the abolition 
of the sultanate, important leaders such as Prime Minister 
1. The Times (London), September 23, 1920. 
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Rauf Bey and ex-Foreign Minister Yusuf Kemal favored restor-
ing some political power to the Caliph. Even the Hindu 
Moslem, the Aga Khan, intervened: in a letter sent to the 
Constantinople papers Ikdam and Tanin, and published Decem-
ber 5, 1923, he expressed the fear that "any diminution in 
the prestige of the Caliph or the elimination of the Caliph-
ate as a religious factor from the Turkish body politic 
1 
would mean the disintegration of Islam.n 
Mustapha Kemal was unconcerned with the disintegra-
tion of Islam; he had decided ten months before to abolish 
the caliphate because it could not serve Turkish national 
interests. The day following the publication of the Aga 
Khan letter, Editor Necmeddin Sadak replied in the Aksam: 
Moslem solidarity, he pointed out, had been useful against 
united Christendom, but now Christians as well as Moslems 
were divided and fighting among themselves; during the 
World War, the Caliph had called for a Jihad, but the Middle 
East Arabs had fought with the British against the Turks. 
F 
Kemal himself carried the fight to the people; he asked them: 
Does Persia or Afghanistan, both Islamic States, recog-
nize any authority in the Caliph? Can it do so? It 
cannot, and rightly so. Because it would be contrary to 
the independence of the state, to the sovereignty of the 
nation. 2 
The Turkish Republic gradually became a secular state 
after the Western model. The Caliphate was abolished in 
1. The Times {London), December 14, 1923. 
2. M. Kemal, Nutuk, II, p. 201. 
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1924, the religious orders were disbanded in 1925, and in 
1928, Islam ceased to be the state religion. The religious 
factor officially disappeared from Turkish political life. 
It remained to be seen whether the relations of Turkey, no 
longer the guide of Islam, with the independent Moslem 
states of Persia and Afghanistan would be affected. 
Time has justified Kemal's stand; he was right in 
discounting the religious factor in the relations of modern 
states. There were, on the other hand, other forces at work 
in Persia and Afghanistan which drew those states closer to 
Turkey than Islam had ever done. Afghanistan in 1919, and 
Persia in 1921, secured their freedom from British domina-
tion. King Amanullah and Reza Khan set out to westernize 
their countries, following closely the example of Kemal. 
All three were opposed, sometimes in major insurrections, by 
the same feudal and religious elements. The general objec-
tive was the same in all three countries, though the method 
and results sometimes varied. The strength of Islam in Per-
sia and Afghanistan precluded the secularization of these 
states; and Reza Khan's plans to proclaim Persia a republic 
in March 1924, as Kemal had done four months before, were 
thwarted by the powerful religious leaders. The Afghan 
Foreign Minister, Mahmut Tarzi Khan, recognized Turkey's new 
type of leadership in the Middle East when he stated: 
The union of the peoples of the East is not directed 
against the West. Turkey is the guide of Afghanistan 
on the road to progress. We follow her footsteps and 
1 
learn new methods from her. 
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There were no problems which might cause friction 
between Turkey and Afghanistan, mainly because they had no 
common frontier. As the London Times remarked, "Afghanistan 
is so far away from Turkey that the friendship between the 
2 
two countries is necessarily somewhat platonic.,, Such was 
not the case with Persia. Although the religious differ-
ences of Sunnite Turkey and Shiite Persia were a thing of 
the past, the Turco-Persian border presented a persistent 
problem. The adjacent areas of Eastern Turkey, Northwest-
ern Persia and Northern Iraq, sometimes referred to as 
Kurdistan, are people6 mainly by the nomadic Kurds, a pas-
toral people still organized along feudal lines. The central-
izing and secular reforms of the Angora Government were es-
pecially distasteful to the Kurdish chiefs; the great insur-
rection which broke out in February, 1925, and which was put 
out only after regular military operations by three army 
corps, was led by Sheik Said, who rose against the impiety 
of the Angora Government, and his lieutenant, Khaled Pasha, 
who fought for an independent Kurdistan. When the Kurds 
were not in open revolt against their respective governments, 
armed bands frequently rode across the border, raided a few 
villages, and raced back to safety. Such border incidents 
/ 1. Cumhuriyet, July 7, 1927, in Bulletin periodique, No. 53, 
p. 11. 
2. The Times, July 25, 1928. 
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were frequent, and the authorities whose districts had been 
raided vented their irritation upon their opposite numbers 
across the border, accusing them of tolerating or even en-
couraging the raids. 
In the spring of 1926, when Turkey was trying to 
emerge from the threatening diplomatic situation into which 
the Mosul crisis had thrust her, she negotiated with Persia 
1 
a Treaty of Friendship and Security, signed at Teheran 
April 22, 1926. This treaty contained the neutrality provi-
sions of the December Treaty with Russia: in addition, it 
attempted to solve the Kurdish frontier problem. Should 
hostilities break out over Mosul, it was expected that the 
British, advocates since 1918 of an independent Kurdistan 
as a buffer between Russia and the Middle East, would rouse 
the Turkish Kurds to rebellion. Article 4 of the Persian 
Treaty was intended to neutralize the Persian border, and 
to prevent the Persian Kurds from assisting their Turkish 
brethren. Each party agreed to safeguard his neutrality 
nby force of arms, 11 and prevent third Powers from 
using his territory for the passage of troops, arms or 
munitions of war, or for obtaining supplies of provi-
sions, live stock or any other objects capable of being 
employed for warlike purposes, or for the passage of 
troops in retreat; or for exciting and stirring up the 
populations of the neutral country with the object of 
using them for their own purposes •.. 
The Treaty also attempted to put an end to the routine in-
cursions of the border tribes: both parties agreed to take 
1. LNTS, CVI, pp. 260-5. 
52 
all necessary measures, separately or by joint action, 
to put an end to any reprehensible activities which may 
be liable to affect the peace of the two countries and 
in which tribes in the territories adjoining the fron-
tiers may engage (Article 6). 
This latter provision was too general to be effective; 
more specific measures, however, will not be introduced un-
til the Turkish Government ceases to covet the Turkish-speak-
ing sections of Persian Azerbaijan, and agrees to a defini-
tive border settlement. Meanwhile, the border problem 
remained as the only irritant in Turco-Persian relations. 
The parallel internal development of the two countries in-
creased their solidarity. When the Treaty of 1926 was signed, 
1 
the Turks waived their capitulatory rights in Persia, a 
prelude to the Persians' successful denunciation of all 
capitulations one year later. The foreign policies of Tur-
key, Persia and Afghanistan remained attuned to that of the 
Soviet Union, in the face of a hostile West. 
1. Oriente Moderno, May 1926, pp. 252-5. 
c. FRANCE AND SYRIA 
When France was awarded the Syrian mandate at San 
Remo on April 25, 1920, she became effectively, alongside 
of Great Britain in Iraq, Turkey's southern neighbor. The 
basis for future Franco-Turkish relations was contained in 
1 
the Angora Agreement of October 20, 1921. The Agreement 
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delimited the Turco-Syrian border in a general way, pro-
vided for a special administrative regime in the Alexan-
dretta district, and recognized Turkey's right to use the 
Syrian section of the "Bagdad" railway for military trans-
portation from Meydan Ekbes to Choban Bey, as well as a 
corresponding right for Syria in the use of the Turkish sec-
tion from Choban Bey to Nusaybin. At Lausanne, the frontier 
as traced in the Angora Agreement was confirmed by Article 
3 (1) of the Treaty, and the Agreement as a whole was re-
affirmed in an exchange of letters between the French and 
Turkish delegates. 
At the Lausanne Conference and during the year which 
followed, Franco-Turkish relations steadily deteriorated. 
Lord Curzon was able to restore a large measure of Allied 
solidarity, which rendered the task of the Turkish Delegation 
unexpectedly difficult. The Turkish Government was displeased 
with this change of heart, after the cordial period following 
1. LNTS, LIV, pp. 173-93· The London Convention of March 9, 
1921 had ended hostilities and retroceded Cilicia to Tur-
key, but it had not been ratified by the Angora Assembly. 
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the Angora Agreement. The conservative elements in France, 
for their part, were dissatisfied both with the Angora Agree-
ment and with the Treaty: from San Remo to Lausanne, Great 
Britain had obtained control of the major portions of the 
Arab Middle East, while France had made all the concessions; 
the abolition of the capitulations was considered a shameful 
abdication of France's economic, financial and intellectual 
predominance in the Near East; the Ottoman Debt was being 
settled in a way unfavorable to the bondholders, a majority 
of whom were French; and the educational policy of the new 
nationalist regime showed a total unconcern for France's 
1 
tthaute mission civilisatricen in the Near East. The right-
ist Government of Raymond Poincare put off ratifying the 
Lausanne Treaty for ten months, until it fell from power in 
May 1924. 
The radical-socialist Herriot Government promptly 
ratified the Treaty, and relations improved for some time. 
The revolt of the Syrian Druzes, however, which broke out in 
July 1925, became another source of ill-feeling. The Turkish 
Government maintained a correct attitude, and did not help 
or encourage the rebels. But the Turkish press was violently 
anti-French, and the hard-pressed mandatory Power was annoyed 
at reading tirades such as the following, in the semi-official 
Cumhuriyet: 
1. R. de Gontant-Biron and L. Le Reverend, D'Angora a Lausanne, 
Les etapes d'une decheance (Paris, 1924); E. Nicol, Angora 
et la France, Une reponse a M. Franklin-Bouillon (Paris, 
1922); R. Colrat, Lauzanne et les Vieillards, Autour d'une 
(Paris, 1923); R. La bonne, "La France et la Turquie, 11 Le 
Correspondant, May 10, 1923, pp. 393-423· 
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These men (the Druzes) have taken up arms to defend with 
a desperate heroism the honor and liberty which France, 
in violation of her pledge, has taken from them. The 
noble France, the civilized nation honored throughout 
the world for its humanitarian ideal, is dead; another1 France, tyrannic and destructive, has taken her place. 
At the same time, the impending Council decision on 
Mosul suddenly increased the long-standing Turco-British 
tension, and Turkey made a bid for French support. But the 
two mandatory Governments declared their complete solidarity 
in Near-Eastern policy. When Turkish troops were moved 
towards the Iraqi border, in anticipation of hostilities, 
the French authorities denied them transportation over a 
new section of the Bagdad railway in Syrian territory east 
of Nusaybin. The Turks protested that this refusal was con-
trary to the spirit of the Angora Agreement. The Mosul deci-
sion, coming on the heels of the Locarno Agreements, con-
vinced them that 11 the French and British imperialists, and 
their new ally Germany, were out to destroy the weak Orien-
tal states." 
Turkey's precarious diplomatic position during the 
winter of 1925-6, already described, persuaded the Turkish 
Government that peace had to be assured with France on the 
Syrian border, as well as with Great Britain on the Iraqi 
frontier. Foreign Minister Rustu negotiated with French Am-
bassador Sarraut, at the same time that he was settling the 
1. Cumhuriyet, November 22, 1925, quoted in Bulletin perio-
dique, No. 44, p. 4. 
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Mosul question with Sir Ronald Lindsey. The Convention of 
1 
Friendship and Good Neighborly Relations signed May 31, 
1926, contained provisions for frontier control similar to 
those of the Turco-Iraqi-British Treaty signed the following 
week. The Turco-Syrian border was traced in detail from the 
Mediterranean to Nusaybin, leaving only the short distance 
from Nusaybin to the Tigris to be worked out later. The re-
ciprocal rights of Turkey and Syria on the Bagdad railway, 
for civilian as well as for military transportation, were 
defined and the necessary procedures were established. Ar-
ticle 14 of the Treaty contained a pledge to the peaceful 
settlement of all disputes not involving sovereignty by con-
ciliation, judicial settlement or arbitration. Turco-Syrian 
commercial relations were established on the nmost favored 
nation11 basis. 
The frontier issue, however, was not closed. The pro-
tocol annexed to the Convention of 1926 described the remain-
ing sixty-mile section to be delimited in the same terms as 
the Angora Agreement of 1921: the border was to "follow the 
old road between Nisibin and Jeziret-ibn-Omar where it will 
2 
join the Tigris." There remained traces of an old Roman 
road running in the general direction described by the Angora 
Agreement; there were also many other !I old roadsn used by the 
nomadic tribes, running parallel to it both to the north and 
1. LNTS, LIV, pp. 195-229· 
2. Ibid., p. 181. 
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south. While the Turks argued for one of the soutnern roads, 
the French stood with equal insistence for one of the north-
ern routes. On January 10, 1928, a Danish arbitrator, Gen-
eral Ernst, drew a line which coincided approximately with 
the old Roman road. Both sides rejected the sc-~ntence, and 
proceeded to draw their own boundary. On June 22, a series 
of agreements fixed the new frontier definitely, and insti-
tuted a mixed Frontier Commission similar to the one created 
three years before along the Turco-Iraqi border. 
Once the border issue was settled, the remaining prob-
lems affecting Syria presented no great difficulty. On 
February 3, 1930 a Treaty of Friendship,Conciliation and 
1 
Arbitration extended the procedure for pacific settlement 
of disputes, already in force between Turkey and France, to 
the countries under French mandate. On October 27, 1933 the 
series of agreements was completed with an over-all under-
standing for the use of the Bagdad railroad, and a settle-
ment of the question of Syrian property in Turkey and Turkish 
property in Syria. 
The gravest issue between France proper and the Turk-
ish Government after Lausanne was that of the Ottoman Debt. 
The general principles for settlement of the Ottoman Debt 
had been laid down in the Treaty; the application of these 
principles was to be effected as a result of negotiations be-
tween the debtor nations and representatives of the creditors. 
1. Oriente Moderno, March 1930, pp. 102-5. 
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Turkey was the major debtor, and the French 11 rentiers 11 com-
.1 
prised almost 73 per cent of the bondholders. The French 
Government had a considerable, though indirect interest in 
the settlement. 
In accordance with Article 47 of the Treaty, the 
Council of the Ottoman Debt determined the proportionate 
liability of each debtor state in terms of annual payments 
as well as the total capital. After ;review by the League 
arbitrator, Mr. Borel, Turkey's share was set at 62.25 per 
cent of the outstanding debt as of October 17, 1912, and 
76-54 per cent of the loans contracted during the next two 
years. In terms of money, this liability would represent 
2 
annual payments of 5,809,312 Turkish pounds. Mr. Borel 
was also asked to determine whether payments were to be'made 
in gold francs or in the depreciated Turkish currency. The 
Treaty was silent on this matter, because agreement had 
proved impossible at Lausanne; the Allied Governments had 
reserved their right to intervene in later negotiations "by 
such means as they will consider suitable in order to pro-
teet the rights and interests of their respective nationals. 11 
M:r:~· Borel ruled that 11 the Debt Council was not called upon 
to decide this question and that the arbitrator was not 
4 
competent to do so. This decision gave the Turkish 
1. A. Pichon, nLa repartition de la dette Ottomane, tt L'Eur-
o2e Nouvelle, August 1, 1925, P· 1019. 
2. The Times (London), December 16, 1925· 
3· A. Pichon, "La repartition de la dette Ottomane," L'Eur-
o2e Nouvelle, August 1, 1925, P· 1021. 
4. The Times (London), December 23, 1925-
3 
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Government a means of bargaining: it would consider paying 
in the sounder currency in return for a scaling down of the 
annual payments. The immediate result of this currency dis-
pute was that the debtor states did not make the annual pay-
ments that were due when their respective annuities were de-
l 
termined. 
Despite this stalemate, the Ottoman Debt Commission 
proceeded to determine the amount of the capital debt still 
outstanding, and to check the claims of the bondholders. 
Computation of the net Capital Debt was involved: during 
the World War, the bondholders of the Central Powers and of 
neutral nations had been paid regularly; nationals of the 
Allied Powers had received nothing. It was necessary to 
determine how much of the payments made since 1914 should be 
applied to interest charges, and how much of the Debt had 
been retired. Turkey's share of the Ottoman Debt was finally 
2 
fixed at 84,597,495 Turkish pounds. 
Meanwhile the Turkish Government and the bondholders 
entered a long period of negotiations beginning July 1, 
1925, and resulting in a new agreement on June 6, 1928. Tur-
key agreed to· pay in Turkish gold pounds, and the annual 
payments were reduced from 5. 8 million to 2 million pounds 
for 1928, increasing at stated intervals to 3.4 million 
1. The only exception was Palestine; responsible for about 
3 per cent of the Debt, she made a partial payment in 
1925. The Times (London), December 16, 1925. 
2. Ibid. 
pounds in 1952, and extending over a period of about 50 
1 
years. The customs receipts of Constantinople, Haydar 
Pasha and Samsun, averaging over four million pounds per 
year, were put up as security. 
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The bondholders accepted the settlement with misgiv-
ings; but the hard realities of the Turkish financial situa-
tion could hardly allow a fuller satisfaction of their 
''indisputable rights." The Turkish national income of 700 
million Turkish pounds per year represented a per capita 
income of 53 1/3 pounds, or 26 dollars. Of this 700 mil-
lion pounds, 35% went for taxes; over 200 million were paid 
in taxes to the central government, and another 50 million 
in local taxes, leaving a net per capita income of 34 1/4 
2 
pounds, or 16 3/4 dollars. The unfavorable trade balance, 
which had remained in the neighborhood of 50 million pounds 
3 
yearly from 1923 to 1928, made it appear probable that the 
difficult financial situation would be prolonged. And the 
Angora Government was resolved not to fall back upon the 
Sultan's policy of meeting current obligations by renewed 
borrowings. Prime Minister Ismet Pasha reflected the diffi-
culty of Turkey's course when he told the National Assembly 
on September 14, 1928: 
We have signed the settlement, concerning the question 
of coupons, which interests France in particular. 
1. 11 Le reglement de la dette publique ottomane, n L 'Europe 
Nouvelle, July 21, 1928, PP• 993-4. , 
2. "Le budget et la monnaie de la nouvelle Turquie," L 'Eur-
ope Nouvelle, July 21, 1928, p. 996. 
3· L'Asie Franxaise, January 1932, p. 37· 
I hope that our spirit of sacrifice will be justly ap-
preciated by the acceptance of so heavy a pecuniary 
engagement. Our principal obtect is to assure confid-
ence on the Syrian frontiers. 
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As we have seen, the Syrian frontier problem remained 
for three more years; the Debt problem proved even more per-
sistent. The 1928 Agreement was reached on the very eve of 
the World Depression. In 1930 Turkey was able to pay only 
one third of the interest. A new agreement in 1933 scaled 
down the totals, though the instalments were still payable 
in gold currency. A final agreement in 1938 reduced the 
Debt still further, by allowing payment of the nominal sum 
in the stabilized Turkish pound;. the remaining liability was 
2 
only 8 million Turkish pounds. 
The relations of France and Turkey during the post-
war period were marked, not by sudden crises, but by constant 
friction and haggling negotiations. The Syrian border and 
the Ottoman Debt presented ever-recurring sources of irri-
tation. French public opinion was especially resentful over 
the decline of French influence in the Near East, while Brit-
ish positions in the same area appeared stronger than ever. 
The Treaty of Lausanne represented the embodiment of this 
state of affairs, and hostility towards it has persisted down 
to the present time. Only recently, a noted French writer 
referred to the Treaty as "that absurd Treaty which, after 
more than a quarter of a century, has not yet yielded its 
3 
full measure of mischief." 
1. Documents for 1928, p. 222. 
2. South-Eastern Europe (London, 1939), p. 182. 
3· Georges Duhamel, "Les foules deracinees," Le Figaro, May 
12~13, 1951 ~ 
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d. THE EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS 
From 1923 to 1930, the relations of Greece and Turkey 
were to pivot around the mass exchange of their respective 
minorities and the innumerable property questions which it 
was bound to raise~ 
The population transfer, except for that of the 
Greeks of Constantinople, was effected· in good time and 
without serious political difficulties. By the end of 1924, 
the operation was virtually complete; it is estimated that 
more than 350,000 Moslems and almost 200,000 Greek-Orthodox 
had been transferred to Turkey and Greece respectively dur-
ing a fifteen-month period. 
The case of the Constantinople Greeks was more in-
volved. Article 2 of the Lausanne Convention excepted from 
the exchange the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople "who 
were already established before October 30, 1918, within the 
areas under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as 
defined by the law of 1912. 11 The term uestablished" gave 
rise to conflicting interpretations by the Turkish and 
Greek Governments. The Turkish members of the Mixed Commis-
sion maintained that establishment was determined by compli-
ance with the law of the country, in this case, the Turkish 
"Nufus" {Population) Law of 1914, which prescribed certain 
registration formalities. The Greek delegation contended 
that the Convention intended ''to describe a position of fact, 11 
and that the fact of establishment could be proved in many 
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ways besides registration. The neutral members of the Com-
mission inclined towards the Greek view; they considered the 
essence of establishment to be the intention of remaining 
permanently in a certain location, and this intention could 
be inferred by such criteria as the payment of local taxes, 
the acquisition of real estate, the permanent exercise of an 
1 
occupation, as well as by registration. 
The three neutral members of the Commission, General 
de Lara of Spain, Mr. Ekstrand of Sweden, and Mr. Widding 
of Denmark, were unwilling to use the balance of power that 
was clearly granted them by the Convention Hto decide all 
questionsn by a majority vote. Instead, they acted in a 
mediatory capacity between the two delegations, in the 
thought that unanimous decisions would have a better chance 
of being executed by the two governments. Meanwhile, the 
Greek Government, alleging that the Turkish authorities were 
acting on their interpretation of the term 11 established, 11 
appealed to the League Council, on October 22~ 1924, under 
Article 11 of the Covenant, to include the question on the 
agenda of its extraordinary session to be held at Brussels 
2 
on the 27th. 
The League Council heard the Greek and Turkish argu-
ments on October 31st. Both parties assured the Council that 
1. b[Ql, November 1924, pp. 1674-8. 
2. Ibid., pp. 1678-9. 
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they were agreed to abide by the decisions of the Mixed Com-
mission; when General de Lara, representing the Commission, 
declared that the latter's powers had not been infringed 
upon, and that the question of establishment was still being 
debated within the Commission, the Council realized that it 
had nothing further to do. However, it invited the contend-
ing parties to ask the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, if necessary, for an interpretation of any diffi-
1 
cult point in the Convention. 
The invitation was soon accepted. The deadlock con-
tinued within the Mixed Commission, and on November 19, the 
President of the Commission asked the League Council to ob-
tain from the Hague Court an advisory opinion on the inter-
pretation of the controversial term. On December 12, the 
Council voted to ask the Court an advisory opinion on the 
following question: 
1. What meaning and scope should be attributed to the 
word "establishedtt in Article 2 of the Convention of 
Lausanne ••. ; and 
2. What conditions must the persons who are described in 
Article 2 of the Convention of Lausanne under the 
name of "Greek inhabitants of Constantinople" fulfill 
in order.that they may be considered as "established" 
under the terms of t~e Convention and exempt from 
compulsory exchange? 
The Turkish delegate assured the Council that pending the 
Court's decision, no measures would be taken against the 
1. LNOJ, November 1924, p. 1679· 
2. Ibid., February 1925, p. 155· 
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persons whose status was in doubt. 
At the first Council session meeting on the Greco-
Turkish issue, on October 31, the dispute was compounded by 
the introduction of another related question. In citing 
examples of violations by Turkey of the Lausanne Convention, 
the Greek representative, Mr. Politis, invoked Article 16, 
which says, in part: "No obstacle shall be placed in the way 
of the in~abitants of the districts excepted from the exchange 
under Article 2 exercising freely their right to remain in 
or return to those districts and to enjoy to the full their 
liberties and rights of property in Turkey and in Greece. 11 
Mr. Politis charged that it was 
••• materially impossible for these Ottoman Nationals of 
Greek race, who were undoubtedly established at Con-
stantinople before the date of the Armistice, to return 
there and to dispose of their property. They are treated 
as absentees and of unknown domicile, and on these 
grounds a law is applied to th~m which was passed in 
respect of abandoned property. 
The Turkish delegate, Fethi Bey, did not deny the charge; 
instead, he pointed to the nmore than 50,000 Turks in West-
ern Thrace, whose. property has been confiscated by the Greek 
Government, LWh£7 are not able to resume possession of their 
2 
property and are in a state of lamentable destitution .n 
After the Greek rout of 1922, the Greek Government had been 
forced to effect mass requisitions, to care for the million-
1. LNOJ, November 1924, p. 1664. 
2. Ibid., p. 1666. 
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odd refugees who streamed into Western Thrace. According to 
1 
Greek figures, the following Moslem property was occupied 
by Greeks in 1923, in addition to some 5,000 acres of land: 
8243 rooms in rural homes, 5590 rooms in urban homes, 127 
mosques and schools, and 667 stables and granaries. Suddenly 
confronted with a second Gre~o-Turkish dispute, the League 
Council invited both Governments to submit reports embody-
ing their grievances in connection with the treatment of 
their respective minorities. The Greek and Turkish Govern-
ments submitted memoranda on the question in December, and 
on March 13, 1925, the League Council instructed the neutral 
members of the Mixed Commission to investigate the condition 
of the Greek minority in Constantinople and of the Moslem 
2 
minority in Western Thrace. 
All that the situation needed to become explosive was 
a dramatic incident: such was the case of the Oecumenical 
Patriarch, and Greco-Turkish animosity reached its peak. 
When the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch Gregorios died in November, 
1924, his most likely successor was Metropolitan Constantinos 
of Derkon. The Turkish Government considered this prelate 
exchangeable. On December 17, the sub-commission at Con-
stantinople ruled that he was subject to exchange; on the 
same day, Mgr. Constantinos was elected Patriarch by the Holy 
Synod. Due to the prelate's exalted position, the sub-commis-
sion referred his case to the Mixed Commission. The latter's 
1. s. P. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities (New York, 1932), 
PP• 519-20. 
2. LNOJ, April 1925, p. 462. 
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decision, of January·28, 1925, by its non-committal charac-
ter, left the way clear for another Greco-Turkish dispute: 
the Commission recognized that Mgr. Constantinos, nhaving 
been born in Asia Minor and having gone to Constantinople 
after October 30th, 1918, fulfilled in his person all the 
conditions necessary for the purpose of exchange"; but it 
held that it was "beyond its competence to take a decision 
in regard to the case of this ecclesiastic in view of the 
1 
fact that he is a Metropolitan.u On January 30, in the 
early hours of the morning, the Turkish authorities picked 
up the Patriarch-Elect at the Phanar, put him on a train for 
Salonika, and escorted him to the border. 
The unceremonious expulsion of Mgr. Constantinos 
threw Greece into an uproar. There were rumors that diplo-
matic relations would be broken, that the Greeks were re-
calling a reservist class. The Greek Ambassador delivered a 
note of protest to the Turkish Government; the latter in 
turn protested against Greek interference in Turkish internal 
affairs. On February 11, the Greek Prime Minister requested 
that the question be considered by the League Council nas 
soon as it meets," in virtue of Article 11, paragraph 2, of 
2 
the Covenant, pertaining to threats to international peace. 
The Greek Government argued that it had been agreed during 
the Lausanne negotiations that the patriarchate would remain 
1. LNOJ, April 1925, p. 483. 
2. Ibid., P• 579· 
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at Constantinople, and that therefore the Patriarch and the 
members of the Holy Synod were not subject to exchange. The 
expulsion of Mgr. Constantinos was a violation of the minori-
ties clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne, giving rise to an 
international dispute which should be settled by the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice, in accordance with 
1 
Article 44 of the Lausanne Treaty. 
The League Council heard the Greek case March 14, but 
there was no Turkish delegation present. In a letter sent 
March 1st to the League Secretary-General, the Turkish For-
eign Minister questioned the League Council's competence to 
deal with the matter, and urged the Council 11 not to consider 
the appeal of the Greek Government in this matter." The 
Foreign Minister stated that Mgr. Constantinos 
came within the category of exchangeable persons by 
reason of his place of birth and the date of his arrival 
in Constantinople, and the authorities merely carried out 
the provisions of the Exchange Convention, which is com-
pulsory. There is no clause in this Convention by which 
a person fulfilling the conditions which render him 
liable to compulsory exchange may be e~empted therefrom 
on the ground of his status or office. 
The Council had, first of all, to settle the question 
of its own competence. It appealed to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice for an advisory opinion in the fol-
lowing terms: 
Do the objections to the competence of the Council 
raised by the Turkish Government in its letter of March 
1. LNOJ, April 1925, pp. 482-4. 
2. Ibid., PP· 579-81. 
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1st, which is communicated to the court, preclude the 
Council from being competent in the matter brought be-
fore it by the Greek Government by its telegram to the 
Secretary-General of the League of Nations dated Febru-
ary 11th, 1925? 
The Council further hoped ttthat it would be possible for the 
question at issue to be settled by private negotiation, per-
haps with the good offices of the neutral members of the 
1 
Mixed Commission." 
The two governments began negotiating all outstanding 
questions. On June 1, the Greek Government informed the 
League Secretary-General that the question of the Greek 
Patriarch had been settled, and requested that its appeal 
to the Council be withdrawn. Mgr. Constantinos had resigned 
as Patriarch, and the Turkish Government, in return, had 
agreed to withdraw the dossiers relating to the exchange-
2 
ability of the members of the Holy Synod. In July, Mgr. 
Vassilios, the non-exchangeable Metropolitan of Nicaea, was 
elected Patriarch of Constantinople. 
A solution was also found in the case of the "estab-
lished11 Greeks of Constantinople. The Hague Court's opinion 
of February 21 properly called attention to the unused powers 
of the Mixed Commission, which alone was ''competent to in-
vestigate, in each individual case, whether a Greek inhabi-
tant of Constantinople was 'established'" in conformity with 
Article 2 of the Convention and could be exempted from the 
compulsory exchange. Nevertheless, the Court expressed the 
1. LNOJ, April 1925, p. 488. 
2. Ibid., July 1925, p. 895· 
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general opinion that establishment was ua situation of fact 
1 
constituted by residence of a lasting nature. n The Angora 
Agreement of June 21, 1925, followed the general principle 
of the Court's interpretation; those persons were consid-
ered established who were registered, or who had implied 
their intention to remain in any other way, such as the exer-
cise of a permanent occupation or the acquisition of property. 
From then on, the problem consisted in applying the agreed 
principle to individual cases. 
The settlement of property questions resulting from 
the exchange did not give rise to dangerous incidents such 
as the expulsion of the Patriarch, but it was a far more 
involved problem than the transfer proper, and it required 
longer negotiations. According to the Lausanne Convention, 
property indemnification was due, not only to the Greeks 
and Turks who migrated as a result of this Convention, but 
also to the far more numerous refugees who had migrated 
since the First Balkan War of 1912. In 1922, more than a 
million Greeks had fled Anatolia and Eastern Thrace upon 
the collapse of the Greek army in Asia Minor. Furthermore, 
another agreement signed at Lausanne, the "Declaration re-
lating to Moslem Property in Greece," provided for the 
restoration or indemnification of property belonging to 
Turks and Greeks who had left Greece and Turkey respectively 
1. s. P. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities, pp. 407-8. 
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before october 18, 1912, or who had never lived there at all. 
In short, the Lausanne agreements were an attempt to straigh-
ten out the whole situation of Turkish property in Greece 
and Greek property in Turkey, a situation that became in-
creasingly tangled as a result of three wars in ten years, 
of exceptional measures by both governments in regard to 
enemy property, and now of the migrations. 
The main points at issue concerned the non-observance 
of the Lausanne agreements. Article 16 of the Convention 
guaranteed the property rights of non-exchangeable persons. 
Yet Moslem property in Western Thrace was requisitioned by 
the Greek Government to house the Greek refugees; the Turks 
retaliated with the seizure of Greek property in Turkey. 
There was also the problem of liquidating the property of 
the emigrants. 
The neutral members of the Commission acted as media-
tors rather than arbitrators, while the two governments ne-
gotiated. The Angora Agreement of June 21, 1925, was a 
first step forward. Greece agreed to restore all Turkish 
properties in· Greece, nwith the exception of those needed 
by the Greek Government for the settlement of refugees or 
peasants owning no land." The excepted properties were to 
be bought by the Greek Government, 20% being paid in cash, 
and the remaining 80% in four-year bonds. Turkey recipro-
cally agreed to restore Greek property, or to purchase in 
the same manner that which was needed for the settlement of 
1 
her own immigrants. 
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Later negotiations further increased the participa-
tion of the two governments in the purchase of property. The 
2 
Athens Agreement of December 1, 1926, modified and amplified 
the Angora Agreement. Greece agreed to purchase all Moslem 
property located in the areas subject to the exchange, and 
which it could not restore, except urban property, woods, 
forests and summer pasture-land. The Turkish Government 
undertook to buy all Greek property outside of Constantinople, 
•'up to the value of the property which the Greek Government 
may acquire.n Property not purchased was to be restored to 
the owners within one month. The Mixed Commission was 
charged with the setting up of the necessary valuation 
groups; the total sums were to be balanced; and in the event 
that the purchases by Turkey did not match those of the 
Greek Government, the balance was to be paid by Greece in 
cash out of "the surplus of the revenues controlled by the 
International Finance Commission up to a maximum of five 
hundred thousand pounds sterling." 
The great task inherent in the Athens Agreement was 
the appraisal of the properties purchased by the two govern-
ments. In 1927, eight mixed Appraisal Committees were cre-
ated, and four more were added in 1928. The Committees had 
to evaluate each single property. By the end of 1928, only 
2000 appraisals had been made, out of a total of 15,000 
1. s. P. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities, p. 521. 
2. LNTS, LXVIII, pp. 11-35· 
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1 
claims. Moreover, the Greek and Turkish delegations on 
the Mixed Commission often disagreed over the proper basis 
for appraisal, and it appeared that the work of evaluation, 
if ever it were completed, would be only partially accepted 
by the interested governments. During the same year, how-
ever, the general political situation in the Eastern Medi-
terranean underwent a sharp shange; Greco-Turkish relations 
especially were affected, and the bilateral negotiations of 
the two governments to liquidate the question of the exchange 
of populations were about to enter their final, and success-
ful, phase. 
After a period of hardship for the emigrants, finan-
cial difficulties for the two governments, especially that 
of Greece, and bitter disputes between the representatives 
of the two states, the exchange of populations was beginning 
to yield beneficial results. The Greeks from the Turkish 
cities had almost doubled the population of Athens and Volo, 
and roughly tripled that of Salonika and Cavalla. They in-
troduced into Greece the crafts which they had made famous 
in the Ottoman Empire. The Greek farmers from Anatolia and 
Eastern Thrace were largely settled in Macedonia, on small 
farms carved out of large estates purchased from absentee 
Turkish landlords. The population of Greek Macedonia became 
homogeneous, with the Greeks comprising 88.8% in 1926, 
1. s. p. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities, p. 526. 
2. A. A. Pall is, "L 'Etablissement des refugies en Grece, n 
L'Europe Nouvelle, March 3, 1928, pp. 285-7· 
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compared with only 42.6% in 1912; the Moslems, who had repre-
sented 39·4% of the Macedonian population in 1912, were now 
1 
only 0.1%. 
The Turkish peasants from Greece had been easily 
settled in Anatolia, where land is plentiful. The Turks 
themselves filled the void created by the departure of the 
Greeks, and engaged in the middle-class occupations which, 
in the Ottoman Empire, had been the special province of the 
non-Moslems. Coming after the last amputation of non-Turk-
ish terri tory from the old Empire, that of the Arab regions 
after the World War, the Greek exodus all but completed the 
turkification of the remainder; the Greeks, who comprised 
about 10% of the population of the present area of Turkey in 
2 
1912, were less than 1% in 1927. As the size of the racial 
minorities was now reduced, not one attaining 1% of the to-
3 
tal population, Turkish suspicion tended to disappear. 
Writing in 1929, Arnold J. Toynbee pointed out that 
... at the close of 1928 it might fairly be said that the 
minorities problem was nearer solution in Turkey, where 
it had once worked such havoc, than it was at that time 
in many East-European countries wher~ it had never mani-
fested itself in such ghastly forms. 
In 1928, the Greek and Turkish Governments continued 
1. E. Rossi, "Lo scambio obbligatorio delle popolazione tra 
la Grecia e la Turchia," Oriente Moderno, September 1930, 
p. 403. 
2. D. E. Webster, The Turkey of Ataturk (Philadelphia, 1939), p.48. 
3· Unless the Moslem Kurds, comprising 8.68%, are considered a 
minority. 
4. A. J. Toynbee, Survey for 1928, p. 199· 
75 
to negotiate the settlement of the property questions which 
divided them; but from then on these negotiations were sub-
ject to the political influence of Fascist Italy in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TOWARDS A WESTERN POLICY, 1928-30 
a. Fascist Diplomacy 
b. Turkey and the Middle East 
c. The End of the Greco-Turkish Feud 
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a. FASCIST DIPLOMACY 
In March 1921, France and Italy simultaneously re-
nounced their Anatolian ambitions. But whereas France only 
concluded an armistice, the Italian Foreign Minister, Count 
1 
Sforza, negotiated a broad settlement with the Angora repre-
sentative. The Italian Government promised to support, at 
the forthcoming peace conference, all Turkish demands in 
general, and specifically the recovery of Smyrna and West-
ern Thrace. Italian troops were to be recalled from Otto-
man territory upon ratification of the new treaty 11 at the 
latest.u In return the Italians were granted economic col-
laboration in the former Italian zone of influence ttaccord-
ing to ottoman law," and in so far as the development of 
resources "was not being carried out directly by the Ottoman 
Government or by Ottoman nationals with Turkish capital." 
The Treaty became a dead letter ten days later, on March 23, 
when the Greeks reopened the Turkish question by resuming 
military operations. Nevertheless, the Italians, like the 
French, withdrew their troops, leaving the Turkish National-
ists free to concentrate on the Greeks. The Treaty of Lau-
sanne confirmed the Italian position in the Dodecanese and 
Castellorizo (Article 15)· 
Mussolini indicated early that he intended to pursue 
a vigorous Mediterranean policy, though it was difficult to 
1. Text: c. Sforza, Di lomatic Euro e since the Treaty of 
Versailles (Yale u., 192 , pp. 10 -5; L Europe Nouvelle, 
August 17, 1929, p. XXI. 
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ascertain just what that policy was. The Corfu incident in 
1923, at any rate, revealed its aggressive character. Dur-
ing the winter of 1925-26, Turkey had reason to fear that 
she might be the next target for Italian attack. The Mosul 
crisis had brought Turco-British relations to a dangerous 
point of tension. Great Britain had made important con-
cessions to Italian ambitions: in 1924 she had ceded Juba-
land, in East Africa, to Italy, and now, on December 14, 1925, 
she recognized the exclusive character of Italian interests 
in Western Ethiopia. The British may have secured an ally, 
in case the Turks chose to challenge the Mosul decision. 
The close relations of Italy with the hostile Pangalos 
regime in Greece further increased the suspicions of the 
Turks. In March 1926, the Greek Foreign Minister went to 
Rome, where he obtained a loan of 2 million lire for the 
1 
purchase of war materials. Meanwhile, Mussolini was in one 
of his bellicose oratorical moods. Speaking from the deck 
of the battleship Cavour, on the eve of his dramatic trip to 
Tripoli, he urged the Fascisti "to become familiar with 
these instruments of war.tt The Turks feared that if their 
army became engaged on the Iraqi border, the Greeks would 
invade Eastern Thrace and the Italians would Jump off the 
Dodecanese Islands. Italian manoeuvres off Rhodes seemed to 
Justify their fears. 
1. E. W. p. Newman, uitaly, Greece and Turkey," Nineteenth 
Century and After, October 1926, pp. 551-3. 
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The Turkish Government made peace with Britain in 
June 1926, and the crisis passed. The following November, 
Mussolini's threatening gestures, hitherto distributed im-
partially along the whole Mediterranean area from Tangier to 
Anatolia, began to center in the Balkans, where Italy's war-
time aspirations had remained unfulfilled. The enlarged 
Serbia, or Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was 
an obstacle to Italian domination of the Adriatic. In an 
attempt to isolate the Serbs, Italy tightened her relations 
with Bulgaria and Hungary, and increased her control over 
Albania. Her efforts to bring Rumania into the Italian ring 
did not succeed, however, as Rumania remained faithful to 
her Little Entente partner. Mussolini's new Balkan policy 
conflicted with French patronage of the Little Entente and 
with the French alliance with the Serbs. The World War had 
liquidated the ancient Austro-Russian struggle for control 
of the Balkans, but a new Franco-Italian rivalry was taking 
its place. 
Turkey welcomed the transfer of Italian pressure to 
the Balkans, but she remained apprehensive of the Duce's in-
tentions in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the Franco-Italian 
competition for Balkan influence, the Turkish press was 
openly hostile to Italy. Mussolini was described as "the 
scourge of mankind," and fascism was condemned as "minority 
1 
government by violence.n The Italian Balkan policy was 
1. Aksam, December 15, 1926 and Ikdam, November 23, 1926, in 
Bulletin periodique, No. 48, p. 10. 
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believed to be supported by Great Britain, always pleased 
with a French set-back; and the Turkish editorialists shud-
dered at the thought that Italy might wrest from France her 
1 
Syrian mandate. As late as December 28, 1927, Mussolini's 
policy was regarded as "a threat, not only to France, but 
2 
to the entire world." 
The change came suddenly. On December 30, 1927, and 
3 
editorial in the semi-official Popolo d'Italia, which was 
reprinted in the whole Italian press, prepared popular opin-
ion for a new policy towards Turkey. It denied "the ugly 
rumors of our aggressive designs on Anatolia." And it paid 
tribute to the Kemalist regime: 
The Kemalist dictatorship can be viewed by our public 
opinion with the greatest sympathy ••• Kemal Pasha is 
not only a victorious general, but also a political 
figure, who, in certain ways, can be compared to the 
strong, determined personality.of Mussolini. 
The editorial concluded: "There is no opposition between 
Rome and Angora. 11 The Turkish press was invited to pick up 
the new line: 
The Turkish press can consider this clearly as cor-
responding perfectly to the feelings of cordial friend-
ship of Italy towards the Kemalist Republic. 
In order to round out his Balkan system, Mussolini 
needed to neutralize Turkey and Greece. Rumania had not 
1. Bulletin Eeriodique, No. 48, pp. 9 and 10. 
2. Milliyet, December 28, 1927, in Bulletin periodiqu~, No. 
58, p. 11. 
3· Reprinted in Oriente Moderno, January 1928, pp. 5-6. 
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responded to Italian advances: to offset French solidarity 
with Yugoslavia and Rumania, he began openly to sponsor the 
cause of revisionism, in a bid for increased Bulgarian, and 
especially Hungarian support. At the same time, his atti-
1 
tude towards Yugoslavia became more threatening. 
Friendly relations with Turkey and Greece would 
clearly strengthen the Italian position in the Balkans. In 
April 1928, Mussolini met the Foreign Ministers of Greece 
and Turkey at Milan; the negotiations led to Treaties of 
Neutrality, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement, with Tur-
2 
key on May 30, and with Greece on September 30. A tri-
partite pact, desired by Mussolini, had proved impossible, 
because Greece and Turkey were still deeply involved in the 
settlement of property questions resulting from the exchange 
of populations. 
The Turco-Italian rapprochement was long overdue. 
The tense political atmosphere of the previous period had 
not prevented close economic relations, and Italy had occu-
pied first place in the Turkish foreign trade since 1923. 
This commercial relationship was especially advantageous to 
both parties: Italy was happy to supply the Turks with manu-
factured goods, during the temporary eclipse of Germany, 
while she bought still larger amounts of Turkey's surplus 
agricultural products, and helped the latter keep a 
1. Speech delivered in the Italian Senate, June 5, 1928, 
Documents for 1928, pp. 141 and 144. 
2. LNTS, XCV, PP• 183-93· 
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chronically unfavorable trade balance within bounds. The 
improved political situation opened prospects of a further 
trade increase. Mussolini stressed this point when he called 
upon the Chamber of Deputies to ratify the Treaty, on Decem-
ber 5/ 1928: '•Now that our political relations are defined, n 
said he, ttwe have an open field for a free, loyal and spon-
taneous collaboration of the two peoples in the commercial 
1 
and economic fields." The Turkish press, in turn, wel-
comed "the descendants of the Venetians and the Genoese, 11 
2 
and recognized Italy's need for pacific expansion. After 
the new trade agreement of 1928, Italy's share in the Turk-
ish foreign trade grew until the peak year of 1931, when, as 
Turkey's best customer, she took 24% of her exports, while 
supplying more than 14% of her imports. Italy remained 
Turkey's best customer until 1933, when Nazi Germany began 
stockpiling, and retained an important position in the Turk-
ish foreign commerce until the application of sanctions in 
3 
November, 1935· 
The improvement of political relations caused the 
Turks to revise their views of the Fascist regime. In 1930, 
when an attempt to establish a two-party system in Turkey 
resulted in rioting and bloodshed, the Cumhuriyet commented: 
In considering the present municipal elections, as they 
are being held here, we are led to do justice to 
1. Oriente Moderno, December 1928, p. 555· 
2. Cumhuriyet, June 1, 1928, in Bulletin periodique, No. 60, 
p. 12. 
3· South-Eastern Europe, p. 178. 
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Mussolini, for having declared war on the parliamentary 
system, when this governmental regime takes the form of 
an endless and sterile clash between political parties 
••• The Duce did well to sap this stupid regime. 
It was inevitable that the removal of the Italian 
threat should cause a cooling-off in Turkey's relations with 
France. Mussolini himself attributed the previous ill-feel-
ing between Italy and Turkey to 11 the intrigues of elements 
2 
alien to Turkey, but hostile to Italy.n His rival in the 
Mediterranean, in the Balkans, and in the Danubian area was 
France, and it was not difficult to guess who those intrigu-
ing elements were. The Turkish press followed his cue, but 
was more specific, as the Curnhuriyet wrote: 
We were very sorry to note that certain countries, like 
France, did not hesitate to engage in this perfidious 
duplicity, and even carried it rather far ••• The Turkey 
of Pierre Loti and Claude Farrere is no more; it has 
been replaced by a Turkey which the Mussolinis and the 
Chicherins appreciate.3 
The treaty with Italy introduced a new factor in 
Turkish relations. This was the first time the Turkish Re-
public was on friendly terms with a great Western power. The 
London Times hopefully speculated: 
Now it will be interesting to observe whether Italian 
influence will detach the Turks from the Russian orbit, 
or will achieve something more remarkable still by as-
sisting Turkey to combine her Eastern and her Western 
policy.4 
1. Cumhuriyet, October 9, 1930, in Bulletin periodique, No. 
80, p. 15. 
2. Documents for 1928, p. 143. 
3· Curnhuriyet, April 8 and September 10, 1928, in Bulletin 
p~riodique, No. 59, p. 9, and No. 63, p. 9· 
4. The Times, July 25, 1928. 
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b. TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
Between 1925 and 1927, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Per-
sia and Afghanistan indulged in a second round of treaty-
making, as they had in 1921. The Russo-Persian and the 
Perso-Afghan treaties of 1927 followed the pattern of the 
Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed at 
Paris on December 17, 1925, by RU~tu and Chicherin. The 
pacts provided that if one party were attacked the other 
would remain neutral and would not enter agreements with 
the enemy. The four States once again expressed their 
solidarity, and their continued opposition to Western im-
perialism. 
In May 1928, at the time of the Turco-Italian nego-
tiations, Turco-Afghan relations entered a new phase. King 
Amanullah visited Angora on his way to tour the European 
1 
capitals. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed 
May 25 provided for closer relations between the two coun-
tries in every field. Political cooperation went further 
than the neutrality pledges of the Russian treaties. If one 
party were threatened by a third power, the other party was 
to lend its good offices to remedy the situation; if war 
broke out nevertheless, both parties were to reexamine the 
situation ,.in order to arrive at a solution that agreed with 
their high interests." Trade between the two countries was 
1. Oriente Moderno, July 1928, pp. 283-5· 
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established on the most favored nation basis. Turkey, still 
the guide of Afghanistan, though no longer in a religious 
capacity, was to furnish that country with uthe juridical, 
scientific and military specialists she might request for 
the progress and improvement of education and the army." 
Soon after, a Turkish military mission left for Kabul. 
On June 15, at Teheran, the new features of the Turco-
Afghan Treaty wer~ added, by special Protocols, to the exist-
1 
ing Turco-Persian and Perso-Afghan treaties. Cooperation 
among the three states became closer and more comprehensive 
than the cooperation of any one with the Soviet Union. 
Their foreign policy showed'signs of becoming increasingly 
independent of, though not opposed to, that of Soviet Russia. 
In December 1929, the Turco-Soviet Pact of 1925 was 
up for renewal. Vice-Commissar Karakhan visited Angora 
where he was feted amid the customary toasts to the per-
petual friendship of the two peoples. The Treaty was re-
2 
newed without modification, and for a period of two years, 
instead of three as in the original Treaty, with the usual 
provision for an automatic renewal of one year unless the 
Treaty were denounced. It is possible that the Soviets had 
become wary of the future course of Turkey's foreign policy, 
in view of her new link with a Western imperialistic State. 
At any rate, it is certain that the Stalin regime was 
1. LNTS, CVI, pp. 264-7. 
2. H. M. Davis, Constitutions, pp. 375-6. 
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unwilling to be committed to any greater degree of solidar-
ity with the three Middle Eastern States. 
Meanwhile, Turkey's new tie with Italy brought about 
a profound change in her relations with Greece. 
87 
c. THE END OF THE GRECO-TURKISH FEUD 
Mussolini had tried in 1928 to bind Turkey, Greece 
and Italy together by a tripartite pact. The attempt failed, 
and the Duce had to be content with separate treaties with 
Greece and Turkey. But his conciliatory efforts were not 
wasted, and it appeared that a Greco-Turkish entente was 
only a matter of time. Venizelos was returned to power in 
May, 1928, and he championed the cause of rapprochement with 
his customary vigor. Speaking at Salonika on July 23, he 
announced that Greece would be willing to sign a treaty of 
friendship and arbitration with Turkey as soon as the prop-
erty questions in connection with the exchange of popula-
tions could be liquidated. "We know," he said, "that Turkey 
has no designs upon our territory, and she can rest assured 
1 
that we have none on hers.tt Turkish Prime Minister Ismet 
Pasha concurred with venizelos, as he told the National As-
sembly on September 14: 
I must declare that there is no opposition between the 
reciprocal interests of the two countries; in other 
words, there is no obstacle in the way of their final 
understanding. There is, above all, no territorial dis-
pute between them. The present differences arise from 
the interpretation of the clauses of existing agreements, 
and relate to the private interests of nationals of the 
two countries, and not to state interests.2 
The settlement of the property questions dragged on 
for two more years. The Agreement of Athens had not been 
1. The Times (London), July 24, 1928. 
2. Documents for 1928, p. 221. 
observed by either side. During the first month after the 
Agreement came into force, in July 1927, a few properties 
had been restored; there the work of restoration stopped, 
each government hesitating to proceed, in the conviction 
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1 
that the other would not carry out its end of the bargain. 
By the end of 1928, even the appraisal of those properties 
to be acquired by the two Governments had come to a stand-
still. 
In December 1928, the two Governments began negotiat-
ing on a basis which would eliminate the interminable work 
of individual appraisals: the properties concerned would 
be evaluated en bloc, the appraisals already made being used 
as a norm; and any balance would be paid in a lump sum by 
2 
the debtor Government. The Inspection Service of the Mixed 
Commission reported that the properties of the exchanged per-
sons alone would require 100 neutral experts working thirty 
years to appraise, at a cost of £6,132,000. The negotiators 
considered the whole problem of property liquidation, and 
the point at issue gradually narrowed down to the amount of 
the sum that one government would owe the other. 
The negotiations broke down in March, 1929, and the 
press of both countries engaged in recriminations. Speaking 
before the Greek Chamber of Deputies on April 1, Venizelos 
appealed for mutual understanding: 
1. s. P. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities, pp. 540-1. 
2. Ibid., P· 551. 
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The conclusion of a Greco-Turkish treaty of friendship 
was prevented until now not by the ill will of the two 
governments nor by their indifference. I am convinced 
that at Angora, as much as at Athens, the friendly rap-
prochement of the two countries is sincerely desired. 
But both parties have realized that if the rapprochement 
is to be durable, it must be preceded by a solution of 
the great economic problems which arose from the compul-
sory exchange of populations and which affect the inter-
ests of hundreds of thousands of citizens of both coun-
tries ••• Both are democratic countries, and they cannot 
but take into consideration the points of view of the 
interested parties, without however being guided exclu-
sively by them. That is why I wish to tell the Greek 
press that it is being unfair when it maintains that 
the obstacle to an agreement lies with the lack of good 
faith of the Angora Government. The Turkish press is 
also unjust when it attributes the difficulty of reach-
ing an a~reem~nt to the lack of good faith of the Athens 
Cabinet. 
The negotiations were resumed the same month. 
For a while, however, Greco-Turkish relations were 
further complicated by a naval question. The Turks were re-
conditioning the heavy cruiser Yavuz Selim -- the former 
Goeben of World War fame. The refitting of this single ship, 
displacing 22,500 tons, would almost double the total ton-
nage of the active Turkish Navy, and give it a marked superi-
ority over the Greek Navy. The Greek Parliament wanted to 
match the Turkish vessel by the purchase of a cruiser. But 
Venizelos again urged moderation and persuaded his colleagues 
to obtain instead small naval craft and aircraft, suitable 
primarily for defence. 
As a result of the improved political atmosphere, as 
well as the good offices of the Italian Government, agreement 
was soon reached on all property questions. On June 10, 1930, 
1. Documents for 1929, p. 140. 
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1 
at Ankara, the Greek and Turkish Governments signed a ncon-
vention regarding the Final Settlement of the Questions 
resulting from the Application of the Treaty of Lausanne and 
of the Agreement of Athens relating to the Exchange of Popu-
2 
lations • 11 The property settlement was a sweeping one; ex-
cept for the property of the Greeks established in Istanbul, 
of the Moslems established in Western Thrace, and such Mos-
lem property in Greece as had already been restored, all 
Moslem property in Greece, and all Greek property in Turkey, 
was transferred to the full ownership of the Greek and Turk-
ish Governments respectively. Greece placed at the disposal 
of the Mixed Commission a sum of 425,000 pounds sterling; 
150,000 pounds of this amount was available for compensation 
to Istanbul Greeks who lost property in other parts of Tur-
key as a result of the agreement; an equal sum was available 
for indemnification to the Moslems of Western Thrace who 
incurred similar losses in Greece; the remainder went to 
the Turkish Government, though a part of it was to be held 
as security pending the restoration of property in Istanbul. 
There would be no more quarrel over the status of the Istanbul 
Greeks; they were recognized as established if they were, as 
1. On March 28, the names of many cities in Turkey had been 
changed, and as much as possible ttturkifiedn: Constanti-
nople became Istanbul, also of Greek derivation, but less 
reminiscent of the Greek Empire; Angora became Ankara, 
Smyrna became Izmir, Adrianople became Edirne, etc ..•. 
2. LNTS, CVIII, PP• 233-53· 
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of August 1929, upresent in the Istanbul Zone which was ex-
cepted from the exchange irrespective of the date of their 
arrival at Istanbul and their place of birth," or if they 
had left Istanbul "in possession of passports issued by the 
authorities of the Turkish Republic." Finally, the Mixed 
Commission was given full powers to put the Convention into 
force, when it was given the arbitral power which it should 
have exercised from the very beginning: both Governments 
undertook to accept its decisions "without discussion," and 
any difference of opinion or dispute was to be finally set-
tled by the neutral members. The Mixed Commission was able 
to liquidate all problems in three and a half years, and it 
was disbanded on December 9, 1933. 
The political treaty soon followed the property set-
tlement. In the latter part of October 1930, Prime Minister 
Venizelos and Foreign Minister Michalacopoulos went to Ankara 
on an official visit. On October 30, a Treaty of Neutrality, 
1 
Conciliation and Arbitration was signed, similar to those 
concluded by Italy two years before with Turkey and Greece. 
A Naval Protocol, annexed to the Treaty, bore witness to 
the beneficial results of Venizelos' conciliatory attitude 
the year before in the Yavuz Selim affair. Each party under-
took 
to effect no order, acquisition or construction of war 
units or armaments, without having notified the other 
party six months previously, so that both Governments 
1. LNTS, CXXV, pp. 9-21. 
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may thus be enabled if necessary to prevent any competi-
tion in the sphere of naval armaments by means of a 
friendly exchange of views and explanations on either 
side in a spirit of perfect sincerity. 
The visit of the Greek statesmen was a festive occa-
sion in Turkey. The earlier career of Mr. Venizelos was 
even reinterpreted for the occasion: ''we might well wonder 
after all, 11 wrote Politika, "if Mr. Venizelos did not con-
tribute in some way to our national welfare, in fighting the 
1 
Ottoman Empire which we ourselves have killed and buried." 
The following year, Ismet Pasha and Tevfik Ru~tu went to 
Athens for the exchange of ratifications, and participated 
in the inauguration of the Olympic games. 
The basic factor in the rapprochement between Greece 
and Turkey was the successful liquidation of their inter-
woven territorial and minority problems. The Thracian fron-
tier was considered definitive by both sides. As a result 
of the exchange of populations, Anatolia had become thoroughly 
Turkish, while Macedonia and Epirus were solidly Greek. The 
remaining minorities were too small to present a problem. 
The Greek Orthodox of Istanbul and the Moslems of Western 
Thrace came to regard themselves as Turks and Greeks respec-
tively, and the Governments ceased to view them with suspicion. 
The success of the Greco-Turkish negotiations had been 
facilitated by the good offices of the Italian Government. 
On the day the Treaty was signed, Tevfik RustU wired his 
~ 
1. Bulletin periodique, No. 80, p. 16. 
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thanks to Mussolini, in acknowledgment of his med±atory work: 
At this time when we are about to sign the Turco-Greek 
Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration, I 
am pleased to express to your Excellency my most friendly 
and sincere thanks for the efforts displayed by your Ex- 1 
cellency in order to facilitate and realize this entente. 
Mussolini's Balkan treaty system was taking shape; it 
remained to be seen what use the Greeks and Turks themselves 
would make of their new relationship. 
1. Oriente Moderno, November 1930, p. 547. 
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a. THE BALKAN CONFERENCES 
During this same month of October 1930, when Musso-
lini capped his Balkan edifice with the Greco-Turkish Treaty 
and the marriage of Princess Giovanna to the King of Bul-
garia, a native movement towards Balkan consolidation was 
inaugurated. The First Balkan Conference met at Athens from 
October 5 to 12. 
The idea of Balkan solidarity was not new. In the 
summer of 1925 the Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. Rentis, had 
suggested a Balkan pact of nonaggression, mutual guarantee, 
1 
and compulsory arbitration. When troops of his own country 
burst into Bulgaria a few months later, it was clear that 
the idea was premature. There were too many major disputes 
between the Balkan States: both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia 
were at odds with Greece over their right of access to the 
Aegean; Bulgaria complained of maltreatment of the Bulgarian 
element in Yugoslav Macedonia, while Yugoslavia accused Bul-
garia of supporting the terroristic activities of the 
"komi tadjis n; Turkey and Greece were still bickering over 
the exchange of populations. The time was ill-suited for a 
rapprochement of the Balkan States. 
The Balkan atmosphere had cleared considerably by 
1930. Mussolini, for reasons of his own, had brought Greece 
1. Charles Vellay, "Un pacte de garantie pour les Balkans," 
L'Europe Nouvelle, August 8, 1925, p. 1047. 
and Turkey together. He had also indirectly and uninten-
tionally brought about a Greek-Yugoslav understanding in 
connection with the Yugoslav zone at Salonika: fear of en-
circlement made the Yugoslavs less exacting, a free zone was 
arranged, and on t-1arch 17, 1929, peaceful Grego-Yugoslav re-
lations were assured by a Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation 
1 
and Judicial Settlement. Even Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations 
took a turn for the better: on February 14, 1930, a fron-
tier agreement established a system of border control for 
the prevention of border incidents. 
When the First Balkan Conference met in 1930, it ap-
peared that understanding would not be difficult among 
Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania. All three were "satisfied" 
powers enlarged by the Allied victory, and interested in 
maintaining the status quo. Difficulties were likely to 
arise in connection with Albania, and especially Bulgaria. 
Albania was Italy's beachhead in the Balkans; Bulgaria had 
territorial claims against Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece 
which were actively enc0uraged by Italy. Mussolini could be 
expected to put pressure on Bulgaria and Albania in order to 
prevent a further consolidation of the Yugoslav position. 
Turkey occupied a middle position between the satis-
fied powers and the have-nots. She had been on the losing 
side during the World War, and had lost an Empire, but the 
Treaty of Lausanne had removed the restrictions that still 
1. L'Europe Nouvelle, April 20, 1929, pp. 519-27. 
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weighed upon her former allies. She was the only one of 
Bulgaria's neighbors to be on good terms with her. The Turk-
ish and Bulgarian Governments had found a satisfactory solu-
tion to those two problems which plague the relations of all 
Balkan states: the rights of minorities and the indemnifi-
cation of emigrants' property. Turco-Bulgarian relations 
1 
rested on the Treaty of Friendship of October 18, 1925, re-
affirmed on March 6, 1929 and amplified by a procedure of 
2 
conciliation, judicial settlement and arbitration. At the 
Balkan Conference, Turkey was in a position to mediate be-
tween Bulgaria and her neighbors. 
The initiative for a Balkan conference had come from 
a former Prime Minister of Greece. At the Twenty-seventh 
Universal Congress of Peace, held at Athens in October 1929, 
Mr. Alexander Papanastassiou had proposed that annual Balkan 
conferences be held, at which all problems of common inter-
est to the Balkan peoples might be studied. The International 
Peace Bureau was requested to call the first meeting. 
The conferences would be unofficial in character, 
and the resolutions adopted would in no way obligate the 
Balkan governments; but it was hoped that the atmosphere cre-
ated by a broad discussion of Balkan problems would encour-
age the governments to take action along the lines indicated. 
3 
The circular letter sent the following May by the President 
1. LNTS, LIV, PP· 125-33· 
2. Ibid., CXIV, pp. 399-411. 
3· T. I. Geshkoff, Balkan Union (Columbia U., 1940), pp. 235-9· 
of the International Peace Bureau to the Foreign Ministers 
of the six Balkan states suggested that the delegates be 
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drawn from the political, economic and cultural organiza-
tions of each country. "The Balkans, 11 the letter added, 11will 
cease to be considered the sore spot of Europe only when the 
Balkan peoples, having understood that their interests can 
better be protected by themselves, will rely only on them-
selves to find remedies for the maladies from which they 
have suffered in the past. tt 
The ultimate political purpose of the Balkan Confer-
ences was bold enough; it was the eventual federation, or 
even the union of the Balkan States. The circular letter 
mentioned the final goal: 
The necessity for more limited federations within the 
framework of a universal federation having been recog-
nized, the LUniversal Peace Congresi7 considers a union 
of the Balkan States most desirable. 
1 
The statutes adopted at the First Balkan Conference reaf-
firmed this purpose: 
The aim of the Balkan Conference is to contribute to 
the rapprochement and collaboration of the Balkan peo-
ples in their economic, social, cultural, and political 
relations, so as to direct this collaboration toward 
the ultimate establishment of the Union of Balkan States 
(Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Turkey and Yugo-
slavia). · 
The success of the Little Entente had proved the effective-
ness of united action by small states; a Balkan Union had 
every change of being more effective. Whereas the Little 
1. Geshkoff, Balkan Union, pp. 240-7. 
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Entente stretched out in a semi-circle around Hungary, which 
it was intended to keep in check, a Union of all the Balkan 
States would rest on a geographical unit, and its purpose 
would be more comprehensive and more constructive. 
The economic advantages expected of Balkan union were 
particularly important during the first year of the World 
Depression. It was hoped that intra-Balkan trade would be 
increased and that the Balkan States, instead of competing 
with each other, would cooperate as a bloc on the world mar-
ket. 
There were grave differences of opinion, however, be-
tween the various national delegations, as to the proper 
means for attaining those ends. The Greeks wanted to go for-
ward on all fronts towards political union, a common commer-
cial policy, a monetary and customs union, integration of 
communications, an ideal of ttuniversal humanismn in the 
schools, and some measure of unification of Balkan law. The 
Bulgarians favored political federation, but insisted upon 
a prior settlement of the minorities problem; the effective 
application of the minority clauses of existing treaties 
was "the condition sine qua non for any cooperation, rap-
prochement, detente, and entente among the Balkan peoples.u 
The Albanians supported the Bulgarian point of view. The 
Yugoslav and Rumanian delegations considered the idea of 
political union premature; they feared that free political 
discussion would provide the Bulgarians with a forum for 
their minorities grievances, and perhaps for their revisionist 
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claims. The Yugoslavs felt that the first step in the di-
rection of Balkan union should be economic integration, 
while the Rumanians advocated closer cultural ties: ttcivic 
and intellectual disarmament, tt they maintained, "must pre-
cede political disarrnament. 11 The Turkish attitude was 
1 
relatively passive. 
The First Balkan Conference drew up the "statutes of 
the Balkan Conference, u which organized it along the lines 
of the League of Nations: the organs of the Conference were 
the General .Assembly, the Council, the Secretariat and the 
National Groups. The General .Assembly was to meet yearly, 
and the conferences would be held in each Balkan country in 
turn. The drafting of resolutions was entrusted to six 
permanent Commissions on Organization, Political Relations, 
Intellectual Cooperation, Economics, Communications and So-
cial Policy. 
The political meetings of the First Balkan Conference 
confirmed the fears of the "satisfied .. states • .A Bulgarian 
draft resolution, which was voted down, brought up the ques-
tion of minorities, "one of the greatest obstacles which 
ought to be removed from the path of Balkan understanding 11 ; 
the resolution declared that it was 
indispensable for the governments of the Balkan states 
as well as for the minorities living in their territories 
to carry out their mutual obligations completely and loy-
ally, in accordance with the stipulations of the minorities 
treaties. 
1. R. J. Kerner and H. N. Howard, The Balkan Conferences and 
the Balkan Entente (U. of California, 1936), p. ig. 
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When another resolution proposing study of a Balkan pact was 
made, the Bulgarian delegate, Mr. Sakazoff, went a step fur-
ther, from the observance of treaties to treaty revision: 
If there were to be a Balkan union based, as it should be, 
upon the principle of equality for all the participating 
states, it would be necessary for the restrictive stipu-
lations of the Treaty of Neuilly to be revised in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Article 19 of the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations. 
Nevertheless, the resolution was adopted, even Bul-
garia voting in favor. It contained the following proposals: 
1. That the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Balkan 
states should meet regularly each year ..• for the 
purpose of exchanging views on Balkan affairs and on 
the means of ensuring solidarity of their countries; 
2. That the Balkan Conference should proceed to the 
study of a pact of the Balkan States on the basis of 
the following principles: 
(a) the outlawry of war; 
(b) the settlement by pacific means of every dispute, 
whatever its nature, which may arise among the 
Balkan nations; 
(c) mutual assistance among them in the event of 
violation of the engagements not to make war. 
The resolution provided that 
the Council of the Conference should set up a special 
committee to examine a draft Pact and to study all dif-
ficulties which stand in the way of the moral detente 
and political rapprochement among the Balkan peoples. 
This committee should submit to the next Conference a 
report on all the points contained in this resolution. 
The Economics Commission of the Balkan Conference 
studied the possibilities of a Balkan customs union, a mone-
tary union, and a common Balkan economic policy. The task 
1. Geshkoff, Balkan Union, pp. 183-6. 
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of this Commission was difficult because of the very nature 
of the Balkan economic situation. The six states are pre-
dominantly agricultural, and their economies are competitive 
rather than complementary. Besides, an economic consolida-
tion of the Balkan peninsula would have limited effect since 
intra-Balkan commerce normally represents only 13% of the 
total Balkan trade. 
In the other fields, the First Balkan Conference 
adopted a draft postal union, directed the Council to study 
the problem of a gradual unification of Balkan law, and 
recommended increased contacts between intellectual organi-
zations, the expurgation of school textbooks and the founda-
tion of an institute of Balkan intellectual cooperation. 
The Conference was successful in creating organizations 
which did not require governmental sanction, such as a Bal-
kan Tourist Federation, a Balkan Sport Federation and a 
Balkan Press Association. 
During the following year, the Governments of the 
Balkan States paid little attention to the recommendations 
of the First Balkan Conference. The Council of the Confer-
ence met in February 1931 to study a draft Balkan pact pre-
pared by Professor Spiropoulos, of Greece; a committee was 
appointed to report on the draft pact to the next Balkan 
Conference. 
The Second Balkan Conference met at Istanbul October 
20-26, 1931. The political sessions were particularly 
stormy. The Bulgarians demanded a settlement of the 
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minorities question prior to the consideration of a Balkan 
pact. This time the Greek and Yugoslav delegations counter-
attacked. The Greek memorandum referred to 
the existence of private military organizations, called 
Macedonian, which have fostered an ultra-nationalist 
antagonism in the Balkans by the same old barbaric 
methods employed in Turkey under the Sultanate organi-
zations which have formed a State within a State and 
have presented the greatest obstacle to the friendly 
relations of the Balkan states ••• The Conference 
should consequently recommend to the States in which 
such organizations exist that they dissolve them imme-
diately. 
The Yugoslav memorandum, after a similar reference to the 
Bulgarian komitadjis, alluded to the relations of Albania 
and Bulgaria with Italy, to 
the rapprochement and alliance of Balkan states with 
non-Balkan states which have avowed aims of conquest 
and colonization of Balkan territories. 1 
Such frank discussion cleared the air, and the poli-
2 
tical resolutions of the Second Balkan Conference took into 
account the Bulgarian objections. The Council was directed 
to submit to a Committee of Inquiry the preliminary 
draft Balkan Pact put forward by the Greek delegation, 
as well as the proposals for ensuring the loyal execu-
tion of the clauses of the treaties of peace, including 
those relating to minorities... n 
The national groups were urged to engage in bilateral talks, 
in order to reach agreement on matters likely to endanger 
the good relations between them and to ensure scrupulous 
respect for all obligations arising out of treaties now 
in force, including those dealing with the protection of 
minorities. 
1. T. I. Geshkoff, Balkan Union, pp. 188-9. 
2. Ibid., P• 193· 
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Again the Conference expressed the hope that the Foreign 
Ministers of the Balkan States should meet annually; it 
requested the Turkish Government 11 to appreciate the neces-
sity of taking the initiative in calling the first of these 
annual meetings." 
The Second Balkan Conference met immediately after 
the planned Austro-German customs union had aroused general 
opposition in European capitals, and been condemned by the 
Hague Court. The Economic Committee of the Conference was 
forced to put off consideration of any broad program of Bal-
kan economic unification. It adopted statutes for a Balkan 
Chamber of Commerce, recommended the creation of national 
offices for cereals, proposed a Balkan Chamber of Agricul-
ture, and laid the groundwork for the creation of an Orien-
tal Tobacco Office by the three tobacco-producing states, 
Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. The Communications Committee 
adopted a new draft postal convention. The Intellectual 
Cooperation Committee recommended the abolition of passport 
visas, and the foundation of a Balkan Institute of Historical 
) 
Research. 
In the interval between the Second and Third Balkan 
Conferences, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia took note of the political activity of the Con-
ference, but in a negative way. They rebuked the Conference 
for its meddling with political questions which were the 
proper business of the governments. Mr. Papanastassiou re-
torted that "the Balkan peoples had as much right to discuss 
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questions concerning their welfare as their governmentstt; 
furthermore, the resolutions of the Conference did not obli-
1 
gate the governments in any way. 
diminished in three years: 
His optimism had not 
If the future labors of the Conference are pursued with 
equal success, and if the Balkan organizations which 
have already been created begin to function, we shall 
achieve union without knowing how we have done it.2 
In spite of the Foreign Ministers, the Third Balkan 
Conference, which met at Bucharest October 22-28, 1932, was 
concerned mainly with the political question of the Draft 
Balkan Pact. The Bulgarians reiterated their demand for a 
prior settlement of the minorities question; they proposed 
bilateral negotiations between the national groups with a 
view to agreements on this question between the interested 
parties. Upon being voted down, the Bulgarian delegation 
withdrew, and the other delegations proceeded to a discussion 
of the Pact. 
3 
The Draft Balkan Pact adopted by the Third Balkan 
Conference on October 26, 1932, is a comprehensive document 
comprising 39 articles. It contains a pledge of nonaggres-
sion, a provision for mutual assistance in case of attack, 
and a procedure for the pacific settlement of disputes. A 
special chapter is devoted to the protection of minorities: 
1. T. I. Geshkoff, Balkan Union, pp. 194-5. 
2. Kerner and Howard, The Balkan Conferences, p. 68. 
3· T. I. Geshkoff, Balkan Union, pp. 290-9. 
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complaints may be referred by the national minority offices 
to the Balkans Minorities Commission. This minorities sys-
tern, however, incorporated in deference to Bulgaria, is a 
limited concession; the Commission's recommendations, to be 
binding, must be_unanimous, including the vote of the inter-
ested party, although split decisions could be referred to 
the League of Nations. Furthermore, the status quo provi-
siOns of the Pact were unacceptable to Bulgaria. The Con-
tracting Parties undertook to 
take all necessary measures for the strict application 
of all the obligations arising from the treaties in 
force; 
and the Conciliation Commission would not consider 
(a) disputes concerning the territorial status of the 
Contracting Parties, and 
(b) disputes concerning questions which by international 
law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of 
the States. 
With the adoption of the Draft Balkan Pact, the poli-
tical work of the Balkan Conferences was practically ended. 
Three months later, Hitler came to power in Germany, and a 
new period began for all the states of Europe. There was a 
Fourth Balkan Conference in 1933, but it concerned itself 
mainly with economic questions. The initiative in political 
planning now passed from the unofficial delegates to the 
government leaders, who worked towards coalition rather than 
federation or union. The Balkan Conferences had served a 
useful purpose; they had provided a forum for the discussion 
of all aspects of Balkan life. Many of the Conference pro-
posals guided the subsequent actions of the governments. 
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The Balkan Conferences may have fostered a certain amount of 
Balkan feeling and mutual good-will. At any rate, the spark 
that lit up World War II did not come from the Balkans, as 
so many feared it would after the first World War. 
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b. LEAGUE MEMBERSHIP 
The question of Turkey's eventual admission to 
League membership was raised as early as the Lausanne Con-
ference in 1922. When the Straits and minorities problems 
were discussed, the Turks professed to respect the League 
but appeared-apprehensive of its supervision. On December 
13, Lord Curzon put the question squarely to Ismet Pasha: 
ttwhat line were the Turkish delegation going to take? Did 
they wish to join the League, to become members, to obtain 
the advantage of its guarantee, or not?!! Ismet replied the 
following day that 
the Turkish delegation had never said that Turkey would 
not enter the League. On the contrary, she was ready 
to enter it as soon as peace was concluded.l 
In January, Ismet and Lord Curzon were deadlocked on the 
Mosul question, and the latter suggested referring the mat-
ter to the League Council for "a most impartial examina tiontt; 
again Ismet was distrustful, and he urged a prior attempt 
at bilateral negotiations. 
That the desire of Turkey to enter the League was 
mingled with doubts as to its impartiality was confirmed 
by Mustapha Kemal, when he told the National Assembly on 
March 1, 1923: 
Once the treaty is ratified it will be time to consider 
the question of Turkey's admission to the League of 
1. Cmd. 1814, pp. 213 and 219. 
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Nations. We hope that the League of Nations will prove 
to be an institution intended, not to maintain the pre-
dominance of certain nations over others, but to pre-
serve peace and harmony among the various powers, and 
to work
1
out an equitable solution of the various con-
flicts. 
The Treaty of Lausanne came officially into force on August 
6, 1924, and on the same day the British Government referred 
the Mosul dispute to the League Council. As far as Turkey 
was concerned, Mosul would be a test of the League's impar-
tiality between great Powers and small, between East and 
West. 
While the Mosul question wound its way from Council 
to Commission to Committee and back to Council, Turkish 
suspicion of the League increased; all procedural questions 
had been decided to the advantage of Great Britain. When 
the Hague Court interpreted the Lausanne Treaty as giving 
the League Council arbitral powers, both Court and League 
were joined in one condemnation: "We can expect nothing, :• 
wrote the Cumhuriyet, tteither from the Court of Justice at 
2 
the Hague, or from the League of Nations.n The Council's 
award of Mosul to Great Britain's protege on December 16, 
1925, was unmistakable proof that the League was a mere tool 
in the hands of Britain and France to dominate the small 
states and to keep the Soviets in check. When Chicherin 
said the following week, speaking of the League: ttwe shall 
1. Bulletin periodique, No. 34, p. 6. 
2. Curnhuriyet, November 25, 1925, in Bulletin periodique, 
No. 44, p. 5 · 
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never allow ourselves to be hitched to the triumphal chariot 
1 
of Imperialism," he expressed the feelings of the angered 
Turks as well. 
Turkey eventually took her Mosul defeat with good 
grace, and resentment against Britain and the League sub-
sided. After 1928, Turkey's improved relations with Italy 
and Greece tended to balance her Russian contact. The Bal-
kan Conferences, though unofficial, marked a beginning in 
multilateral diplomacy. The westward movement of Turkish 
policy was slow, but sure. Yet Turkey did not enter the 
League until 1932. 
It has often been stated that Turkey's reluctance 
was due to Russian pressure. As a matter of fact, a strictly 
Soviet interpretation of the Treaty of 1925 would forbid her 
entry into the League; Turkey was pledged "not to take part 
in any alliance or agreement of a political character with 
one or several Powers directed against the other contracting 
party,n and the League was precisely, by Russian definition, 
a coalition of the capitalist states bent on the destruction 
of the Soviet Union. International treaties are not subject, 
however, to unilateral interpretation; furthermore, when the 
Soviets signed a similar treaty with Persia, on October 1, 
2 
1927, they acknowledged, by an exchange of letters, that 
the treaty provisions were consistent with Persia's previous 
obligations as a League member. 
1. The Times (London), December 24, 1925. 
2. L'Europe Nouvelle, October 29, 1927, pp. 1457-8. 
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The Turkish Government had its own reasons for bid-
ing its time. The Soviet tie was its only advantage in its 
dealings with the West; if Turkey threw in her lot with the 
League, she would seriously compromise the Soviet relation-
ship, and would not gain corresponding support within the 
League; her diplomatic position was still weak and her 
voice would not be heard among those of the World War vic-
tors. It was better to wait until League membership ceased 
to be an alternative to the good understanding with the 
Soviets. The moment was not far off. Stalin's victory over 
the Trotskyites in 1927 augured for Russia a more national 
policy; the world revolution was adjourned, and normal rela-
tions with the capitalist states became possible. The rise 
of the Nazi party in Germany, and the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria constituted a double threat to the U.s.s.R. Poli-
tical cooperation with Germany, the keystone of Soviet policy 
since 1922, ended even before the advent of Hitler, and Mos-
cow turned towards her former arch-enemies, France and Po-
land. The Soviets were not yet ready to enter the League, 
and the latter was not yet ready to receive them, but the 
admission of Turkey no longer threatened to compromise her 
relations with the U.s.s.R. 
The Turkish Government intimated that an invitation 
from the League would be received favorably. On July 1, 
1932, the League Assembly voted to invite Turkey to become 
a League member. In the Turkish reply of July 9 accepting 
the invitation, Foreign Minister Rustu followed the precedent 
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set by Germany in 1926: referring to the obligations Turkey 
was about to assume under Article 16 of the Covenant, he was 
compelled to add that Turkey ~ail in a special position 
as a result of the military obligations contained ln 
the conventions signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923. 
In the light of the German example, it was certain that 
Turkey would press for remilitarization of the Straits and 
the Thracian border at every possible opportunity. A few 
days before, Ru~tu had wired Moscow that Turkish policy 
towards the Soviet Union would remain unchanged: ttr am happy 
to assure you," said he, n that my government's purpose of 
developing the friendly relations which have always existed 
between the U.s.s.R. and Turkey will not be modified in any 
2 
way." 
On July 18, the League Assembly voted to admit Turkey 
to League membership. Fourteen years after the end of the 
World War, Turkey's reconciliation with the West was complete. 
The over-all situation of the new League member was 
incomparably better in 1932 than it had been nine years be-
fore. The basic measures for social reform had been intro-
duced, and it only remained for time to complete the western-
ization of the Turkish people. After the adoption of new 
law codes in 1926, the last vestiges of the judicial capitu-
lations disappeared. Women attained equal legal status with 
1. LNOJ, Special Supplement No. 102, p. 21. 
2. L 1Asie Frangaise, July-August 1932, p. 264. 
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men. In 1930, they were allowed to vote in local elections 
and to hold local office; these civic rights were to be ex-
tended to the national level in 1934. Education was pressed 
vigorously: as soon as the Latin alphabet was introduced 
in 1928, public officials were required to become acquainted 
with it. Night schools were organized to lower the illiter-
acy rate (92% in 1927); in 1932, more than two million 
adults attended these schools. In March 1931 el~mentary 
education became compulsory; the total school enrollment 
1 
rose from 346,580 in 1923-24 to 593,593 in 1931-32. A 
first census, taken in October 1927, revealed a population 
of 13,648,270; in 1932, it was about fifteen million. 
The Government took steps to help agriculture, which 
supplies the livelihood of 67% of the Turkish people. Maxi-
mum interest rates were set, and the Agricultural Bank organ-
ized farm credit. The State built silos where the farmers 
could store their grain and receive credit pending its sale 
on the market. surplus grain was bought by the Agricultural 
Bank, to prevent a falling-off of the domestic price. Fin-
ally, the Government set up model farms, and trained the 
2 
peasants in the use of modern implements. 
The main goal of the Government, however, was in the 
development of industry. As early as 1924, the People's Re-
publican Party, meeting at Smyrna, laid down the principles 
1. D. Mihajlovic, La nouvelle Turquie economique (Belgrade, 
1937), PP· 15-18. 
2. Ibid., p. 22. 
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of the Republic's economic policy. The recent war period 
had shown Turkey's complete dependence on foreign resources 
even for her own defence. It was imperative that-the 11 colo-
nia111 economy of the later Ottoman State make way for a more 
autarchic system. The means for achieving a more national 
economy were to be the following: the development of industry 
with native capital, the improvement of transportation, the 
purchase of foreign concessions and the avoidance of foreign 
loans. 
Until 1929, the Government had difficulty implement-
ing this broad program. Turkish private capital was insuf-
ficient for the task, and the national budget was usually 
deficitary. The foreign trade showed an unfavorable balance 
every year until 1929, when the value of imports surpassed 
that of exports by a ratio of five to three. Nevertheless, 
some progress was made, and in 1930 Turkey's economic situa-
tion began to improve. Between 1923 and 1932, the produc-
tion of coal in the Eregli-Zonguldak area was increased from 
597,000 to 1,593,000 tons. During the same period the Gov-
ernment built new railroad lines and began purchasing old 
ones from foreign owners. In 1924, the State owned 1,734 
kilometers of railroads, compared with 2,352 for private 
companies; in 1932, it operated 3,592 kilometers compared 
1 
with 2,282 for the companies. 
The Turkish foreign trade took a turn for the better 
1. Istatistik Y!lllg~, 1934-35, pp. 352, 613. 
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in 1930, the first year in which exports exceeded imports. 
Until 1929, Turkey was bound by the Lausanne Commercial Con-
vention to maintain the tariff rates of 1916. The year 1929 
was especially bad for the trade balance; the major factors 
were the crop failure, the introduction of the Russian Five 
Year Plan, and the stockpiling by Turkish merchants in anti-
cipation of the new Turkish tariff. In 1929, the Turkish 
Government recovered full control of its customs, and new 
trade agreements were negotiated with all countries. The 
State exercised control over its own nationals dealing 
abroad, requiring that purchases abroad be compensated by 
imports. The traders found ways of circumventing the law, 
and the Government began to control the foreign trade more 
directly through clearing agreements with other countries. 
After 1929, Turkish foreign trade showed a favorable balance 
until 1938, when large armaments purchases again swelled 
the volume of imports. During the depression years, when 
the value of goods declined and international trade de-
l 
creased, the volume of Turkish exports rose steadily. 
The Turkish Government was remarkably successful in 
the field of finance. From 1928 on, the budget was balanced. 
The budgetary policy was twofold: to increase disbursements 
which spur economic activity, while cutting unproductive ex-
penses as much as possible; and to undertake new enterprises 
only when the funds were available. In 1930, the Turkish 
1. D. Mihajlovic, La nouvelle Turquie economique, pp. 49-54. 
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Government shook off its dependence on the foreign-owned 
Ottoman Bank. During the latter part of 1929, the Turkish 
pound had fallen considerably as a result of Turkey's worsen-
ing trade balance. The Ottoman Bank, which handled the Gov-
ernment's financial transactions, prevented the pound's com-
plete collapse. At that time, the Government was planning 
to create its own bank of issue, and the Ottoman Bank re-
quested a controlling interest in the new bank. When the 
Turks refused to grant its request, the Ottoman Bank ceased 
to support the Turkish pound, and the latter fell to one-
tenth of its par value, or 110 Turkish pounds to the pound 
sterling. 
The Turkish Government did not yield to pressure. It 
created the Turkish Central Bank, henceforth its own bank of 
issue, prohibited the transfer of capital abroad, and strictly 
controlled the money exchange. The Turkish pound was stabi-
lized at 103 to the pound sterling. In September 1931, when 
Britain went off the gold standard, the Turkish pound was 
pegged on the French franc, at 12.06 francs to the pound. 
When the French franc was devalued in 1936, the Turkish Gov-
ernment announced its policy of maintaining the value of its 
currency. The stability of the Turkish pound after 1930 was 
a factor in inducing the bondholders of the Ottoman Debt in 
1938 to accept payment in Turkish pounds instead of the un-
stable French franc. After the Turkish Government gained 
financial control in Turkey, the native banks, like the 
Business Bank and the Agricultural Bank, experienced a sudden 
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development, while the foreign-owned banks saw their opera-
tions reduced or went out of business. As for the Ottoman 
Bank, its charter was renewed in 1933, but it now did little 
more than arrange short-term loans for the Turkish Govern-
1 
ment. 
In nine years the Government had restored order at 
home and confidence abroad. Its authority reached to the 
most remote vilayets. The Kurds had rebelled for the last 
time in 1930, and the Christian minorities no longer pre-
sented a problem. Foreign governments had belatedly and re-
luctantly transferred their embassies to Ankara; the capital 
had grown from a town of about 25,000 in 1923 to a city of 
over 100,000. The Ankara Government still operated on the 
one-party system, as in 1923, and Mustapha Kemal, as Presi-
dent, was a virtual dictator. In 1930, he had sponsored the 
formation of an opposition party under the leadership of 
Fethi Bey, but the ensuing riots convinced him that the 
country was not yet ready for peaceful political contests. 
He is reputed to have said afterwards: "Let the people leave 
politics alone for the present. Let them interest themselves 
in agriculture and commerce. For ten or fifteen years more 
I must rule. After that perhaps I may be able to let them 
2 
speak more openly.~~ The Army was maintained at a peace-
time strength of 140,000 officers and men, with as many more 
1. D. Mihajlovic, La nouvelle Turquie economique, PP• 28-9, 
48-9. 
2. H. c. Armstrong, Gray Wolf (New York, 1933), p. 278. 
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in the reserve class. The Navy consisted of an active fleet 
of some 35,000 tons, mostly reconditioned World War ships, 
with a few new submarines. An embryonic Air Force was being 
1 
trained by French advisers. 
In foreign affairs, the Turkish Government could look 
back with satisfaction at its nine-year achievement. Turkey 
emerged from the Lausanne Conference independent, but with-
out a friend among the Western Powers. For the next three 
years, she was almost surrounded by a hostile ring; in the 
difficult winter and spring of 1925-26, there was a possibil-
ity of war with Great Britain, Greece, Italy, and even 
France. Trouble could also be expected from the Turkish 
and Persian Kurds. Foreign Minister Ru~tU defined his Gov-
ernment's policy when he stated: 
We want peace •.• in order to work at the great task we 
have undertaken: to make of our country a modern and 
prosperous State. The settlements we desire are there-
fore definitive settlements, first with our neighbors, 
then with the rest of the world.2 
Peaceful relations were assured with France and Great Britain 
in 1926, with Italy in 1928, and with Greece in 1930. 
The new policy of the Turkish Republic is nowhere 
more apparent than in the reconciliation of the Turks with 
the Greeks and the other former subjects of the Sultan. 
Speaking at the opening session of the Second Balkan Confer-
ence on October 20, 1931, President Kemal appealed for a new 
1. Statesman's Year-Book, 1932, pp. 1342-3. 
2. F. de Gerando, ttLa politique exterieure de la Turquie nou-
velle," Revue politique et parlementaire, May, 1927, p. 199. 
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Balkan community, based on mutual respect for each other's 
independence: »The Balkan peoples,tt said he, 
now live in independent States .•• It can be said that 
all these States, including Turkey, owe their existence 
to the historical process of the slow decadence of the 
Ottoman Empire, forever condemned by History. That is 
why the Balkan peoples have a common past of many cen-
turies. If this past has dark and painful aspects, Tur-
key has suffered from it no less than the other Balkan 
peoples ••• As you see, in the distant past the Balkan 
peoples were linked together by stronger ties than they 
have been more recently .•• It is necessary and useful 
to renew these ties whose value and importance were un-
fortunately misunderstood in the midst of political 
passions, religious antagonisms and stubborn historical 
'grudges.' 1 
Turkey finally entered a period of friendly relations 
with the world at large in 1932, when she accepted member-
ship in the League of Nations. She was to share in the 
League's difficult years ahead. 
1. D. Mihajlovic, La nouvelle Turquie economique, p. XV. 
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a. '!'HE SOVIE'f DIPLOMATIC BEVOLUTION 
The advent ot Hitler to power on January 30, 1933, 
represents a sharp turning poiat in European polities. All 
states, great and small, reassessed their positions and re-
oriented their policies. Tbe choice lay between appeaseaent 
and opposition: some States, like Poland, relaxed their se-
curity arrange .. nts, while others, like Czechoslovakia, 
sought to reiatorce thea. 
The reactioa ot the Western Powers -- Great Britain, 
Prance and Italy -- was one ot hesitation an4 eomproaiae. 
llussolini, to whoa npeaee treaties were not eternal" as 
early as 1928, took the initiative in drafting a Four-Power 
Pact which mentioned treaty revision and Geraan e•uality ot 
status. France was afraid to alara her Little Entente Allies, 
and the ebjeetioaable teras did not appear in the tinal text 
signed at Rome on June 7, 1933· The Pour-Power Pact pro-
vided tor consultations between Great Britain, Prance, Italy 
and Germany on all queationa ot co .. on interest; treaty re-
vision was implied by a reference to Article 19 or the 
League Covenant. The Pact was not ratified so that the un-
favorable iapression it created was not ottset by the ad-
vantages it was intended to furnish. '!'be Four-Power coopera-
tion did not aaterialize, and the Little Entente Powers had 
becaae painfully aware that Prance, their sponaor, would not 
hesitate to sacrifice their iatereats in return tor peace in 
the Vest. 
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!be reaction or the Little Entente itself to Bitler's 
rise was i..ediate and uDequivocal. On Pebruar,r 16, 1933, 
in order "completely to unity their general policy," Czecho-
slovakia, Rwu.nia and Yuaoslavia organizecl theaselves OB' a 
permanent basis. Hitherto the organization of the Entente 
had rested on the bilateral treaties of 1921-22. ~he present 
1 
statute of the Little Entente created a political Permanent 
Council which was to meet at least three ti .. s a year, an 
Econoaic Couacil, and a Secretariat with a section located 
at Geneva. The Statute provided tor representation of the 
three states by a single delegate at international confer-
ences restricted to larser powers. The treaties of alliance 
and arbitration were reattiraecl and. extended tor an unlia-
ited period. 
The aost profound change caused by the advent of the 
Iazia occurred in Soviet Russia, whose foreign policy, in 
the process or chaage since 1931, completed its revolution. 
The Soviets, when invited, had cooperated ia the work or 
certaia League co .. issioaa. But they doubted that any good 
could coae or the League, the tool of capitalist imperial-
ism; Litvinov had used the Disaraament Conference to show up 
the unwillingness of the imperialists to effect any real dis-
armament. In 1931 the Soviet attitude changed to one of ac-
tive cooperation. The Japanese threatened from occupied 
Manchuria, and the mounting electoral successes of Hitler in 
1. Documents for 1933, pp. 415-8. 
Germany, with his well-known prograa, portended an early end 
to Russo-Ge:naan collaboration. Ionaggression pacts were con-
cluded with the neighboria& states of Poland, Eathonia, Lat-
via and Finland, as well as with France. 
When Hitler becaae Chancellor in 1933, the Soviets 
made their choice between East and Vest: they appeased the 
Japanese by concessions in the Far East, and threw thea-
ael ves headlong into the European diplou.tic battle. Their 
former theae of total disarmament was discarded in favor of 
collectiYe security. During tbe London Economic Conference 
in June-July 1933, Litvinov incorporated the conclusions of 
the PolitiS' report into a "eoavention for the Definition 
1 
ot Aggression" signed on July 3, ~ and 5 by the U.s.s.R., 
Lithuania, Esthonia, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, 
Yugoslavia, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. The Convention 
- -
listed the acts whtch constitute ag~ression, from a foraally 
declared war to the support ot armed raiding parties; it 
further condemned the "political, military, economic or 
other" pretexts coamonly used by aggressors to justify their 
aggression. 
There could be no aore vigorous defence ot the status 
quo than the Litvinov Convention, and the "satisfied" states 
gradually accepted their new partner. In July 1933 Rumania 
signed a pact of nonaggression with the u.s.s.R.; the fol-
lowing year, both Powers guaranteed each other's frontiers, 
1. Ll~, CXLVII, PP· 67-77 and CXLTIII, PP• 211-9. 
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and the Soviet Union recognized, by iaplication, ~uaanian 
sovereignty over Besaarabia. Yugoslavia, whose court had 
been a reru~ tor the White Kusaian nobility, finally recog-
nized the Soviet Govemae:n.t. On May 2, 1935, France siped 
a mutual assistance pact with the U.s.s.R., and Czechoslo-
vakia followed s~it two weeks later. Meanwhile, the Soviet 
Union had been admitted to membership in the League ot Xa-
tiona, one year after the withdrawal or Germany. 
The advent of Hitler brought Turkey and the Soviet 
Union closer together than they had been for ten years. 
Economic relations were iaproved. In 1933, the Turkish Gov-
ernment launched a Five Year Plan or industrial development 
aiailar to the one introduced in the U.s.s.R. four years be-
tore; the Buaaiana supplied technicians and advanced a ten-
million dollar loan for textile aachinery~ Political coopera-
tion was placed on a more per.aaaent baaia; the Turco-soviet 
Treaty or 1925, which had been kept alive by short-term re-
newals, was prolonged in 1935 tor a ten-year period. In 
their ettorts to oraaaize a collective front, the Soviets 
used Turkey as a go-between with the Balkan States. 
As a means or attaining collective security, Litvinov 
advocated regional pacta or autual assistance. He urged the 
peaceful states to band together, and not to heed the cries 
ot encirclement. "By a policy or elimination," said he 
we thus arrive at another means, na•ly pacta or autual·-
aaaiatance, which auat by no •ana he regarded as an at-
tempt to encircle anyone, since each state belonging to 
a given region may Join in these pacta ••• or course, it 
ia different when any state, anxious to have £ree hands, 
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deliberately retuaea to participate in the proposed 
regional pact; but iD this event it bas no right to 
coaplain ot encircleaent it, in accordanct with its own 
desire, the pact ia concluded without it.l 
~ne Soviet Foreign Co .. isaar had in aind tbe Pact ot Balkan 
Bntente. 
1. Eerner an4 Howar4, The Balkan Conferences, pp. 1~2-3. 
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The Pourth -- and last -- Balkan Conterence 1 which 
met at Salonika in Bovember 1938 1 concerned itself mostly 
with economic questions. It adopted a draft multilateral 
coJIJA8rcial convention which would effect a partial integra-
tion or the Balkan national economies. The Convention embod-
ied the two following principles: 1) the acceptance by all 
the Balkan states or the moat favored nation principle as 
the basis tor their commercial relations; 2) the.institution 
or preferential taritfs 1 more favorable than those already 
fixed in the most favored nation agreements 1 on commodities 
that are specially important to a particular Balkan state. 
These preferential tariffs would receive international sanc-
tion by the insertion of a "Balkan Clause" into the future 
com.ercial treaties with the non-Balkan states; but the Bal-
kan preferential treatment would not be tully effective un-
til the expiration of all existing treaties of the Balkan 
States which contained the most favored nation clause. 
In the political field 1 the Conference reiterated "the 
recoamendation or the previous Balkan Conferences that •.• an-
nual meetings or the Balkan foreign ministers should be 
realized as soon as possible"; the governments were urged to 
enter into a multilateral pact based on the principles in-
volved in the Draft Balkan Pact adopted by the Third Balkan 
Conference"; the Conference hoped ttthat the governments /_Woul§ 
improve the provisions or the Draft Balkan Pact as required 
1 
by the changed circumatances since its adoption." 
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~he invitation w•s unnecessary; the governments had 
already taken the initiative, and the Foreign Ministers were 
busy shuttling back and forth between the Balkan capitals. 
Turkey had followed the Soviet Union into the anti-revision-
ist _camp, as Ru,tu, paraphrasing Stalin, was about to tell 
the rev~sionist Bulgarians: "we Turks are in tact anti-re-
visionist. Ve ask nothing or anyone, and on our part we 
2 
give nothing to anyone.• The Turkish Foreign Minister had 
just proposed a Balkan Locarno, then a Black sea Pact; the 
i 
Bulgarians had rejected the termer because it would per-
petuate the existing frontiers, and tbe latter because it 
would include the U.s.s.R. 
On Septemaer 14, 1933, Greece and Turkey laid the 
cornerstone tor a Balkan Entente. Ia a "Pact or Cordial 
. 3 
Friendship," they mutually guaranteed the inviolability or 
their eo-on frontier. They agreed to "a preliminary con-
sultation on any international question which may concern 
thea." And they borrowed a clause from tbe Little Entente 
statute, providing that 
in all international aeetinas the meaberahip or which is 
restricted, Greece and 'i'urke,- are prepared to consider 
·that· it will be the duty or the representative or one 
or the two Parties to detend the eomaon and special in-
terests or both Parties, and the,- undertake to endeavour 
1. T. I· Geshkott, Balkan Union, p. 202. 
2. Kerner aDd Howard, The Balkan Conferences, p. 123. 
3· LITS, CLVI, PP· 165-9· 
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to ae-cure such joint Npreaentation, either alternately 
or, in particular cases or special iaportance, by the 
country aost closely concerned. 
As an iadieation that the two governaenta anticipated a long 
period or joint diplomatic action, the pact was to run ten 
years, and was automatically re~ewable tor another ten-year 
period. From tbe practical viewpoint, the mutual guarantee 
ot the short Greco-Turkish border was intended to cheek 
&ft7 Bulgarian aove to the Aegean, either through the Turkish 
or the Greek sections or Thrace. 
During the next ten weeks, tbe Prime Ministers or 
Turkey and Greece, and Foreign Minister or Rumania and the 
X:ing or Yugoslavia visited Sofia. The only rea\llt or these 
travels, as tar as Bulgaria was concerned, was the renewal 
'-
or the 1929 Treaty or Beutrality with Turkey tor another 
rive-year period. The Bulgarians were alarmed, however, by 
the srowing movement or encirclement around thea, and by the 
Soviet patronage or this movement; but they refused to be 
bound to a definitive acceptance or the status quo. They 
were encouraged to persist in this attitude by developments 
in Germany, as well as by the counsels or Muasolini. An ex-
change or visits between Xing Boris and King Alexander 
showed a desire tor a rapprochement with Yugoslavia; the 
question or the Macedonian ainority was apparently being de-
terred to strengthen Bulgaria's chances or obtaining satia-
raction in the problea or the Aegean outlet. 
At the same time, the anti-revisionist bloc was form-
ing. On October 18 and llovember 27, the Turkish Goveraaent 
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signed treaties or friendship and pacific settlement with 
Rumania and Yugoslavia. Inasmuch as Turkey had no common 
frontier and no outstanding ~ueations with these two coun-
tries, the pacts were not so much practical instruments, as 
they were declarations of political solidarity. In January 
1934, Foreign Minister Maximos ot Greece reported that Paris, 
London and Eome favored a Balkan Pact, and stated the Greek 
view ot its purpose with complete frankness: "The pact," 
said he 
will provide for the consolidation of the status quo, to 
which Greece adheres. Her poai tion is that the treaties 
must remain untouched. Such is also her point or view 
in regard to the Treaty or Beuilly, particularly con-
cerning the clause! relatiye to the outlet or Bulgaria 
on the Aegean Sea. 
2 
The "Pact or Balkan Entente" was signed at Athens on 
February 9, 1934, by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Ruma-
nia, Turkey and Yugoslavia. In the preaable, the four 
states declared themaelvea to be 
firmly resolved to ensure the observance of the contrac-
tual o'Dligations already in existence and the maintenance 
ot the territorial situation in the Balkans as at pres-
ent established. 
The three articles or the pact proper contained aeneral pro-
visions of mutual guarantee and concerted action. The tour 
Powers mutually guaranteed 6 tae security of each and all of 
their Balkan frontiers.• '!'hey uadertook to "concert together 
in regard to the measures to be taken in contingencies liable 
1. Kerner and Howard, The Balkan Conferences, p. 124. 
2. ~~ CLIII, PP· 153-9· 
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to attect their interests." They agreed "not to embark upon 
any political action in relation to any other Balkan country 
net a signatory or the present agreement without previous 
mutual consultation, nor to incur any political obligation 
to any other Balka~ country without the consent or the other 
ContractiD.g Parties." The Pact was declared. "open to any 
Balkan country whose accession thereto is favourably re-
gardecl by the Contracting Parties." 
A longer Protocol-Anaex defined, in eight articles, 
the specific purpose ot the Pact. 
Its object is to guarantee the security or the several 
Balkan frontiers against any aggression on the part or -
any Balkan state. Jfevertheless, it one o:r the High Con-
tractini Parties--is the victill or aggression on the part 
ot any other non-Balkan Power, and aBalkan State asso-
ciates itaelt with such aggression, whetber at the ti• 
or subsequently, the Pact of Balkan Entente shall be 
applicable in its entirety in relation to such Balkan 
State. 
The provisions or the London Conventions tor the Definition 
ot Aggression were adopted as a means tor determining whether 
there existed an act or aggression. 
- . 
The Pact or Balkan Entente was short in contrast to 
the 39-article Dra~t Balkan Pact proposed by the Third Bal-
kan Conference. It had a single purpose -- to stem the Bul-
garian revisionist movement. "The main obJect or the Entente," 
said Prime Rinister Iaaet, "was to safeguard the security or 
common trontiera and to try to win over Bulgaria, in time, 
as a friend, tailing which the members or the Entente would 
1 
take steps to neutralize that country." All tour Powers, 
1. Article "Turkey," in 10 Eventful Years (U. ot Chicago, 
19~7), vol. IV, P· 375· 
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however, were not nearly so deterained as the stern wording 
ot the Pact would indicate. Turkey, unwilling to risk being 
drawn into a conflict with the Soviet Union, obtained from 
Titulescu 
a written declaration to the etteet that should Soviet 
Russia, allied to a Balkan State non~signatory'ot the 
Pact of Balkan Entente, co• into conflict with Rwaania 
over contested Beaaarabia,· Turkey would be under no o•-
ligation to come to the aid of aumania against the So-
viet Union.l 
One might wonder it Turkey was obliged to tight Bulgaria in 
any other case. Article 7 of the Protocol-Annex to the Bal-
kan Pact states that "the observance or the contractual ob-
ligations already in exiateace," which the tour Powers were 
resolved to ensure, included the observance "or existtng 
treaties between Balkan States, to which one or more ot 
the High Contracting Parties is a sigaatory party." The 
Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of 1929, recently renewed, confirmed 
Article 1 or the Treaty or 1925, which read: "There shall 
be inviolable peace and sincere and perpetual friendship be-
tween the Turkish llepuhlic and the Kingdom of Bulgaria.tt 
The Greek Government also qualified its obligations 
under the Pact. The Venizelos opposition alarmed Greek pub-
- . 
lie opinion by pointing to the danger of war with Italy, it 
the latter, along with Albania, should attack Yugoslavia. 
Foreign Minister Maxiaos had to reassure the Chamber or Depu-
ties, on Marc& 15, that "Greece cannot in any way, in ful-
filling her obligations under the Balkan Pact, be drawn into 
1. T. I. Geshkoft, Balkan Union, p. 218. 
133 
1 
a war with a great Power." Greece did not conclude military 
conventions with her Entente partners~ and her obligations 
remained a matter or principle. Finally in Yugoslavia~ 
opinion was also divided; the government defended the pact 
as a guarantee of security~ while the opposition believed~ 
as did King Alexander~ that the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border 
would have been readered more secure vy an agreement with 
2 
Bulgaria. It was reared that the Pact would compromise 
the incipieat rapproche .. nt which tbe royal visits or the 
previous .fall had brought about. 
The Bulgarians defended their abstention from the 
Pact on solid Juridical ground: 
The avowed intention or the Pact~ which is to preclude 
any peaceful revision or the· treaties, Lfil in direct 
contradiction with Article 19 or the Covenant of the 
League or Bations.3 
Bulgaria was placed "before an accomplished tact~" and in-
vited to Join "as a second-rate associate." Premier Mushanov 
reaarked that the Pact was superfluous~ since no one~ least 
of all demilitarized Bulgaria~ would tr.y to threaten the 4 . . . . 
tour states. Ievertheless, the Bulgarians were al&l'JIIed by 
the ring roraed around them by th~ir four neighhora~ with 
the blessing of the U.S.S.R. Furthermore~ the Balkan Pact 
1. B. p. Papadakis, "La Grice et l'Entente balkanique," L'Eu-
rope Bouvelle~ April 11, 1936~ p. 372. ----
2. P. Brosaolette, "una hiatoire peu connue: eelle de l'En-
tente balkanique~" L'Europe Kouvelle, Ap~il 22~ 1939~ p.429· 
3· A. Baurov~ "La Bulgarie et le paete balkanique," L 1Kurope 
Kouvelle, May 9, 1936, p. 487. . 
4. Corriere della Sera, February 9, 1934. 
states could be expected to take ailitary action against 
Bulsaria for its support of the Macedonian Organization. 
The London Convention, incorporated in the Balkan Pact, la-
beled as aggression any 
provision or support to armed bands formed in its terri-
tory which have invaded the territory or another State, 
or refusal, notwithstanding the request or the invaded 
State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures 
in its power to deprive those bands or all assistance 
or protectioa." 
on May 19, an Army coup upset a regime whose close affilia-
tion with the Maeedonian Organization had finally isolated 
Bulgaria. The new regime ruled by decree; it suppressed the 
Macedonian moveaent; it worked to improve relations with 
Yugoslavia aad Greece, as well as with Soviet Bussia, with-
. . 
out, however, pledging Bulgaria to a renunciation or her 
claims. 
In October and Roveaber 1934, the Foreign Ministers 
or the four Balkan Pact States met at Ankara to organize the 
Balkan Entente on the model or the Little Entente. The Stat-
utes provided for a political Permanent Council and an Advis-
ory Economic Council. The Permanent Council consisted or 
the four Foreign Ministers themselves, and was to meet regu-
larly. 
The Permanent Council met at Bucharest on May 10-11, 
1935· The Balkan Entente made co .. on cause with the over-
lapping Little Entente, and went on record as opposed to any 
eventual restoration or the Hapsburgs in Hungary, or even 
Austria. In view of the introduction or conscription in Ger-
many in March, and the failure or France to do more than 
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protest, the Council agreed to a relaxation of the military 
restrictions on Bulgaria and Hungary, if these two countries 
1 
accepted their territorial status as definitive. 
The Council met again in October, one week after the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia. The Balkan Entente endorsed 
the League Assembly's decision to impose economic sanctions 
on Italy. All four Entente States applied the sanctions, 
and, itn the event that hostilities should spread to the East-
ern Mediterranean, the states having access to the Mediter-
ranean -- Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia -- arranged for the 
use of their ports iy the British Bavy, and received guaran-
tees from the British Government in ease of attack. 
The activities of the Advisory Economic Council fol-
lowed the pattern previously set by the Economic Committee of 
the Balkan Conferences. The main obJectives adopted at its 
first meeting, held at Athens January 3-9, 1935 were the 
same as those proposed by the First Balkan Conference: 1) to 
increase trade between the participating states; 2) to work 
out a concerted commercial policy towards extra-Balkan eoun-
2 
tries. The Economic Council recomaended to the four govern-
ments the insertion in future commercial treaties of the 
regional tt:aalkan clause."-- But the Balkan Entente had to eon-
tend with the same practical difficulties which had raced 
the Balkan Conferences in the integration of the national 
1. T. I. Geshkoff, Balkan Union, p. 226. 
2. L'Europe Bouvelle, April 2~, 1935, p. 399· 
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economies; by 1936, only one comaereial treaty, the Tureo-
Spanish Treaty or December 31, 1935, contained the Balkan 
1 
clause. 
As it entered the fateful year of 1936, the Balkan 
Entente, along with the whole structure of European security, 
was about to be tested by tbe bold strokes or the dictators. 
1. N. HadJivassiliou, "Les travaux du Conseil lconomique de 
l'Entente balkanique," L'Europe Nouvelle, April 2~, 1~37, 
PP· 398-~oo. 
137 
c. 'l'HE JIIDDL'E EAS'l'EU BLOC 
While the Balkan Entente was beginning to function, 
another regional bloc was in the process of formation in 
the Middle East. Already in 1928 Turkey, Persia and Afghan-
istan had begun to give their foreign policies a common 
direction. In 1932 Iraq attained complete independence; 
she was tree now to draw closer to the other three Middle 
Eastern States, a course ror which abe had shown a clear 
inclination during the last two years or the British mandate. 
'!'he major obstacle to any entente was :the_ disputed 
frontier or Persia with both Turkey and Iraq. This problem 
was a survival or a pre-war border controversy between Per-
sia and the Ottoman Empire. A Delimitation Protocol in 1913 
bad satisfied neither party; the issue was further complicated 
after the World War by the substitution or two contending 
states instead of one on Persia's western frontier. 
The question or the Turco-Persian frontier came to a 
head in 1930. In the latter part or June the Kurds rose 
again in a widespread revolt agaimst the Turkish authorities. 
This time the moveaent originated in the region or Mount 
Ararat, only a rew miles rroa Persia; it quickly spread 
south along the border towards Kutur and Lake Urmie. Once 
again the uprising was put down only after regular army op-
erations. 
The Turkish forces were handicapped by the boundary 
line, which they were not allowed to cross. From Mount 
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Ararat, the rebels fled to the Little Ararat, on Persian 
territory, where they were helped to prepare tor new raids 
by their Persian kinsmen. The Turkish press charged the 
Persian Government with giving aid to the insurgents, or at 
least with tolerating their incursions into Turkish territory, 
in violation or the frontier agreement or 1926. The Turkish 
Government, however, realized that the nature or the bound-
ary line rendered difficult any cooperation by the Persian 
authorities, and that a border rectification was necessary. 
Tevfik Rustu went to Teheran, and negotiations were 
. - . 
begun on a new basis. Persian claims relative to Turkish 
Kurdiatan and Turkish claims to Persian AzerbaiJan were set 
aside, and the. controversial treaty or 1914 was forgotten. 
Turkey proposed an exchange or territory whereby she would 
receive all the land containing the approaches to Mount 
Ararat, in return tor an equivalent section or farm land 
1 
farther south. A new and definitive boundary line was drawn 
on the basis or the Turkish proposal and embodied in a Fron-
2 
tier AgreeMnt signed at Teheran on January 23, 1932. A 
Treaty or Arbitration and Conciliation was concluded on the 
same day. 
The problem or the Iraqi-Persian border came up in 
1934. Iraq claimed the whole Shatt-el-Arab, the outlet ot 
1. Stateaent or the Turkish Ambassador to Teheran, in Aksam, 
August 26, 1931, Bulletin per1o41que, Bo. 19, p. 15. 
2. Oriente Moderno, March 1935, pp. 110-13. 
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the Tigris and Euphrates Rivere to the Persian Gult; Persia 
contended that the median line ot the waterway constituted 
the boundary. When Persian gunboats appeared on the Shatt, 
Iraq referred the dispute to the League Council, charging 
that the Persian action was a threat to peace. When Iraq 
proposed that the 1913 Delimitation Protocol be interpreted 
by the Bague Court, Persia refused to recognize the Court's 
Juriscliction. 
The Iraqi-Persian dispute reached an impasse at Gen-
eva at the time when Italy was preparing tor the Ethiopian 
war. '!'he states or the Middle East felt uaeasy about Musso-
lini1s aspirations "in Asia and Africa"; rear or Italy per-
suaded Persia (now Iran) and Iraq to compose their differ-
ences. In September 1935, Turkey, Iraq, Persia and Afghani-
stan discussed a Middle Eastern Pact similar to tbe Pact or 
Balkan Entente. A dratt pact was initialed on October 2. 
In January 1936, Iraq withdrew her appeal to the League Coun-
cil tor settlement or her dispute with Persia, and both gov-
ernments began to work out a practical solution or their 
boundary problem, as Turkey and Persia had done in 1930. 
The Middle Easter& Entente officially came into being 
only on July 8, 1937, roar days atter final agreement was 
reached on the Iraqi-Persian frontier. The Middle Eastern 1 . 
Pact signed at Saadabad, near Teheran, on that day, pledged 
the tour States to nonaggression, to mutual consultation in 
1. LITS, CXC, pp. 21-7. 
-
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international disputes affecting them1 and to respect tor the 
other parties' regiMes. A Per.anent Council of the tour 
Foreign Ministers was constit~ted 1 to provide the foreign 
policy or the tour states with a commoa orientation. The 
Saadabad Pact 1 however, unlike the Balkan Pact 1 did not pro-
vide for a Joint guarantee or existing frontiera 1 nor was it 
followed by military conventions. 
In October 1935 1 the Middle Eastern Entente was al-
ready taking ahape 1 while the Balkan Entente had been func-
tioning tor a year. It reaaiaed to be seen how these diplo-
matic structures 1 and especially the Balkan Entente, would 
withstand the political and econoaic pressure or Germany 
and Italy. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE BREAK-UP OF THE SECURITY STRUCTURE, 1936-39 
a. The Montreux Convention 
b. Turkey and the Axis 
c. The Fate of the Balkan Entente 
d. The Question of Alexandretta 
a . 'I'D MOI'fttEUX COBVEliTIOll 
'!'he invasion or Ethiopia on October 3, 1935, did not 
alara the supporters of the status quo. 'l'he League Council 
declared Italy the aggressor and the Assembly voted the 
application of econoaic sanctions; fifty-two states parti-
cipated in these measures, including all tour Balkan En-
tente States. The scene or hostilities was Eastern Africa, 
and the European States were aore concerned with localizing 
the conflict than with puttiag a atop to it. '!'he British 
Government entered special agreements with Turkey, Greece 
and Yugoslavia, in ease the war should spread to the Eastern 
Mediterraneaa. The sanctioaist Powers applied the sanctions 
loosely, in order to remain on the best possible terms with 
Italy. 'l'he suez Canal reuined open to the passage or 
Italian troops and supplies. Furthermore, it was generally 
felt that Italy was in tor trouble, perhaps tor another 
Adowa; even the Italian General Starr anticipated a six-
year war. The slow progress of the Italian troops, and the 
early reaoval of General de Bono as Commander-in-Chief, 
seemed to confirm the opinion of the experts. 
In March 1936, the European security structure was 
dealt two stunning blows in succession. On March 5, the 
Italian army defeated the main Ethiopian forces at Ciu, and 
a swift conquest was in sight. On March 7, Hitler tore up 
another article or the Treaty of Versailles by marching his 
troops into the Rhineland; Praace fumed and protested, but 
finally acquiesced. 
The unchallenged occupation or the Rhineland shook 
the whole network or mutual assistance pacts or which France 
was the pivot. Poland, Czechoalovakia, Rumaaia and Yugo-
slavia had elaborated their security plans around a French 
guarantee; it France could not react to a direct threat on 
her own border, she could hardly be expected to intervene 
where she was not directly concerned. Besides, the efficacy 
or French intervention would ae greatly reduced by the re-
rortifieation of the Rhineland zone. 
The conquest of Ethiopia was the death-blow or the 
League or Jfations. '!'he League and ita ••ber states had 
proved themselves unable, aad, still worae, unwilling to 
prevent the destruction or a meaber state. Haile Selassie 
indicated the true proportions or the problem when he told 
the League Assembly, on June 30: "It is not merely a ques-
tion or a settlement in the matter or Italian aggression. 
It is a question of collective aeeurity; or the very exist-
ence or the League; of the trust placed by States in inter-
national treaties; of the value of proaises made to amall 
states that their integrity and their independence shall be 
respected and assured." And he put the queation squarely to 
the delegates: 
On behalf or the Ethiopian people ..• ! ask the fifty-two 
nations who have given the Ethiopian people a promise 
to help them in their resistance to the aggressor: What 
are they willing to do for Ethiopia? I ask the Great 
Powers, who have promised the guarantee or collective 
security to small States -- those small States over whom 
hangs the threat that they may one day suffer the fate 
ot Ethiopia: What measures do they intend to take? •.• 
What answer aa I to take back to my people?l . 
The answer waa given July 4, when sanctions were in effect 
removed. 
2 
On April 10, 1936, the Turkish Government sent a note 
to all the Powers which had taken part in the Straits nego-
tiations at Lausanne, inf'orming them that Turkey was "pre-
pared to enter into negotiations with a view to arri¥ing in 
the near future at the conclusion or agreements tor regula-
tion or the regime of the Straits under the conditions or 
security which are indispensable for the inviolability of 
Turkey's territory, in the aost liberal spirit, for the con-
stant development of commercial navigation between the Medi-
terranean and the Black Sea." 
This was not the first time that Turkey mentioned re-
militarization of the Straits. On July 9, 1932, when Tevtik 
Ruatti accepted the League's invitation to membership, he ha4 
~ 
referred to Turkey's "special position as a result of the 
obligations or a military nature" contained in the Straits 
and Thracian Conventions signed at Lausanne. During the next 
three years, the Turkish Foreign Minister could be depended 
upon to mention the subject at every possible occasion. But 
Hitler's rise to power had caused a stiffening of tbe anti-
revisionist front, and the regional security pacts or this 
1. Documents for 1935, II, pp. 520 and 522. 
2. Documents tor 1936, pp. 645-8. 
llf-6 
period were all postulated on the maintenance or the existing 
treaties. At the Disarmaaent Conference, in May 1933, and 
again in May 193~, Rustu'a attempts to discuss remilitariza-
~ 
tion were not well received: the French were annoyed that 
treaty revision should be brought up at a disarmament confer-
ence, or at any time for that matter. 
When Hitler restored conscription, on March 16, 1935, 
the Western Powers became more amenable to treaty revision by 
common consent, and the Stresa Conference prepared the ground 
tor a removal or the military restrictions affecting Austria, 
Hungary and Bulgaria. '!'he representatives or Great Britain, 
Prance and Italy "took into consideration the desire expressed 
by the States, whose military status was respectively deter-
mined by the Treaties or Saint-Germain, Trianon and Neuilly, 
1 
to obtain the revision or this status. 11 A conference of all 
the interested Powers was to meet at Rome in May to study the 
question. The occasion seemed excellent tor Turkey; on April 
17, at the Extraordinary Session or the League Council eon-
2 
voked to consider German rearmament, B.iiftU Aras presented 
the Turkish view: "The military clauses relating to the 
s trai ta, •• said he 
are or a discriminatory character. Here we find, besides 
the demilitarized zones, that the means or defence are 
1. "Joint Resolution or the Stresa Conference, tt April 14, 
1935, Documents for 1935, I, pp. 81-2. 
2. By a law or January 1, 1935, all Turkish citizens were com-
pelled to adopt family names: Tevfik Rti,tu became Ru,tu 
Aras, Mustapha Kemal became Keaal Ataturk, Ismet became 
Isaet Inonu, etc .••. 
limited. These ··military clauses have no counterpart 
like the Loc.arno Agree•nta. '!'bey create an unfair situa-
tion at the expense or Turkey. Moreover, the inequality 
still subsists, notwithstanding the important changes 
that have occurred in the circumstances prevailing when 
the clauses were accepted and the fundamental c~anges to 
which those circumstances may still be subject. 
Litvinov declared that his own country would "put no diffi-
culties in the way of the realization or the wishes expressed 
by Lhi!7 rriend the representative or Turkey." The other 
Council members felt, with Sir John Simon, that the subject 
was not "directly connected w~th Ltheiif discussion"; never-
theless, the question was placed on the agenda of the Rome 
Conference. The Bome Conference never met, and the Straits 
question had to await the further pressure of events. 
The swift conquest of Ethiopia by Italy, in the 
Spring of 1936, was an ominous development for Turkey. After 
his successful war "against fifty-two States in coalition," 
there was no telling where Mussolini would next pursue Italy's 
"historic objectives in Asia and Africa." If Italy's wartime 
ambitions in Anatolia were revived, the Straits would be the 
weakest link in Turkey's defence. Furthermore, Germany had 
just shown, in March, how remilitarization could be quickly 
and successfully carried out. Por one month, the Turkish 
General Staff urged the immediate occupation of the Straits 
zone, in the Rhineland manner. It was generally expected in 
Europe that Turkey would do just that. But the Turkish Gov-
ernment decided upon one last attempt by way or negotiation. 
1. LNOJ, May 1935, P· 562. 
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The argument contained in the Turkish note or April 
10 to all the interested States ran as follows: the demili-
tarized regime was postulated on two general conditions --
the eventual disarmament of all Powers, and the guarantee or 
the Straits' security by all the signatories or the Lausanne 
Convention -- and specifically by four great naval Powers, 
Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. There had been no 
disarmament, quite the contrary; furthermore, the four guar-
antor Powers were at odds, and military collaboration on their 
part was "doubtful." The note added that while the Lausanne 
Convention only mentioned states or peace and war, there was 
an intermediary state when a threat of war existed, and it 
had been amply proved "that the most delicate stage or dan-
ger from without is this very stage or a threat or war in 
which a state or war may arise unexpectedly and without any 
formality." In view or the changed circumstances since 
1923, the Turkish Government could not, "without being 
guilty or serious negligence, expose the whole country to 
an irreparable coup de main." Finally, the Turkish note 
contained a reminder that unilateral action was not excluded: 
As the issue at stake is the existence or Turkey herself 
and the security 6t her whole territory, the Government 
or the Republic may be led to take before the nation the 
responsibility incumbent upon it by adopting the measures 
dictated by the imperious necessity of circumstances. 
All the Powere except Italy replied favorably. The 
Soviets, who abhorred the Lausanne Convention, were the most 
enthusiastic; they pointed out with satisfaction that "the 
principle of full Turkish sovereignty over the Straits had 
been affirmed in the Tureo-Soviet treaties and has been sup-
ported by the U.S.S.R. at the time of the Lausanne Conference, 
and that since that time they had round no cause to change 
1 
their attitude." As for Mussolini, who was busy just then 
founding an empire, he declared that "the time was ill-suited 
for an exaaination of such grave problems." Italy would be 
ready to take part in the discussions "when the situation 
became clarified"; and she made the most explicit reserva-
tions regarding any decision which might be taken in her ab-
2 
sence. All the other invited Powers except Japan were still 
applying economic sanctions against Italy; it was generally 
supposed that the clarification or the situation which she 
had in mind was the removal of these sanctions. Furthermore, 
Italy was well aware that her own militarism was the major 
cause or the Turkish initiative; the Turkish note had alluded 
to "insular fortifications" as a factor in the growing un-
certainty of the Mediterranean situation, an obvious refer-
ence to the new Italian base on the Island of Leros, just orr 
the Anatolian Coast. 
All the States which met at Montreux on June 22 were 
favorable to Turkish remilitarization of the Straits, and 
it was expected that the drafting or a new convention would 
3 be easy and rapid. But the Turkish draft Convention, which 
1. D. A. Routh, Survey for 1936, p. 607. 
2. Oriente Moderno, July 1936, pp. 390-91. 
3. '!'ext: A. Giannini, "II regime degli Stretti dopo gli Atti 
di Montreux," Oriente Moderno, Oct. 1938, pp. 536-~4. 
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was read on June 23, contained a complete revision of the Lau-
sanne Convention. The British delegation was taken by sur-
prise . One year before, Dr. .Aras had assured the League 
Council that "subsequent changes in the military regime of 
the Straits cannot, in our opinion, in any way affect the 
1 
regime of the freedom of the Straits." The Montreux Confer-
ence lasted almost three weeks. 
The Turkish draft reveals the Turkish Government's 
determination tp recover a maximum of sovereignty over the 
Straits. "The provisions of the present Convention," says 
Article 12, "cannot be extended or interpreted in such a 
way as to infringe upon the sovereignty of Turkey over the 
zones to which this Convention applies." No mention is made 
of the general principle contained in Article 23 of the 
Treaty of Lausanne, concerning the freedom of navigation in 
the Straits zone by sea and air, in peace and in war. Finally, 
the International Straits Commission was to be abolished by 
the silent treatment. 
The security or the Straits was variously provided 
for. Remilitarization was implied by the absence of demili-
tarization clauses. Warships or non-Black Sea Powers would 
pass through the Straits in units not exceeding 14,000 tons, 
while a somewhat leas rigid regulation applied to Black Sea 
Powers. In time of war, Turkey being a belligerent, the 
passage of warships would be subJect to a special authoriza-
tion from the Turkish Government and this requirement also 
1. Documents for 1935, I, p. 112. 
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applied if Turkey felt threatened by war. Finally, civilian 
and military aircraft would not be allowed to fly over the 
Straits; air traffic between the Mediterranean and the Black 
Sea would be routed elsewhere by the Turkish Government. 
The Turkish draft Convention also changed radically 
the peacetimebalance of naval power in the Black Sea. While 
the Lausanne Convention had allowed all non-Black Sea naval 
Powers to match the strongest riverain Power in the Black 
Sea, the new convention would set a 28,000 ton limit to the 
aggregate strength or the non-riverain fleets allowed in 
the Black Sea. The maximum strength or any one Power would 
be one half, or 14,000 tons. In addition, warships or the 
non-littoral Powers could not stay in the Black Sea more 
than fifteen days. These peacetime restrictions would also 
apply if a non-Black Sea Power were at war with a littoral 
Power, there being no mention or the former's belligerent 
rights. These Black Sea provisions especially were disturb-
ing to the British delegation; it was obvious that the Soviets 
had helped the Turks prepare their draft revision or the 
Straits regime. Under its teras a strong Black Sea fleet 
could raid the Eastern Mediterranean, then speed back to the 
safety or the Black Sea. And the Russian fleet would com-
pletely dominate this inland Sea. 
During the first three days, the Conference considered 
those provisions of the Turkish draft which pertained to the 
passage of commercial ships, and no major difficulties were 
encountered. Then it adjourned while most of the delegates 
went to Geneva for the League of Rations session, at which 
sanctions against Italy were lifted. During the recess, 
the British delegation prepared a counter-draft to the 
~urkish plan, which was submitted to the Conference when 
it reconvened on July 6, and accepted aa a basis tor dis-
cussion. 
1~ 
The British drart1 attempted to salvage, as much as 
possible, the international character or the Straits, "with-
in the framework of Turkish security." The preamble men-
tioned the preservation or the principle or free navigation 
embodied in Article 23 of the Lausanne Treaty; Article 1 
reaffirmed the principle or "freedom or transit and naviga-
tion by sea through the Straits.• The international Straits 
Commission was maintained, although its mission would be 
limited to the gathering or statistics on naval traffic 
through the Straits and on the tonnage or the Black Sea 
fleets. 
The Britis9 only slightly modified the measures of the 
Turkish draft providing for the security of the Straits. The 
tonnage allowed foreign fleets passing through the Straits at 
one time was raised to one-half or the active ~urkish fleet, 
2 
or 15,000 tons, whichever was the higher figure. If Turkey 
were at war, naval traffic through the Straits would be left 
1. Text: A. Giannini, loe. cit. 
2. The Turkish fleet in active service was estimated at 
about 36,000 tons. Statea.en•a Year Book, 1936. 
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to the entire discretion or the Turkish Government. The same 
discretion applied if Turkey felt threatened, except that any 
measures she might take would be subject to recall, it the 
Council of the League or Rations, by a two-thirds aajority, 
decided that they were unjustified. The British draft recog-
nized Turkey's right to deter.aine zones forbidden to air-
craft; but Turkey would undertake to provide tor the sate 
paaaa~ or civilian aircraft between Europe and Asia, and 
between the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. 
The British plan conceded peacettae naval superiority 
in the Black Sea to the Russians, but it attempted to reduce 
the disproportion that the Turkish draft would ensure. The 
aggregate naval strength allowed the non-littoral Powers in 
the Black Sea at one ti.e was upped to 30,000 tons, or which 
one Power might furnish three-fourths. These ships would 
be allowed to stay one month at a time in the Black Sea. 
Furthermore, an escalator clause permitted an increase above 
these figures; it a Black Sea fleet became ten per cent 
stronger than the strongest Black Sea fleet at the time or 
1 
the Convention, the non-riverain Powers could increase their 
total forces in the Black Sea by the same amount, up to 
-5,000 tons. Article 14 introduced another possibility; the 
tonnage limitations or the Convention would not apply to a 
1. The Black Sea tonnage or the littoral States, except Tur-
key, was reported as follows on January 1, 1937: 
Bulgaria ••••.• 384 tons 
Rumania • . 3,881 " 
u.s.s.R. . • • 65,200 " 
~, March-April 1937~ P• 270. 
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naval rorce or any size or deacription visiting a Turkish 
port at the invitation or the Turkish Government. And the 
British draft reaffirmed the principle contained in the Lau-
sanne Convention that the peacetime tonnage restrictions upon 
non-Black Sea Powers "would not be applied against a belli-
gerent Power to the detriment or its belligerent rights." 
The British delegation displayed considerable imagina-
tion in its efforts to restore some balance in the peacetiae 
naval quotas in the Black Sea. The British draft convention 
provided that any naval power not having a ten-thousand-ton 
force in the Black Sea, could, with the permission or the 
Turkish Government, send to tkat Sea, "tor humanitarian pur-
poses," a naval compleaent up to 10,000 tons, notwithstanding 
the aggregate tonnage limitations normally applicable. The 
Russians did not relish the thought that a tremor in the 
Crimea might conjure before Sevastopol a formidable humani-
tarian fleet or 100,000 tons. 
At Montreux, as at Lausanne, the British and Russian 
delegations were the principal antagonists. Turkey was 
mainly concerned with tbe recovery or her sovereignty over 
the Straits, which she obtained without great difficulty. 
She was so intent on iamediate reailitarization that, accord-
ing to the Turkish draft, the Convention would have come into 
force on the date or signature. It was pointed out that an 
international convention was subject to ratification by the 
interested governments; remilitarization was provided tor 
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1 
in an annexed Protocol, immediately effective, while the 
Convention proper was to come into force upon ratification. 
The maxt.um tonnage of foreign ships which could be in 
transit through the Straits was fixed at 15,000 tons, except 
2 
that Russian capital ships could proceed through the Straits 
singly. In time of war, if Turkey were a belligerent, the 
passage of warships through the Straits was lett to her en-
tire discretion. She had the same privilege if abe felt 
threatened by war, except that any measures she might take 
would be subject to recall if the League Council, by a two-
thirds majority, and the signatory Powers, by a simple major-
ity, decided that the measures were unjustified. This veto 
power was hardly more than a statement of principle; in the 
world of 1936 there was little likelihood that so many Powers 
would agree on anything. The Turks had more difficulty at-
taining their last objective, the removal of the Interna-
tional Straits Commission. They were successful, however, 
-
and Article 24 of the Convention transferred to the Turkish 
Government the functions of the Commission. After which the 
Turkish delegation sat back and awaited the outcome of the 
great British-Soviet debate. 
The basic principles underlying the British and Soviet 
arguments had remained the same since 1923; the British con-
sidered the Straits an international waterway leading to an 
1. "convention regarding the Regime of the Straits with An-
nexes and Protocol," LI!S, CLXXIII, pp. 213-41. 
. . 
2. The Soviet Union had four 23,000-ton battleships in all. 
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open sea, while to the Soviets they were the door to an in-
land sea. The circumstances had changed, however, in 13 
years, and the Soviet Union had gained enormously in material 
and diplomatic strength; she was the recognized champion of 
collective security in Europe, and she commanded considerable 
support among the smaller states. The British had been able 
to impose their own Black Sea regime in 1923, as they had in 
1856; but revision had become inevitable in 1936, as it had 
in 1871. 
Hevertheless, the British managed to secure acceptance 
or several features of their draft. The right or the Turkish 
Government to invite foreign naval forces "or any tonnage or 
composition" for courtesy visits was recognized; the Soviets, 
stout defenders or Turkish sovereignty, could hardly oppose 
this point. These fleets, however, could visit only ports 
in the Straits, and not Turkey's Black Sea porta. The Brit-
ish plan for peacetime naval strength in the Black Sea was 
adopted, with modifications. Ron-littoral Powers could main-
tain an aggregate force of 30,000 tons in the Black Sea; if 
the strongest Black Sea fleet were increased by 10,000 tons, 
the other Powers could match the increase up to 45,000 tons; 
no one non-littoral Power could have more than two-thirds of 
the total tonnage allowed; and the outside ships could not 
remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days. Even the 
supplementary huaanitarian warships might be allowed, but 
they were not trusted; any Power could supplement its force 
already in the Black Sea up to 8,000 tons, regardless of the 
157 
aggregate tonnage liait, with the authorization or Turkey 
and or all the other Black-Sea Powers; and their ships had to 
get out of the Black Sea within twenty-one days Just like the 
others. The passage or civil aircraft over the Straits was 
provided for, by air routes to be indicated by the Turkish 
Government, and located outside the forbidden zones; air 
traffic was assured between Europe and Asia, and between the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea. 
The British and Soviet delegates clashed on the ques-
tion of belligerent rights in the Black Sea. Faced with 
this clause in the British draft which reiterated one of the 
provisions of the Lausanne Convention, Litvinov countered 
1 
with a proposal which represented the perfect solution, from 
the Russian point of view, to the Black Sea problem: in time 
or war, the Straits would be open to the fleets or the belli-
gerent Black Sea Powers, but closed to the navies of the 
other belligerent Powers. The British vigorously opposed the 
Soviet proposal on the grounds or reciprocity, and maintained 
that the Straits should be equally open or closed to all bel-
ligerent rowers. The Soviets suspected the British of defend-
ing a German, as well as a British, viewpoint. Great Britain 
had concluded a naval agreement with Germany only three weeks 
before, which allowed German naval rearmament up to 35~ or 
the British fleet; and Hitler's intentions towards the U.s.s.R. 
were well known. At any rate, the British certainly had 
1. D. A. Routh, Survez ror 1936, p. 623. 
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Germany in mind at Montreux; if the Convention encouraged 
the Soviets to expand their Black Sea fleet, Germany could 
invoke the "escape" clause of the recent agreement and start 
an armaments race. 
At one time, the Russians suspected the British them-
selves of anticipating hostilities with the Soviet Union, 
and they asked whether Britain's peaceful intentions, as-
serted in the Edea-Litvinov Communique the year before, had 
not changed. The British delegation replied that it was a 
1 
matter of principle, but an editorial which appeared in the 
London Times the following day revealed the British mind 
more frankly than the diplomats could do. There was no imme-
diate concern over the potentialities of the Soviet naval 
strength: •The Russian navy," said the Times, "is at present 
. . 
negligible in size, and not addicted to navigation." But, 
added the editorialist prophetically, 
" ••• everything at present points to a steady accretion 
of internal strength and external prestige which may 
soon give Russia a place of dominance in a divided Eur-
ope, and in the Far East a position which will ultimately 
overshadow Japan. How will she interpret the responsi-
bilities or promotion?... The Soviet Union has, in fine, 
two foreign policies ~- the short-range opportunist pol-
icy or the Kremlin, and the long-range idealist policy of 
the Comintern. The latter is being kept in the back-
ground .•• When Russia holds, as one day she may, the bal-
ance or power in Europe, and perhaps in Asia as well, the 
cause or world revolution may be round to have merged in- " . ~ .. 
to the short-range opportunist policy; ••. and the poli:ef"~\1..-"""'-~ 
though still remote, is not to be ignored that the infin-
itely adaptable Bolshevists will forge out of their ori-
gina~ missionary aspirations a new technique or imperial-
ism. 
1. The Times (London), July 9, 1936. 
2. Ibid. 
-
1~ 
Paced with the alternative presented by the British 
delegation, the Soviets preterred the Straits to be closed to 
all belligerents, rather than wide open, and it was decided 
that in case of war, Turkey being neutral, "warships belong-
ing to belligerent powers shall not pass the Straits." The 
Russian fleet would hot have access to the Mediterranean, 
but it was far more important that the Black Sea shores or 
the U.s.s.R. should be secure. 
It was felt at the Conference that the maJor questions 
had been solved, but a more serious crisis was yet in store. 
The closure or the Straits to non-Turkish belligerent ships 
was not applicable, of course, to those operating under Ar-
ticle 16 ot the League Covenant. The Soviets, supported by 
all the Powers which had mutual assistance treaties concluded 
within the framework of the Covenant, maintained that these 
pacts were a further implementation of the Covenant, and that 
the Straits should be open as well to naval forces operating 
under these treaties. All the States represented at the 
conference, except Great Britain, Bulgaria and Japan, had 
such mutual assistance pacts. The British were afraid that 
the new Straits Convention would become an openly anti-Axis 
instrument. "It cannot be of lasting value," said the London 
. . 
Times, "unless it is subordinated to the Covenant of the 
League or Mations,·and unless it offers to all nations equal 
treatment whether they have signed the Convention or not. 
This it clearly cannot do if it is to be dovetailed into a 
1 
system ot alliances." 
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Again the British delegation was suspected ot cater-
ing to the Axis, as it raced the combined opposition ot the 
mutual-aid States, led by the Soviet Union, France and Ru-
mania. At the July 9 session, Titulescu asked, pounding his 
fist on the table, "why Great Britain supported mutual as-
sistance pacta at Geneva and opposed them at Montreux," after 
which he stormed out of the conference room and left for 
2 
Bucharest. The British solved the problem by linking it to 
the principle, already accepted, of Turkey's complete control 
of the Straits when she herself was at war. They proposed 
that warships belonging to belligerent Powers should not pass 
through the Straits, except in eases arising out of the appli-
cation of Article 25 of the present Convention (military sanc-
tions under the League Covenant), and in cases of assistance 
rendered to a state victim of aggression 
in~. virtue of a tre$.tY of mutual assistance binding Tur-
key, concluded within the framework of the Covenant ot 
the League of Nations, and registered and published in 
accordance with Article 18 of the Covenant. · 
The mutual-aid States accepted the British proposal on July 
15, with the thought that in case of war Turkey, a member of 
the Balkan Entente, would probably end up as a belligerent on 
the right side. 
The Montreux Convention was signed by all the delega-
tions on July 20. Unlike the Lausanne Convention, which was 
1. The Times, July 14, 1936. 
2. Ibid., July 10, 1936. 
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to last iadetinitely, it would run for 20 years, and provi-
sion was made for its amendment. ~e days or perfect and 
permanent agreements had passed. 
!he new Convention registered the changes in the equi-
librium ot forces around the Turkish Straits. Soviet Russia 
was no longer weak and isolated, and the new regime rendered 
her naval position in the Black sea superior to that of any 
possible coalition, subject, however, to the continuance ot 
her peaceful relations with Turkey and with the League of 
Nations. It rested with her whether the Black Sea would re-
main a sate inland sea, as she had always wanted it to be. 
Russia's satisfaction with the new agreement was in direct 
proportion to the discontent of the Axis Powers. Italy es-
pecially, aware that her militarism had prompted the Powers 
to strengthen the Straits against her, saw in the Convention 
the revived "threat of a Mediterranean pact." And she drove 
. . 
a hard bargain before she adhered to it two years later. 
Great Britain found aome cause for gratification with 
the Montreux Convention. Her delegation had managed to 
transfer to Turkey much of the discretionary power which, 
according to the original Turkish draft, would have fallen 
to the Soviet Union. !be principle of the freedom of the 
Straits, by sea at least, had been rewritten into the new Con-
vention, and it was to endure "tor an unlimited period." The 
. . 
major consolation was perhaps that the procedure of interna-
tional law had been respected: "From the point or view of 
general European polities," Foreign Secretary Eden told the 
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House of Commons, 
the Conference has shown that treaty revision by negotia-
tion and agreement, in accordance with the normal proce-
dure and the normal principles or international relations 
and practice can lead to a settlement more favourable to 
all concerned than the method of repudiation or the 
method of aodification of treaty engagements by uni-
lateral action.l 
As for Turkey, she was the great gainer at Montreux. 
!he working of the new Convention depended so much on her 
sovereign will and her treaty relations, that the value of 
- her friendship rose sharply on the diplomatic ll8.rket. Great 
Britain's interest in Turkey, especially, was intensified, 
now that the latter had become once more the guardian of 
the Straits; fro.a now on the British would help the Turks 
resist the increasing :pressure or the Axis dictators. "The 
Montreux Conference," said D. A. Routh, "gained [Tu.rkeff. the 
. . 
praise or revisionists and anti-revisionists alike: the 
former because she advanced the cause of revision, the lat-
2 
ter because of the way she went about it. The Turkish de-
eiaion to seek revision by eeaaon consent was a wise one. 
The smaller States depend largely on treaty protection for 
their security; if they follow the exaaple of the powerful 
transgressors, aa Poland was to do in 1938, they help swell 
the ill tide that will ultimately sweep them away. 
1. The Times (London), July 28, 1936. 
2. Survel for 1936, p. 612. 
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b • TURKEY AD THE AXIS 
The dictators kept the other European States in per-
petual uncertainty by alternating their violent tirades with 
reassuring promises. On May 5, 1936, the day his troops en-
tered Addis Ababa, Mussolini denied having any further colo-
nial aspirations; he told a Daily Mail correspondent: "I 
give you ay word that they are wrong about Italy having any 
further colonial ambitions. Believe me, this victory in 
East Africa puts Italy into the group ot the 'satisfied' 
1 
Powers." He wished to break up the entente between Great 
Britain and Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia by reassuring these 
Mediterranean States that Italian imperialism did not consti-
tute a threat to them: "These States have nothing to tear," 
said he, "absolutely nothing. Italy has treaties or friend-
ship with Greece and Turkey and is determined to ohserve 
them." When asked if he bore them malice for their partici-
pation in the application or sanctions, he replied: "we are 
2 
not a people given to rancour." The Italian Government then 
gave Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia formal assurances that it 
did not contemplate retaliator.r action against any or them, 
and the British Governaent discontinued the agreements of 
3 
the previous November. 
1. Documents tor 1932, II, p. 464. 
2. Jailf Telegraph, May·28, 1936, in Documents for 1932, II, 
PP• 133-4. 
3· The Times (London), July 28, 1936. 
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The uneasiness of the small states was not altogether 
removed by reassuring stateaents; the solidarity and the ar-
rogance of the dictators increased in direct proportion with 
their success. On July 11, an Austro-German agree•nt 
pledged Germany to maintenance of Austrian independence, but 
it specified that Austria was •a German state." Mussolini 
. . 
was conceding Central Europe to Hitler and turning to Italy's 
"historic objectives• in "Asia and Africa." On November 1, 
after Ciano's visit to Berlin, the Duce announced the exist-
ence of a •vertical line between Rome and Berlin, lWhic~ is 
not a partition, but rather an axis." At the saae time he 
denounced the "illusions,• the "commonplaces," and "all tbe 
• .._ 4 • • 
conventional lies whdch still constitute the relics of the 
great shipwreck of Wilsonian ideology," such as disarmament, 
collective security, indivisible peace. And he singled out 
the League of Rations tor his main thrust: 
Since it is extremely difficult that it can be renewed, 
as tar as we are concerned, it can calmly perish. In 
any ease we have not forgotten, and we will not rorset, 
that the League or Nations organized, with methods of 
diabolical diligence, the iniquitous siege against the 
Italian people; attempted to starve this people in its 
concrete reality of men, women, and children; sought to 
break our military effort and the work of civilization 
that was beins carried out at about 4000 kilometres away 
fro• the mother countr.y. It was not successful, not be-
cause it did not wish to be, but because it found facing 
it the solid unity of the Italian people, capable or all 
the sacrifices and also of.waging war against titty-two 
states in coalition.l 
The conduct or Italy caused special concern in Turkey. 
As President In~n; later recalled, "the expansionist policy 
1. Documents for 1936, pp. 343-6. 
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and the clamorous speeches of the Fascist regime kept the 
1 
Turks in a state or considerable uneasiness." Moreover, the 
·Italian Governaent had a particular grievance against Turkey; 
the latter had taken the initiative in obtaining a new 
Straits Convention that waa extremely favorable to the Soviet 
Union. The Russian Black Sea fleet could now erupt into the 
Mediterranean in execution or a League assignment or or a 
mutual assistance pact binding Turkey, while the Italian fleet 
would be denied access to the Black Sea.It had 'been hoped that 
Italy would adhere to the new Convention after the removal of 
sanctions and of the British guarantees in the Eastern Medi-
terranean. On February 2-3, Dr. Aras met the new Italian 
Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, at Milan. The two statesmen 
proceeded to an examination or all questions or common inter-
est, •with special reference to the Convention or Montreux 
regarding the regime of the Straits and their respective po-
sitions in the Eastern Mediterranean." An official communique 
indicated the negative results or the meeting; the two Foreign 
Ministers agreed "to continue to keep in touch through the 
normal channels of their respective diplomatic chancelleries 
in order to give practical effect to the results of the ex-
2 
change or views to which they have proceeded." Two days 
later, at Belgrade, Dr. Aras revealed the Italian stand: 
All the Balkan States have already recognized de facto 
~he annexation or Abyssinia. In consequence there can 
1. Article "Turkey," in 10 Eventful Years (Chicago, 19~7), 
vol. IV,.p• 375·. 
2. Documents for 1937, pp. ~16-17. 
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be only a question or recognition de jure. This question 
will be raised at the next session or the League or Ra-
tions; it is the same as tar as the adhesion or Italy to 
the Montreux Convention is concerned. The question or 
the Straits has been settled. The attitude or the King-
dom or Italy, in regard to this~ is benevolent, and I may 
say that her adherence to the Treatl or Montreux is only 
a question or time and opportunity. 
Italy's acceptance or the Convention would be obtained when 
Turkey recognized the legitimacy or the new-born Italian Em-
pire. 
When Great Britain withdrew her Mediterranean guaran-
tees on July 27, 1936, she did not lose interest in Greece and 
Turkey. The latter had gained. tremendously in strategic im-
portance by the Convention signed one week before. If Turkey 
were at war or felt threatened, naval traffic through the 
Straits was left to her entire discretion, and the British 
had learned that the coastal defences or the Gallipoli Penin-
sula are difficult to force. The Turks in turn welcomed the 
friendship of the great naval Power, as a complement to their 
good relations with the great land Power to the north. On 
September 4-6, 1936, Edward VIII visited Istanbul and Ankara. 
On November 20-26, a Turkish naval squadron was entertained 
at Malta. 
During the Spanish Civil War, the British Government 
hung on to the fiction or non-intervention, in the hope of 
localizing the conflict and preventing its extension to the 
Eastern Mediterranean. During 1937, however, many Soviet 
1. Documents for 1937, p. 417. 
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ships carrying supplies to Republican Spain were sunk by 
submarines as they came out or the Dardanelles. It soon be-
came apparent that the attackers were based on the Italian 
islands of the Dodecanese. A conference of Great Britain, 
France, the U.s.s.R., Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, 
Bulgaria and Egypt met at Xyon, Switzerland, on September 
9-14, to devise measures or patrol and defence. It was de-
cided that "any submarine which attacks such a ship Lnot be-
longing to either or the conflicting Spanish partieif shall 
be counter-attacked and, if possible, destroyed." This in-
struction was extended "to any submarine encountered in the 
vicinity," if there existed sufficient grounds tor the be-
lief that the submarine was guilty or the attack. Cargoes 
were to be cenv~yed along specific routes, and submarines 
belonging to the signatory Powers were t0 remain outside the 
convoy zones. The naval action devolved upon the British 
and French Mediterranean fleets, while the other Powers sup-
1 
plied the port facilities. The smaller Bowers at Nyon, 
Eden reported, "played up well under the almost effusively 
. 2 
friendly lead of Turkey." 
The Italians had once again drawn Britain and Turkey 
together. They continued to fortify the air and submarine 
bases of . Rholies : ancr Leros, in the Dodeeanese. This 
1. "Nyon Arrangement,"~~ Aug.-Sept. 1937, pp. 669-687. 
2. W. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948), p'. 
246. 
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constituted a threat to British communications in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, as well as to the Greek islands and the Turk-
ish mainland. The Turkish Government's concern over the 
nearby Italian fortifications was haughtily ignored by Count 
" " Ciano, who told Ru,tu Aras: 
It is unpleasant for us, and quite futile, that the Turks 
should keep on protesting against these fortifications, 
regarding them as a threat ·aimed at Turkey. The Dodecan-
ese are one link or the ca .. unications or the Empire 
whose security we intend to provide tor in the moat ef-
ficacious and complete manner.l 
The cooperation of Turkey with Great Britain and Greece was 
intensified. Royal Air Porce officials supervised the newly-
2 
created Turkish aviation school. British specialists under-
took to rebuild the shipyards of the Golden Horn. 
The tightening of the British relationship, however, 
created a problem for Turkey. Soviet-British relations were 
far from cordial; the British had never overcome their feel-
ing of aversion towards the Bolsheviks, while the Soviets 
found Britain too willing to enter agreements with Germany 
and Italy. Prime Minister In~nG was afraid that a close tie 
with Britain might compromise Tureo-soviet relations. But 
ft . Ataturk was determined to work with Britain, and on October 
" ft 25, 1937, Inonu retired to private life "for reasons of 
health. "3 
The rift between the Axis an~ the democracies con-
tinued to widen. on December 11, Mussolini announced that 
1. Ciano's Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p. 94. 
2. Oriente Moderno, October 1937, p. 507. 
3· Ibid., p. 506 . 
............ 
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Italy was withdrawing from the League or Nations, "rrom that 
destructive environment represented by the Geneva Council of-
1 
fools." When Hitler took Austria, on March 12, 1938, and 
the southern boundary or the Nazi Germany was moved to the 
Brenner Pass, even Mussolini was alarmed: "When an event is 
inevitable," he explained, "it is better that it should take 
place with your consent rather than in spite of you, or still 
2 
worse, against your will." He has to accept the fact that 
Hitler had seized the controls of the Axis machine. The 
fact that Germany had become by far the greater menace led 
Great Britain to negotiate once more with Italy, and the 
smaller Powers, one after the other, recognized the Ethiopian 
conquest. On February 27, at the Council of the Balkan En-
tente, Greece and Turkey agreed to recognize the Italian Em-
pire, as Yugoslavia and Ruaania had already done. Turkey 
formally conferred recognition on April 4, and Italy, in turn, 
adhered to the Montreux Convention on May 2. 
The Anschluss increased Britain's determination to 
fortify Turkey. On May 27, Prime Minister Chamberlain an-
nounced to the House of Commons that Turkey had been granted 
credits totaling 16 million pouads sterling, of which six 
million were for the purchase of armaments and ten for 
3 industrial equipment. In July a Turkish naval mission 
1. Documents for 1937, p. 290. 
2. Documents for 1938, I, p. 237· 
3· The Times, Special Number Aug. 9, 1938, p. VIII. 
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1 
obtained the transfer to Turkey or two British submarines; 
Foreign Minister Aras emphasized the British orientation of 
Turkish foreign policy when he declared on July 20: "No mat-
ter what happens, never will we be found in a camp opposing 
Britain .•• Britain may lose a battle, but never a war. She 
2 
has money, a navy, and character." 
Mr. Aras' confidence was suddenly shaken by the Munich 
capitulation in September. In a quick change of heart he 
confessed that his Yugoslav colleague Stoyadinovie had been 
right, and that one should get along with Berlin. 
" " 
tt Ataturk 
was ill and Inonu out of office; the Foreign Minister turned 
sharply towards Germany. On October 11, Economies Minister 
Walther Funk, after a week spent at Ankara, granted Turkey 
credits for 150 million marks (75 million Turkish pounds). 
The deviation towards Berlin was momentary; one month after 
n n tt 
the Funk Agreement, Ataturk died. Inonu succeeded him as 
President, and quickly restored the previous policy. Soviet-
British relations appeared to be on the mend, and close ties 
could be maintained with both Powers. After an uninterrupted 
tenure of more than thirteen years as Foreign Minister, Dr. 
n tt Aras was succeeded in the new Saydam Cabinet by Mr. ~ukru sara-
coglu. 
Upon their accession to power, the Nazis began their 
drive to corner the Balkan market. The Weimar Republic had 
1. Oriente Moderno, August 1938, p. 423· 
2. Documents for 1938, I, p. 299· 
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restored Germany's economic position in the Balkans to a 
normal level; by 1932, German trade had settled at a yearly 
avera~ of about 20% of the import and export trade of the 
Balkan countries. The Nazis devised new methods of exchange 
and overnight they obtained a firm grip on most of the Balkan 
economies. Albania remained an Italian fief, but in the other 
countries, the success of the German~rive was amazing. The 
1 
following figures reveal the extent of the German commercial 
penetration: 
1) Germany's Share in the Import Trade of: 
ill£ ill§ l.2.l§ (Germany-Austria) 
Greece g.6 22.4 29.0 
Yugoslavia 17·7 26.7 39·4 
Rumania 23.6 36.1 4o.o 
Bulgaria 25·9 61.0 52·0 
2) Germany's Share in the Export Trade of: 
~ ill& ~ (Germany-Austria) 
Greece 14.5 36-4 38.6 
Yugoslavia 11·3 23·7 42.0 
Rumania 12·5 17-8 26-5 
Bulgaria 26.0 47.6 59 .o 
The Germans offered irresistible terms. They consis-
tently paid more than the market price, and sold at competi-
tive p~ices; they contracted for large amounts and for long 
periods of time; they granted credit freely, and their barter 
system permitted repayment in kind; they granted long-term 
credit for the purchase of machinery and other non-expendable 
goods; and, except for a few critical items such as aluminum, 
1. South-Eastern Europe (London, 1939), pp. 126; 140, 157 and 
168. 
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they seldom restricted the type of goods they sold in return. 
Such favorable terms were all the more welcome to the Balkan 
countries, whose markets had become glutted as a result of 
the world depression. 
The opportunity for increased trade with Germany was 
especially attractive to Turkey; in 1933, she launched her 
Five Year Plan of industrial construction in the fields of 
textiles, metallurgy, cellulose, ceramics and chemicals. 
German machinery, rolling stock and armaments were indispen-
sable, and Germany was ready to buy large amounts of Turkish 
tobacco, cotton and wool. In 1937, Germany took 51~ of Tur-
key's exports, compared with 13 1/2~ in 1932; she supplied 
1 
4~ of Turkey's imports, compared with 23~ in 1932· Tur-
key's trade balance had shown an average annual deficit of 
36 million Turkish pounds during the period 1925-32; from 
1933 to 1939, the balance was favorable by an annual average 
2 
of 12 1/2 million Turkish pounds. 
The Turkish Government took special steps, however, to 
prevent the national economy from becoming dangerously de-
pendent upon the German economic empire. Germany's large-
scale buying created huge balances of "blocked" marks to the 
. . 
credit of the supplying States; these credit balances could 
be used only in the purchase of German goods, and thus the 
Balkan States were forced to orient their import trade towards 
1. South-Eastern Europe, p. 178. 
2. From trade figures in the Statistical Year-Book of the 
Leaeue of Xations, 1933-1934 (Geneva, 1934), p. 189; and 
194·-1941 (Geneva, 1941), p. 172. 
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Germany. In 1937, Turkey had accumulated a twenty-million 
mark credit balance; Germa.n.·."imports were rigidly curtailed, 
and in one year, the balance was wiped out. The Turkish Gov-
ernment also counterbalanced the German trade by awarding 
large State contracts to non-German firms. Armaments were 
1 
obtained from Skoda as well as Krupp. In 1937, a contract 
amounting to three million pounds sterling for the construc-
tion of steel works at Karabuk was given to the British firm 
2 
of Brassert and Company. 
The same concern for independence appeared in finan-
cial affairs. The Turkish Republic was determined to avoid 
the Ottoman Empire's fatal poliey of covering deficits by 
foreign borrowing. During the difficult years 1923-30, Tur-
key did not negotiate a single foreign loan. Once the coun-
try's financial situation was straightened out, two ten-mil-
lion-dollar loans were secured to help finance the Five Year 
Plan, one from the Soviet Union, and the other from the 
Kruger Match Company. In 1938, the urgent demands of mili-
tary preparedness again forced Turkey to seek money abroad. 
On May 27, she obtained a sixteen-million-pound credit in 
Great Britain, guaranteed by the British Government, and 
3 
payable over twenty years. There was a temporary deviation 
towards Germany in the immediate post-Munich period, when 
1. Oriente Moderno, December 1936, p. 673· 
2. D. A· Routh, Survey for 1936, p. 673· 
3· The Times (London), Aug. 9, 1938 (Special Number), p. VIII. 
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Turkey obtained a 150-million-mark credit from Walther Funk. 
But the new Saydam Government promptly reoriented its finan-
cial policy towards London, and the Funk Agreement was not 
ratified by the National Assembly. 
Germany's economic drive down the Balkan Peninsula 
disconcerted her competitors. The trade agreements she 
negotiated were not advantageous to her from the point of 
view of immediate profit. 
In 1938 she paid double the world price for Rumanian 
wheat, and it is reported that during the recent nego-
tiations for a new trade agreement the Germans urged that 
the price suggested by the Rumanians for their cattle ex-
porta {to be fixed in advance ror a certain quantity) was 
not sufficiently remunerative to their producers, and ac-
cordingly fixed a price appreciably higher.l 
British economists were suspicious or the gift-bearing Dr. 
Funk; they were forced to acknowledge that "Germany did not 
up till March 1939 Lthe tt.e of writi~ exploit her position 
2 
as might have been expected." The Secretary or the Depart-
ment or Overseas Trade, Mr. Hudson, was moved to pity for 
the German consumer: "Germany," he told the House Of Commons, 
' ' 
"is obtaining a stranglehold on the countries in that part of 
Europe, an uneconomic stranglehold at the expense of her own 
people, because it means raising the cost of living to her 
own people and, in fact, exporting goods at leas than cost 
.,3 
price. 
1. South-Eastern Euro2e, 
2. 1!?1!., PP· 195-9. 
3· ~-, pp. 202-3. 
P· 136. 
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Germany's long-range purpose was political as well as 
economic. The stocking or supplies in the Xeich ror the com-
ing wars could have been achieved by more orthodox and profit-
able methods. In 1939, it began to appear that she intended 
to bind the Balkan national economies permanently to her own, 
and then to transform them to suit the needs or her own econ-
omy; in the final stage, she could dictate the terms, and 
her initial liberality would be amply repaid. In this eon-
neetion, the German-Rumanian commercial agreement or March 
23, 1939, furnishes a preview or the satellite role which 
Germany reserved tor the various Balkan economies. The clear 
purpose or the agreement was the reshaping or the Rumanian 
economy in terms or its maxiaum utility to Germany. Both 
countries were to cooperate in intensifying the production of 
those products which Germany needed, such as oil, rats, timber 
1 
and minerals. or all the Balkan countries, Rumania had the 
greatest industrial potentialities; it is significant that 
Germany was severely restrictive in the types or German 
machinery which she allowed the Rumanians to purchase. 
Turkey was not absorbed into the German economic sys-
tem, just as she mamaged to remain outside or the Axis poli-
tical orbit. Other Balkan States, however, were less success-
ful, and the master-strokes of the Rome-Berlin partners pro-
roundly shook and modi~i4d the Balkan Entente. 
1. South-Eastern Europe, pp. 136-7. 
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The Permanent CoQncil of the Balkan Entente met at 
Belgrade on May 4-6, 1936, at the time when Italian troops 
were entering the Ethiopian capital. The new Greek Premier, 
General Netaxas, requested confirmation, by the Entente mem-
bers, of the limitations to the obligations of Greece under 
the Balkan Pact. The President or the Council, Mr. Stoya-
dinovic, assured General Metaxas "that the declaration in-
terpreting the position or Greece which was made before the 
Greek Parliament ~a!7 tully compatible with the spirit or 
the Balkan Pact, and that the obligations or Greeee, clearly 
and unequivocally defined, ~e~ only concerned with the 
1 
Balkan frontiers." The Council favored Turkish remilitari-
zation or the Straits, which the Montreux Conference was to 
consider in June; and it implied that a Bulgarian request 
2 
tor treaty revision would be favorably received. The Balkan 
Entente was becoming resigned to treaty revision, but it was 
still united. 
'!'he first break ca• suddenly in Rumania. The Rwaanian 
Cabinet resigned on August 29; Prime Minister Tatarescu imme-
diately formed a new cabinet or the same ministers, with the 
sole exception or Foreign Minister Titulescu. In these cir-
cumstances, it was difficult to believe the statement or the 
new Foreign Minister, Ion Antonescu, to the effect that 
1. Quoted by A· J. Toynbee, Survey tor 1936, p. 520. 
2. T. I. Geshkoft, Balkan Union, p. 226. 
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"Rumania's foreign policy remains the same as that which has 
1 
been pursued up to the present." Titulescu had been one of' 
Europe's leading advocates of' collective security and the 
preservation of' the status guo; his recent agreements with 
Soviet Russia had been especially distasteful to the con-
servative elements in Rumania. Antonescu reaffirmed Rumania's 
fidelity to her allies, her friendship with Soviet Russia and 
her devotion to the League or Nations. But there was room in 
his policy for new elements: "We shall maintain," said he, 
"the best relations with our neighbors and with all other 
Countries, including Germany, our good relations with whom 
have their origin in the existence of' great economic inter-
2 
eats." In November, he visited Warsaw, where he was briefed 
by Colonel Beck on the theory and practice of neutralism. 
A similar change in policy was under way in Yugoslavia. 
The Germans launched their economic drive in Yugoslavia in 
1936. In May, a barter agreement was concluded which more 
than doubled the volume of trade in the next three years.· 
Yugoslavia round herself overnight with a 24-million-mark 
credit balance in·aerman banks; she directed her purchases 
to Germany, but the Germans kept up their mass buying, and 
the balance was never substantially reduced. German capital 
poured into Yugoslavia, and the German grip on the Yugoslav 
3 
economy continued to tighten. At the same time, there 
1. Documents for 1936, p. 394. 
2 . ~. , p • 39 5. 
3· South-Eastern Europe, pp. 140-50. 
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were indications that diplomatic relations with Italy were on 
the mend. While Yugoslavia was fretting over t~e possibility 
ot Italian reprisals tor the application of sanctions, Brit-
ish Foreign Minister Eden told the House of Commons, on July 
27, that he had received assurances rrom the Italian Govern-
ment to the efteet that "with Yugoslavia Italy intends no 
less to develop the same good relationship she enjoys with 
1 
Turkey and Greece." 
The ineffectiveness ot the League of Nations and of 
the mutual aid system was felt especially in Yugoslavia and 
Rumania, the two connecting links between the Little and Bal-
kan Ententes. At the meeting or the Permanent Council of 
the Little Entente, held at Bratislava on September 13-14, 
1936, Yugoslavia, with the support or Rumania, introduced a 
change in Little Entente policy in spite or Czechoslovak op-
2 
position. In the Official Communique, the three States de-
clared that they would continue their efforts to maintain 
the best possible relations with all States; "this will be 
the ease first or all with the bordering States, with whom 
they wish to entertain and develop the best possible good-
neighborly r.~ations." The main purpose of the Little En-
tente had been surveillance of, and not rapprochement with, 
the neighboring state of Hungary. It was to be expected that 
the attitude of Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent that or 
1. The Times (London), July 28, 1936. 
2. Documents for 1936, pp. 352-3. 
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Rumania, would be the same within the Balkan Entente in con-
nection with Bulgaria. 
Early in December, the Bulgarian Government made a 
treaty proposition to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government 
consulted its partners in both Ententes, and met with the 
opposition of Greece and Turkey; these States had to give 
way, however, and Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiosseivanoff was 
able to state, on January 2, 1937, that the pact would be 
concluded. "We are especially pleased," said he 
. . 
that in spite of initial objections on the part of cer-
tain of our neighbors, their final consent has enabled 
us to confirm in a diplomatic instrument, which will be 
a treaty of friendship similar to, and perhaps identical 
with the one which already binds us to Turkey, the good 
relations which exist in fact between Bulgaria and Yugo-
slavia, and which constitute an essential element of 
Balkan peace.l 
The Treaty of Perpetual Friendship signed at Belgrade on 
January 24, contained only one substantive article, identical 
with Article 1 or the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of 1925: 
There will be inviolable peace and sincere and perpetual 
friendship between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the 
Kingdom of Bulgaria.2 . 
What military measures Turkey, and now Yugoslavia, would take 
against Bulgaria in execution of the Balkan Pact, remained a 
mystery. 
Yugoslav Prime Minister Stoyadinovic repeatedly stressed 
the universal approval which the Bulgarian treaty found with 
the Entente allies. Be stated on February 2: 
1. Documents for 1937, p. 401. 
2. Ibid., pp. 401-2. 
180 
It is necessary for me to recall to your minds that our 
allies and our friends have given their assent to this 
Pact. For this reason we consulted the Czechoslovak Re-
public, the Kingdom of Greece, the Kingdom of Rumania, 
and the Republic of Turkey. These four allied States 
gave !heir entire approval to the conclusion of this 
Pact. 
~'IV 
It only remained for the Permanent Council of the Li*tle En-
tente to give the Treaty its blessing. Its Official Communique 
of February 18 stated that 
the Permanent Council was pleased to learn of the conclu-
sion of the Treaty of Friendship between Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia, signed at Belgrade, on January 24, 1937· It 
noted that this Pact corresponds with the purpose of the 
Balkan Entente: to maintain and consolidate peace in the 
Balkans. Therefore it considers the Pact signed by Bul-
garia and Yugoslavia as a valuable contribution to the 
eatablishaent of a friendly collaboration between all the 
Balkan peoplea.2 
The pleasure of the Turkish, and especially of the Greek mem-
bers of the Entente was certainly not whole-hearted. 
Yugoslavia was about to remove a far more formidable 
danger on another frontier. Speaking at Milan on November 1, 
1936, Mussolini had reaffirmed his intention of ending his 
ten-year-old feud with Yugoslavia, when he said: 
I declare that by now necessary and sufficient conditions 
exist, of a moral, political, and economic character, to 
place on a new basis or concrete friendship the relations 
between the two countries. 3 
Three months later, Premier Stoyadinovic was still waiting 
impatiently for the Duce's intention to materialize. "You 
know," he stated on February 4, "that Mussolini has held out 
. . 
to us a hand or reconciliation in his speech at Milan, and I 
1. Documents for 1937, pp. 389-90. 
2. f!!!·, P· 350. 
3· Documents for 1936, p. 345. 
'• 
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cannot believe that there could be any Government in our 
country who would not have accepted this proffered hand of 
reconciliation. We now walt to see whether acts will follow 
words and we have no reason not to create an atmosphere of 
1 
good nelghborshlp and good friendship." 
The negotiations began soon after, and on March 25, 
Count Ciano went to Belgrade to sign the Treaty of Frlend-
2 
ship and Perpetual Peace. The Yugoslavs were at last re-
lieved of the Italian menace; both parties expressed a desire 
to inaugurate "a new era in the political and economic rela-
tions between the two States." They undertook "to 'respect 
their common frontiers." Yugoslav foreign policy was drawn 
towards the Axis by Article 2, which reads: 
In ease of international complications, and if the two 
countries are agreed that their common interests are or 
may be threatened, they undertake to concert together 
regarding the measures to be taken to safeguard them. 
The two States, whose reciprocal trade had not recovered from 
the interruption caused by sanctions, agreed "to intensify 
and expand the present exchange of goods and services and to 
investigate the possibilities or closer economic collabora-
tion." Finally, Mussolini obtained de jure recognition or 
his Empire, and the Treaty referred to "His Majesty the King 
of Italy, Emperor or Ethiopia." On the day the Treaty was 
~ 
signed, Premier Stoyadinovic defined his neutralist policy 
when he stated: 
1. Documents for 1937, p. 391· 
2. Ibid., PP· 302-3. 
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The foreign policy of Yugoslavia continues to be faith-
ful to the principles on which it is based and to the 
obligations which she has aasuaed with regard to her 
friends and allies. She is attempting to create upon 
all her frontiers a propitious atmosphere for the favour-
able development of our contacts with neighbouring coun-
tries, and for the discussion of any difficulties which 
might separate us, with a view to the final sertlement 
of the problems with which we are preoccupied. 
The day following the signature of the Treaty, Ciano 
and stoyad1nov1e had a frank talk on the shape of things to 
come. The Yugoslav leader outlined "the principal and deci-
sive role" he wished Yugoslavia to play in the Balkan Penin-
sula. The Yugoslavs were a people of more than 15 millions, 
and the birth rate was very proa1s1ng. The next ten years 
would be devoted not to territorial expansion, but to in-
ternal development: then 
when one day horizons and new outlets ~111 be required 
by the vigorous life of the young Yugoslav people, I 
think it will be exactly in the direction of Greece and 
Turkey that the march will begin. 
As for Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, "the future destinies of the 
two Slav nations ~ould b!7 parailel." Concerning Rumania, 
either she 
joins our system, and then we will have the grain and 
the oil wells at our disposal, or Rumania will be against 
us and, in a short time, we will have the wells just the 
same. 
Relations with Czechoslovakia, the Little Entente partner, 
will "be reduced to an empty formal!~." Yugoslavia's pur-
chases of arms, hitherto made principally in France and Czecho-
slovakia, would henceforth be concentrated in Italy and Germany. 
Ciano gathered from the talk that Stoyad1nov1~ was a "good 
Fascist," and foresaw that Italy would shortly be able "to 
1. Documents for 1937, p. 291. 
• 
take the place in Yugoslavia of France herself} 
The Treaty had been negotiated with a minimum of con-
sultation with the allies of both Ententes. When the Turkish 
Foreign Minister met Count Ciano at Milan on February 4, the 
Balkan situation was discussed, bb$ the Italo-Yugoslav talks 
were not mentioned; the Italian Minister noted, in his record 
of the meeting: "In accordance with the wish of the Yugo-
slavs I did not in any way discuss with Aras the present 
2 
negotiations of which he is not informed." The Yugoslav 
initiative was resented by all the Entente States, and es-
pecially by Greece, whose position, like that or Czechoslo-
vakia, was profoundly affected by the reorientation of the 
Yugoslav and Rumanian policies. Bow that Yugoslavia was 
reconciled with Bulgaria and Italy, the danger of attack by 
these two Powers had suddenly shifted to the Greek border. 
An Italian attack launched from Albania would now be directed 
against Epirus; a Bulgarian attack would be aimed at the 
Aegean, instead of Yugoslav Macedonia. In either eventuality, 
the Yugoslavs would certainly be tempted to obtain more than 
a free zone at Salonika. 
The other States of the Little and Balkan Ententes 
1. Ciano's record: Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, pp. 98-105. 
The Italians encouraged Yugoslav aspirations in the direc-
tion of Greece and Turkey. On December 11, 1937, Mussolini 
mentioned to Stoyadinovi~ "the Slavs' gravitational 
thrust towards the Bosphorus and the Aegean." Stoyadinovic 
~romiaed to bring his policy towards Greece and Turkey 
more and more into harmony with Rome's." Ibid., p. 152. 
2. ~., P· 95· 
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were forced to seek additional guarantees elsewhere in view 
of the increasingly "independent" policies of Yugoslavia and 
Rumania. Czechoslovakia increased her armaments, and streng-
thened her ties with France, and especially with Soviet Rus-
sia. In the Balkans, Greece and Turkey fell back upon their 
bilateral Entente, and worked closely with Great Britain. 
On May 25, 1937, Prime Minister In~nG paid Dictator Metaxas 
an official visit at Athens. " President A taturk, in a mes-
sage that was read to the Greek hosts, assured Metaxas that 
"the frontiers or the Allied Balkan States constitute a 
single frontier. Those who might entertain designs on this 
frontier would be exposed to the scorching rays of the sun, 
and I advise them to be careful." General Metaxas replied 
that "the representatives of the Greek Army, Navy and Air 
Foree here assembled express their great joy and enthusiasm 
upon hearing the message of His Excellency the President of 
the Turkish Republic; this message corresponds to our own 
feelings and to the deep and eternal friendship which the 
1 
Greek nation feels tor its sister .[T:J nation." The solidar-
ity ot the Balkan Entente was loudly praised during the Ingn~ 
visit, but special tribute was rendered to the Gre~o-Turkish 
pact which had been its forerunner. 
On February 28, 1938, Greece and Turkey initialed an 
2 
Additional Treaty, signed at Athens on April 27, which pro-
longed and reinforced the Pact of Cordial Friendship or 1933· 
1. Documents tor 1937, p. 420. 
2. Documents tor 1938, I, pp. 286-7. 
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Both parties undertook to protect their neutrality by force 
of arms if necessary, if the other were attacked. If one 
party were threatened, the other would try to remedy the 
situation by diplomatic means; if war resulted nevertheless, 
both parties were to examine the situation "with a view to 
a solution in conformity with.their high interests." 
In the meantime, the Balkan Entente was drifting 
towards further depreciation. The Permanent Council met at 
Ankara on February 25-27, 1938. It took note of the fact 
that Yugoslavia had already given Italy de jure recognition 
of her Ethiopian Empire and that Rumania was determined to 
do the same. "In these circumstances," said the Official 
1 
C oJIUiunique, 
which show once more the complete identity of views which 
exists among the members of the Balkan Entente in connec-
tion with this Mediterranean policy, the Council feels 
that Greece and Turkey, in order to promote international 
cooperation in the Mediterranean basin, should take proper 
action to adjust their attitude in the Ethiopian question 
to the friendly relations which they entertain with Italy. 
Greece and Turkey formally recognized the Italian Empire on 
April 4. 
Premier Stoyadinovie continued to neutralize the pol-
icy of Yugoslavia. On March 9, he declared: 
Yugoslavia has during the past year continued her coopera-
tion with the League or Hat1ons, naturally within the 
scope or the limited activity which present practical 
conditions allow. The Royal Yugoslav Government will con-
tinue this cooperation, in harmony with the general lines 
or their foreign policy, taking care that their partici-
pation in these activities does not come into conflict 
1. Documents for 1238, pp. 285-6. 
with their desire to maintain good and friendly relations 
with all European Great Powers and to remain aloof from 
all ideological blocs.·· 
And he referred in the following terms to Germany, whose 
army reached the Yugoslav border three days later: 
Good and friendly relations with the great and progres-
sive German Reich can be developed in all spheres with 
complete1respect for the political conceptions of both parties. 
After Munich, on November 13, 1938, his policy had collected 
all the incompatible elements of neutralism. "The friendship 
which we opportunely established with our great neighbor on 
the western frontier," he said, 
has shown itself to be a powerful factor for peace in 
the recent European crisis. The alliance with Rumania, 
G~eece and Turkey in the framework of the Balkan Pact has 
secured our.Balkan frontiers. The pact of eternal friend-
ship with the fraternal country of Bulgaria has secured 
peace on that frontier also. An agreement was concluded 
recently at Bled with our neighbour to the north, and 
the friendly words of the Hungarian Foreign Minister yes-
terday showed that on this. frontier too we may Justifi-
ably hope for a favourable development of relations.2 
No reference was made to the Little Entente; it had died at 
Munich. 
The Balkan Entente was also dead, although its shadow 
continued to walk about. On July 31, 1938, a Treaty of 
a 
Friendship and Non-Aggression, signed at Salonika by the En-
tente as a whole and Bulgaria, removed in effect what may 
have been left of the Entente's original purpose. Both par-
ties undertook to "abstain from force" in all their future 
1. Documents for 1938, I,pp. 295~6. 
2. Ibid., P• 298. 
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relations, and the operation or the mutual aid provisions or 
the Balkan Pact became all the more problematical. It was 
agreed at the same tiae to allow the rearmament or Bulgaria, 
and the remilitarization of the Thracian frontier by Bul-
$&ria, Greece and Turkey; these provisions, however, re-
quired the approval of the other signatories of the Treaty 
or Heuilly and the Lausanne Convention concerning the Thra-
eian Frontier. 
In his last message to the Kational Assembly, on No-
" vember 1, 1938, President A taturk referred "with particular 
1 
satisfaction" to the semi-inclusion of Bulgaria in a much-
diluted Entente. Xo collective action could any longer be 
expected from the Entente, but it was hoped that the hesitat-
ing members would at least remain neutral in case or conflict, 
while Greece and Turkey stood by the terms of their bilateral 
entente. Turkey was leaning towards Britain in the general 
European struggle, and the inclusion or France in a three-
way understanding only awaited the final settlement of the 
Alexandretta dispute. 
1. 
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e . '!'HE QUES'I'IOlf OF ALEXANDRE'l'TA 
On September 9, 1936, the French and Syrian Govern-
ments initialed a treaty of alliance, similar to the British-
Iraqi treaty, which contemplated the termination or the 
French mandate three years later, and the admission or Syria 
to the League or Nations. One month later, on October 9, the 
1 
Turkish Ambassador to Paris delivered a note to the French 
Foreign Minister, requesting that he 
decide whether it would not be advisable for the French 
Government to conclude with the delegates of the popula-
tions, the vast majority or whom are Turkish, in the re-
gion or Alexandretta and Antioch, a treaty similar to 
that signed by France with the representatives of Syria 
and the treaty now being negotiated with those or Lebanon. 
The autonomy of the Alexandretta district, the note argued, 
was intended by the Angora Agreement or 1921 "to come within 
the framework or the French mandate, and not or Syrian inde-
pendence." The question of the Sanjak or Alexandretta was 
reopened. 
The district or Alexandretta had been the objector spe-
2 
cial treatment in the Angora Agreement. The description of 
the 'l'urkiah-Syrian border, contained in Article VIII, excluded 
it from Turkish territory; but Article VII provided it with 
a special status: 
A special administrative regime shall be established for 
the district of Alexandretta. The Turkish inhabitants of 
this district shall enjoy every facility for their cul-
tural development. The Turkish language shall have offi-
cial recognition. 
1. LIOJ, January 1937, pp. ~1-2. 
2. ~, LIV, PP· 177-193· 
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The Treaty or Lausanne later confirmed the delimitation of 
the Turkish-Syrian border, aa described in the Angora Agree-
ment. 
When the Lausanne Treaty was submitted to the Turkish 
National Assembly for ratification, in August 1923, the Gov-
ernment's-failure to recover the Sanjak was the main target 
of the irredentist opposition. Yahya Kemal warned vaguely: 
"There is no security possible as long as the border remains 
what it is." Hamdallah Soubhi was more specific: "If France 
wishes to get out or her present difficulties LWith.Germani7, 
she must not have to worry in the East, and that is not pos-
sible as long as the situation remains troubled on our south-
1 
ern border." Nevertheless the Treaty of Lausanne was rati-
fied, as Mustapha Kemal wished. The special administrative 
regime was established, amd om May 14, 1930, it was embodied 
in an Organic Law promulgated by the French High Commissioner. 
Until 1936, the Sanjak or Alexandretta was not an issue in 
2 
Turkish polities. 
The prospect of an independent Arab state or Syria, 
however, revived the interest or the Turks in the fate of 
"' 1. Bulletin periodigue, Ho. 31, p. 3· 
2. Count Charles de Chambrun, French Ambassador to Ankara 
from 1928 to 1131~ later recalled a conversation he had 
had with Dr. Ruftu, in which the ~urkish Foreign Minister 
had said: "We•reapeet this mandate entrusted to France. 
Oh! if any other nation held it, that would be a different 
matter, we would have to protect the Turkish populations 
of Alexandretta and Antioch." c. de Chambrun, Ataturk et 
la Turguie Nouvelle (Paris, 1939), p. 36. 
190 
their "brothers" across the border. The rate or the Assy-
rians at the hands or the Iraqi Arabs, during the first year 
of Iraq's independence, was not a reassuring memory. The 
Turkish preaa reported the triDulations of the Sanjak Turks, 
and clamored tor outright retrocession. " .. Ataturk dramatically 
visited Adana, near the limits of the Sanjak, where he was 
reported to have said that, sooner or later, Alexandretta 
1 
and Antioch would be reunited to the mother country. In 
the Sanjak proper, the Turkish element had suddenly come to 
life; the Turks threw away their fezzes for European hats, 
and constantly clashed with the turban-wearing Arabs. 
The official government attitude at Ankara was more 
moderate. It was expressed by the semi-official Ankara: 
We only hope that, in accordance with the Angora Agree-
ment, the national existence o·r our compatriots or Anti-
och will be freer and more secure; the decision most 
nearly corresponding to Justice would be to give them a 
broadly autonomous governaent.2 
But this moderate demand, the Ankara Government was determined 
to press. Speaking before the Kational Assembly, on Kovember 
" 1, 1936, Ataturk declared: 
The important topic of the day which is absorbing the 
whole attention or the Turkish people, is the fate or 
the district or Alexandretta, Antioch and its dependen-
cies, which in poiat or raet belongs to the purest Turk-
ish ele .. nt. we are obliged to take up this matter seri-
ously and firmly.j 
1. Tan (Istanbul), September 26, 1936, quoted in Oriente Mo-
lirBo, Koveaber 1936, p. 614. 
2. Quoted in Oriente Moderno, November 1936, p. 616. 
3· Quoted by A· J. Toynbee, Survey for 1936, p. 772. 
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Replying to the Turkish note of October 9, the French 
Foreign Minister, Mr.Delbos, on November 10, pointed out that 
the mandate over Syria had been granted to France on April 25, 
1920; therefore, the Angora Agreement was negotiated the fol-
lowing year in the name of Syria. The Mandate Charter of July 
24, 1922, speci·t:ted that "the mandatory shall be responsible 
for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria or Lebanon 
is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of 
a foreign Power" (Article 4). Mr. Delbos finally called at-
tention to Article 3 of the recent Franco-Syrian Treaty, by 
which "the rights and obligations of all treaties, conven-
tions and other international acts concluded by the French 
Government in matters concerning Syria or in the name of that 
country, 11 would be transferred to the Government of Syria 
1 
alone, on the day of the termination of the mandate. In a 
second note, on November 30, Mr. Delbos offered to consider 
"any suggestions the Turkish Government might make for a 
clearer definition, within the framework of the 1921 agree-
ment, of the special administrative regime of the Sanjak." 
And he suggested, in the event his suggestion proved inaccept-
able, that the question be referred to the Council of the 
League of Nations. 
The alternative was debated in the Turkish Assembly 
and the extremists were heard once more. Deputy Ibrahim Mete 
stated that autonomy for the Sanjak was insufficient, that 
1. LNOJ, January 1937, pp. ~3-4-
2. ~., P· 52· 
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annexation was the only solution. " n Aka Gunduz declared that, 
if necessary, the Turks would recover ·"Hatay" by force of 
1 ' 
arms. It was decided to refer the case to the League Coun-
cil; on December 8, the Foreign Minister sent a note to the 
League Secretary-General, requesting that the following ques-
tion be considered at the coming extraordinary session or the 
Council: 
1. The adoption of interim measures of protection to en-
sure the safety of the Turkish people of the Sanjak, 
whose lives and liberties are endangered; 
2. The substantive question at issue between Turkey and 
France as to the future of the aforesaid territories.2 
By appealing to the League Council, the Turkish Government 
made it clear that it was not content to negotiate "within 
the framework of the 1921 Agreement." 
The dispute became overnight a matter of general Euro-
pean interest. The newly constituted Axis encouraged the 
Turkish demands, hoping for a prolonged conflict between Tur-
key and one of the Western democracies, and further embarrass-
ment for the League of Nations. Italy even held out prospects 
3 
of a prompt ratification of the Montreux Convention. Great 
1. Tan (Istanbul), Nov. 28, 1936, quoted in Oriente Moderno, 
December 1936, p. 672. The name "Hatay" (Hitt1te) 11was 
used to designate the Alawite element, or "Hatay Turkleri" (Hittite Turks). The ancient Hittites were. presumed to be 
related to the Turks. Thus, the Turkish-speaking Alawites, 
and the Turks proper, constituted the Turkish majority 
that the Turkish Government referred to throughout the 
Alexandretta dispute. 
2. 1!Ql, January 1937, p. 36. 
3· Araa recalls that the next time he saw Ciano, in February 
1937, the latter, by frequent allusions, sought to incite 
the Turks to the i~ediate military occupation of the San-
jak. T. R. Aras, Gor~tlerim, (Istanbul, 1945), p. 138. 
' ' 
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Britain and France, on the other hand, wished to preserve the 
systea of maadates, and to spare the League any further de-
feats; their position was all the more delicate because, while 
they needed to retain the good-will of the Turks, once more 
guardians of the Straits, they could not afford to arouse the 
Arab world. 
on December 16, the Council voted, on Rapporteur Sand-
ler's motion: 
1. To send to the SanJak three observers who were to re-
main there until the end of January, and to keep the 
Council informed of conditions; 
2. To postpone examination of the substantive question 
to the Council's regular session in January, recom-
mending that the two Governments continue their con-
versations tn the meantime in close contact with the 
Rapporteur. 
The French and Turkish delegations met at Paris and 
Geneva in January 1937, and, with the mediation of Mr. Sand-
ler and British Foreign Minister Eden, complete agreement on 
the principles and the broad outline of the settlement was 
reached on January 27. The Sandler report, approved by the 
Council on that day, described in general terms the new Stat-
ute, which would define the Sanjak's autonomous status, and 
the Fundamental Law, which was to be its constitution. The 
report also recommended that a committee of experts be ap-
pointed to write out the Statute and Fundamental Law along 
2 
the lines indicated. 
1. f!Ql, January 1937, PP· 31-2. 
2. Ibid., February 1937, pp. 118-20. 
194 
Both documents were presented to the League Council 
1 
and approved on May 29, 1937· The Statute recognized Syrian 
sovereignty over the Sanjak; Syria was to administer its for-
eign affairs, and there would be a common customs and monetary 
administration. In every other way, the Sanjak constituted 
"a separate entity, enjoying full independence in its internal 
affairs." The Statute was guaranteed by the League or Nations, 
and the latter was to be represented in the Sanjak by a resi-
dent delegate or French nationality, even after the expira-
tion or the French mandate. The whole district was to be 
demilitarized, France and Turkey being designated jointly to 
2 
maintain its territorial integrity. Turkey was granted a 
3 
free zone in the port of Alexandretta for 50 years. 
regime was to take effect Koveaber 29, 1937· 
The new 
In delivering the customary self-congratulations over 
the results obtained, the Foreign Ministers or the U.s.s.R., 
Great Britain and France hailed "this latest victory or the 
League or Nations." Mr. Litvinorr pointed to the establish-
ment or closer relations between "countries which are carry-
ing out a policy of loyalty to the League of Nations ... and to 
the organization or peace and collective security." Mr. Eden 
was pleased that the welfare or the Sanjak Arabs as well as 
1. Text: LNOJ, May-June 1937, pp. 580-587. 
2. Article 7 or Statute, and "Treaty of Guarantee of the Ter-
ritorial Integrity or the Sanjak," LNOJ, November 1937, pp. 
838-9. 
3· This provision does not violate the terms or the mandate, 
Turkey having been granted the same privilege by the Angora 
Agreement, Annex III. 
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that of the Turks had been insured. Mr. Delbos rejoiced that 
France had "effectively safeguarded the interests of the 
1 
country still under her tutelage." 
The only dissenting voice came from Damascus, where it 
was felt that Syrian interests had been sacrificed to the 
over-all requirements of Frellch foreign policy. True, Syrian 
sovereignty over the Sanjak was recognized; but whereas for-
merly the autonomy or the district had been strictly limited 
by definition, now it was Syria's three remaining attributes 
which were specified. Syrian sovereignty was further compro-
mised by the League's supervisory powers, and by the joint 
Franco-Turkish territorial guarantee. There was an admission 
in the statute itself that the new instruments were not per-
fectly compatible with the mandate: 
For the duration of the mandate, they Lthe Statute and 
Fundamental Law7 will be applied to the greatest extent 
compatible with the exercise of the said mandate (Article 
55)· 
The Syrians may have derived some consolation from the fact 
that the solution was declared to be permanent, and that they 
need not worry about Turkish claims to Aleppo; in another 
instrument signed May 29, France and Turkey "recognized the 
. 2 
Turco-Syrian frontier ... and guaranteed its inviolability." 
Foreign Minister Araa declared before the League Council: 
"Turkey accepts the settlement .•• as constituting the final 
1. ~, May-June 1937, PP· 331-3. 
2. "Agreement for the Guarantee of the Turco-Syrian Frontier," 
J!..Ql, November 1937, pp. 839-40. 
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League of Nations Electoral Commission. The registration of 
voters, and the indirect elections comprising two successive 
operations, were to be completed by April 15. According to 
the Fundamental Law, voters were to register with their re-
spective "communities": Turkish, Alawite, Arab, Armenian, 
Greek-Orthodox, Kurdish, and "others." The proportionate 
electoral strength of each community, as shown in the regis-
tration, would determine its share of representatives in an 
Assembly of 40 members; the indirect elections 'that were to 
follow would enable each group to select its individual 
representatives. 
In December, the Electoral Commission issued a code 
1 
of Election Regulations designed to implement the general 
electoral provisions of the Fundamental Law. The Regulations 
provided for a strict control of registration: when a pros-
pective voter declared that he belonged to a certain commun-
ity, he could be challenged by the representatives of other 
communities sitting with the Commission, in which ease he was 
obliged to furnish proof or his community affiliation, before 
registration could be completed. A copy of the Election 
Regulations was sent to the Turkish Government, "for informa-
tion." 
The Turkish Foreign Minister took violent exception to 
the election procedure followed by the Commission. His two 
principal grievances were: 
1. LNOJ, February 1938, pp. 137-144. 
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1. The elections remained 'completely out or Lhi!l Govern-
ment's control, whereas the other guarantor Power is 
involved therein as closely as it could be.' Moreover, 
the mandatory Power was trying to influence the result 
of the elections 'to the detriment of the Turkish ele-
ment, which is predominant in the territory.' 
2. The documentary evidence that could be required of the 
voter before he was registered with a certain community 
constituted an infringement on the freedom of elections. 
The·Turkish Government eould not remain indifferent to 
.
1 the. policy or colonization' pursued by the mandatory 
Power in the Sanjak, and protested against the appli-
cation or the Election Regulations; it declared 'this 
travesty of the agreed texts to be inacceptable until 
they have been revised in consultation with the two 
guarantor Powers.•l 
French Foreign Minister Chautemps pointed out that, 
for the duration or the mandate, France retained her executive 
power in the Sanjak; if the Turkish Government, however, had 
a different interpretation, he suggested that the question 
be referred to the League Council. In March 1938,a special 
League Committee amended the Election Regulations in a way 
2 
which met the Turkish demands. The registration procedure, 
especially, was modified to read: 
The applicant shall be presumed to be a member of the 
community to which he declares himself to belong. Never-
theless, the President of the Board may formally challenge 
him, upon the request or a representative of a community. 
If the voter confirms his previous statement and publicly 
declares that his decision was freely arrived at, he shall 
be registered accordingly. 
It was now possible for members of the Turkish-speaking Ala-
wite group to register with the Turkish community proper. The 
deadline for the completion of the elections was changed to 
July 15. 
1. Telegrams to the League Secretary-General, Dec. 15 and 24, f!Ql, February 1938, pp. 132-5· . . 
2. Amended text: ~' July 1938, pp. 624-35· 
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The registration period was stormy. The Turkish For-
eign Minister repeated his charge that the mandatory authori-
ties were exerting pressure to obtain a result unfavorable to 
the Turkish element. On the other hand, a British member of 
the Commission, Comm•nder Hillhouse, resigned in protest over 
the discrimination of the same authorities against the non-
Turkish elements. Tension increased and riots again broke 
out; Turkish troops were reported massing along the border. 
The Turkish Ambassador to Rome infol'lled Count Ciano that "if 
the French Government will not allow Turkish troops to enter, 
they will in any ease enter by force"; the Italian Foreign 
1 
Minister "discreetly incited the Turks to action." Mean-
while, martial law was proclaimed in the Sanjak, and the 
2 
League Commission was recalled to Geneva. 
The French Ambassador to Ankara, Mr. Henri Ponsot, 
and Foreign Minister Aras began negotiating bilaterally, thus 
sparing the League of Nations another victory. The new series 
of agreements concluded July ~, 1938 comprised a Treaty of 
Friendship which restored the arbitral provisions of the 1930 
Treaty. The price paid by France -- and by Syria was the 
admission of Turkey to partnership in the internal control 
of the sanjak: the district's internal security was placed 
under joint guarantee, France and Turkey each contributing 
1. Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, p. 219. 
2. Oriente Moderno, July 1938, p. 353; H. Beeley, Survey for 
1938, I, p. 484. 
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2500 troops to maintain order. Turkish troops entered Alex-
andretta July 5, and Antioch on July 7· 
1 
A joint Declaration, issued the same day as the 
agreements, while affirming that the question of the Sanjak 
was "not a territorial question for Turkey," recognized "the 
preponderance of the Turkish element" in the sanjak. The 
registration of voters, continued under joint Franco-Turkish 
supervision, resulted in a Turkish majority which assured the 
Turkish community of 22 representatives out or 40 in the As-
sembly. 
On September 2, the "Republic of Hatay" was proclaimed. 
' " ' The President of the new Republic, Tayfur Sokmen, was also a 
representative tor Adalia in the Turkish National Assembly; 
Prime Minister Abdur Melek represented Aintab at Ankara. The 
Statute of May 29, 1937, which the Ratay Legislative Assembly 
approved on September 6, had been modified in such a way that 
it constituted a virtual declaration of independence. It de-
fined Ratay as "an autonomous State, completely independent 
in its internal affairs, having a republican regime, and 
founded on the preponderance of the Turkish element." It 
made no mention of Syrian responsibility for its foreign ar-
2 
fairs, and of the League or Nations resident delegate. 
Turkitication of the Republic, as a prelude to annexa-
tion, was vigorously carried out. The People's Party, a 
counterpart or the single party in Turkey, issued a manifesto 
1. Oriente Moderno, July 1938, p. 329. 
2. Ibid., September 1938, p. 503; October 1938, p. 554. 
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whieh contained the same principles of republicanism, demo-
cracy, secularism and nationality. The flag of Hatay was 
identical with the Turkish flag, except that the star and 
ereseent were outlined in white, instead of being solid white. 
The Turkish "Independence March" was adopted as the national 
' . 
anthem. And the wearing or the European hat becaae eompul-
1 
sory. 
At the same time, the autonomous Bepublie gravitated 
towards Turkey. In February 1939, the Turkish lira became 
the official currency. In March, passports were no longer 
required for travel to and from Turkey. It only remained 
for the international shocks of 1939 to break HataY.'s nominal 
tie with Syria, and to let it be absorbed as the 64th vilayet 
of the Turkish Republic. Negotiations had been alternated 
with threats of force; the Turks ultimately obtained com-
plete sovereignty over the Sanjak by "an adroit combination 
2 
of the old diplomacy and the new." 
1. Oriente Moderno, September 1938, pp. 503-4; October 1938, 
p. 554; November 1938, p., '609 . 
2. P. P. Graves, Briton and Turk (London, 1941), p. 239· 
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PAB.T III 
THE WAR YEARS 
1939-1945 
CHAPTER 1 
THE REALIGNMENT OF 1939 
a. Divisible Peace 
b. The Turkish Alliance with the West 
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a. DIVISIBLE PEACE 
On March 15, 1939, the German army marched into 
Czechoslovakia and proceeded to occupy the non-German re-
mainder of this State, which Hitler had promised to respect 
at Munich. During the night, President Hacha had been per-
suaded to stave off the annihilation of his people by agree-
ing to "place the fate of the Czech people and country in 
. " complete confidence in the hands of the FUhrer of the German 
Reich." On the day following the occupation, the territory 
of the "former Czechoslovak Republic was declared a part or 
the German Reich, to be known as the Protectorate of Bohemia 
and Moravia." Three weeks later, on April 7, Italian troops 
landed at Durazzo and occupied their satellite Albania. On 
April 12 the King of Italy accepted the Albanian crown. 
These latest coups of the dictators removed the last 
hopes or the Western democracies that Hitler and Mussolini 
could be bound by agreements. Prime Minister Chamberlain 
was shocked, and complained that Hitler had broken his word. 
Churchill's warnings commanded more attention than ever, and 
the Chamberlain Government was forced to reorient its foreign 
1 
policy accordingly. On March 31 the British and French 
Prime Ministers simultaneously pledged their countries to 
1. Foreign Minister Gafencu of Rumania commented that "no 
longer could there be agreea~nt between the Reich and 
England, once litler had written his book and Churchill 
had read it." Last Days of Europe (Yale u., 1948), p. 
101. 
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defence or Poland, which appeared to be next on Hitler's 
list. After the Italian coup, they gave similar assurances 
to Greece and Rumania. And negotiations were begun with 
Turkey, whose relations with Greece almost constituted an 
alliance, and upon whose participation in the common defence 
depended the sending of assistance to Rumania. 
The annexation of Czechoslovakia caased no great re-
percussions in Turkey. But the Albanian coup struck closer 
to home. The following day, Rumanian Foreign Minister 
Gafencu met Saracoglu at Istanbul. Saracoglu envisaged the 
problem as two-fold: to find out how strong a policy Brit-
ain and France intended to pursue in the Balkans, and to 
strengthen the Balkan Entente. According to Gafencu's ac-
count, it was resolved that 
should events compel either Rumania or Turkey, or both to-
gether, or the entire Balkan Union, to choose and take a 
·definite stand between the two opposing groups, it is 
freely understood that Rumania and Turkey will join 
forces -- and insist that their allies in the Balkan En-
tente do likewise -- with the group organized and united 
for the creation of a joint resistance to the tendencies 
toward hegemony threatening their independence and secur-
ity. 
And they were to 
strive to obtain all the requisite information with a 
view to effective military support (troops, material, 
arms, munitions, navy, and air force), so that their par-
ticipation in the comaon resisrance may contribute ef-
fectively to ultimate success. 
The Ministers hoped that the Balkan Entente, with outside · 
help, might cope with the threat of Italy. Meanwhile, Prime 
1. G. Gafencu, Last Days of Euro2e, pp. 122-3. 
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Minister Saydam prudently announced his Government's ttrriendly 
1 
neutrality towards all Powers." 
Britain and France soon announced their Balkan policy. 
On April 13, the French and British Governments gave guaran-
tees to Greece and Rumania. Chamberlain told the House of 
Commons: 
His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance 
to the avoidance of disturbance by force or threats of 
force of the status guo in the Mediterranean and the 
Balkan Peninsula. Consequently they have come to the 
conclusion that, in the event of any action being taken 
which clearly threatened the independence of Greece or 
Rumania, and which the Greek or Rumanian Government 
respectively considered it vital to resist with their 
national forces, His Majesty's Government would reel 
themselves bound at once to 1end the Greek or Rumanian 
Government, as the case might be, all the support in 
their power. We are communicating this declaration to 
the Governments directly concerned, and to others, es-
pecially Turkey, whose close relations with the Greek 
Government are known.2 
The Greco-Turkish friendship was not the most impor-
tant reason why Turkey figured in the plans of France and 
Britain. The Montreux Convention prohibited the passage of 
the Straits to the warships or all belligerent Powers, unless 
in execution of a League directive, or in accordance with a 
mutual assistance pact binding Turkey. It was therefore ne-
cessary to conclude such a pact with Turkey. Conversations 
begam immediately. On May 12, both Governments announced 
that "in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in 
the Mediterranean area they would be prepared to cooperate 
1. G. Jlschke, Die T~rkei in den Jahren 1935-1941 (Leipzig, 
1943), p. 72. 
2. The Times (London), April 14, 1939· 
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effectively and to lend each other all the aid and assistance 
in their power." Prime Minister Saydam explained to the Turk-
ish National Assembly: 
You know that political events have lately occurred with 
lightning speed •.. At first this Government decided that 
Turkey's best course was to remain neutral, but when 
events involved the Balkan Peninsula and raised the ques-
tion of security in the Eastern Mediterranean we were 
raced with a situation pregnant with danger which made 
it impossible for us to remain neutral ... Believing that 
this danger now exists, we have made up our mind to eo-
operate, and, if necessary1 to fight with those equally anxious to preserve peace. 
The Anglo-Turkish Declaration was but a first step 
towards the conclusion or a formal treaty or alliance. Prime 
Minister Chamberlain announced, as he read the Declaration: 
It is agreed that the two countries will conclude a 
definitive long-term agreement or a reciprocal character 
in the interests or their national security ... It is 
recognized by the two Governments that certain matters, 
including a more precise definition or the various con-
ditions which would bring the reciprocal engagements into 
operation, will require closer examination before the 
definitive agreement can be completed. This examination 
is proceeding.2 
Those "certain mattersn which had to be settled before 
the treaty could be concluded were not limited to the Anglo-
Turkish alliance relationship. There was also the question 
or including France in a tripartite Mediterranean scheme; 
there was above all the problem of Russia's place in the gen-
eral European defence structure. Franco-Turkish relations 
still hinged on the Alexandretta question. Since September 
1. The Times (London), May 13, 1939· 
2. Ibid. 
-
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1938, the Republic of Ratay had been clamoring for union 
with Turkey; the annexation of Czechoslovakia and Albania 
encouraged this movement, and the Turkish Government demanded 
the cession of the Sanjak as the price of a mutual-assistance 
treaty with France. When Foreign Minister Bonnet declared 
before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Depu-
ties on April 19: "Turkey will not occupy Alexandretta," the 
Syrians could expect the worst. Cession was being discussed, 
and France yielded on June 23. The new Turco-Syrian boundary 
1 
was declared definitive, like the previous ones. On the 
same day, a Franco-Turkish declaration of mutual assistance 
similar to the Anglo-Turkish statement was made, pending 
2 
the conclusion of a tripartite pact. The latter would have 
to await the outcome of the Moscow negotiations. 
The Axis reply to the measures taken by Britain and 
3 
France to organize a coalition was the Pact of Steel. On 
May 30, Germany and Italy agreed that if either became en-
gaged in war with another power or powers, the other would 
immediately intervene "with all her armed forces on land, 
sea and air." The alliance was not conditioned by the provi-
sion that the first party should be the victim of aggression, 
and not the aggressor. Mussolini foresaw the Axis taking 
the whole Danube and Balkan area immediately after the 
first hours or the war ..• By this lightning-like operation 
1. Text of Treaty: LNOJ, July-August 1939, pp. 356-61. 
2. Text: Le Temps (Paris), July 25, 1939. 
3· Text: C.-A. Colliard, Droit International et Histoire Dip-
lomatique (raris, 1950), pp. 576-7. 
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which is to be carried out decisively, not only the 'guar-
anteed states,' like Greece, Rumania, and Turkey, would 
be out of the fight, but one would also protect one's 
back. 
The Duee explained to his Axis partner, however, that Italy 
would not be ready for war for another three years. She 
needed to organize Libya, Albania and Ethiopia, build six 
capital ships, rejuvenate her artillery, develop a more autar-
chic economy, and shift war industries from the Po Valley to 
southern Italy. Furthermore, the world conflagration could 
await the end of 1942, by which time Italy would have been 
able 
to carry out the ~oa!7 world exposition in 1942 by which 
not only the activity of the .Fascist regime for 20 years 
will be documentyd, but also reserves of foreign exchange 
can be obtained. 
Meanwhile, Britain and France were engaged with Moscow 
in conversations which had begun, through regular diplomatic 
channels, immediately after the initiation of negotiations 
with Turkey. Once th• respective commitments of Britain, 
France and the U.s.s.R. were defined, the pact with Turkey 
could be decided upon and fitted into the general picture. 
On April 28, the Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
Potemkin, arrived at Ankara, where he remained until May 5· 
He had apparently been sent by Litvinov to complement the ef-
forts of Britain and France in South-eastern Europe; he ap-
peared interested in finding out whether the Balkan Entente 
could be made into an effective defence against aggression. 
1. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, 1946), vol. V, 
pp. 453-5· 
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At Ankara, he engaged in exploratory conversations concerning 
a mutual assistance pact between the U.s.s.R. and Turkey. At 
Bucharest, he assured Gafencu that the replacement of Litvinov 
1 
by Molotov did not mean a change in Soviet foreign policy. 
The Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations were making slow 
but steady progress. On May 31, Molotov reported to the Su-
preme Council on the progress of the negotiations. Taking 
note of the British declarations to Poland and Turkey, and 
of the willingness of Britain and France to conclude a mutual 
assistance pact on a reciprocal basis, he stated the three 
conditions necessary to the creation of 
an effective peace front of the peaceable countries 
against the advance of aggression: 
1. The conclusion of an effective pact of mutual assist-
ance against aggression, a pact of an exclusively de-
fensive character between Great Britain, France, and 
the u.s.s.R.; 
·2. A guarantee against attack by aggressors on the part 
of Great Britain, France, and the U.s.s.R. to the 
states of central and eastern Europe, including all 
the European countries bordering on the U.s.s.R. with-
out exception; 
3· The conclusion of a concrete agreement by Great Brit-
ain, France, and the U.s.s.R. regarding the forms and 
the extent of the immediate and effective assistance 
to be given to each other and to the guaranteed 
States in the event of an attack by the aggressors. 
And Molotov added: 
Such is our opinion, an opinion we force upon nobody, but 
to which we adhere. We do not demand acceptance of our 
point of view and do not ask anybody to do so. We con-
sider, however, that this point of view really answers the 
interests of security of peaceable States.2 
1. G. Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign (London, 1945), 
pp. 239-40; id., Last Days of Europe, p. 185. 
a. v. Molotov, Peace Front Against Aggression (London, 1939), 
pp. 8-10. 
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The British had agreed to a mutual assistance pact, 
although their original intention had been merely to secure 
from the Soviet Union a declaration of guarantee of the in-
depen~ence of Poland. On June 12, Mr. Strang left for Moscow 
to conduct negotiations directly with the Soviet Government. 
The Soviet desire to include Finland, Latvia and Esthonia met 
with opposition on the part of the British, who rightly felt 
that these countries did not want a Russian guarantee. The 
Russians insisted and the British gave in. The Soviets then 
demanded that the mutual-aid provision apply to eases of ag-
gression both direct and indirect, the latter meaning, for 
instance, "an internal coup d'etat, or a political change 
favorable to the aggressor." Again the West was forced to 
accept the Russian terms, although indirect aggression was 
defined as an action "the aim of which would be, under the 
menace of force or without such menace, to make use of the 
territory of one of the states indicated, in order to carry 
out an aggression against tb~s latter, or against one of the 
contracting parties." The Soviets then insisted that the 
military agreements be negotiated before the conclusion of the 
political treaty. On July 24, France and Britain accepted the 
postponement of the political agreements until agreement was 
reached in ~ilitary matters, and a Franco-British military 
mission left for Moscow. 
The Ankara Government was confident throughout that 
the Anglo-Franco-Soviet front would materialize. Reviewing 
Turkey's foreign relations on July 8 before the National 
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Assembly, Foreign Minister saracoglu recalled his country's 
solidarity with the Soviet Union for two decades, the coopera-
tion of Turkey and the West during the Ethiopian war, at 
Montreux, at Nyon, and the renewed possibilities of the Bal-
kan Entente. As for the Axis, he added: "It is certain that 
if normal and fiiendly relations are to be maintained, it is 
necessary for this intention and desire to exist on both 
1 
sides." 
The French and British military delegations arrived 
at Moscow on August 11, and the talks began the following 
day. On August 14, Voroshilov threw a bombshell into the 
discussion when he asked: "In ease of an aggression directed 
against France and England, would Soviet troops be authorized 
to penetrate into Polish territory, across the Vilna Corridor 
and Galicia, and also into Ruaanian territory?" The objec-
tions of the Poles and Rumanians to the presence of Soviet 
troops on their territory was well known. "In the absence 
of a solution to this question," added Voroshilov, "further 
. 2 
discussions were doomed to certain failure." The French 
put pressure on the Poles; while they were still trying to 
reach a formula whereby the Russians would be allowed passage 
after the outbreak of hostilities, the talks were broken up. 
It was announced that Ribbentrop was flying to Moscow, and 
on August 23, the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed. 
1. L'Europe Nouvelle, July 15, 1939, p. 775· 
2. G. Gafencu, Last Days of Europe, p. 213. 
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Rumors that Hitler would reach an understanding with 
the Soviets had gone the diplomatic rounds during the first 
week of May. On May 7, the French Ambassador to Berlin, Mr. 
Coulondre, had warned the French Foreign Office that "The 
" FUhrer will come to an understanding with Russia ..• Perhaps 
. 1 
we shall see a fourth partition of Poland.H During his stay 
in Bucharest, Mr. Potemkin had been obliged to deny the ru-
mors: "The totalitarian Powers, 11 said he, 
are spreading the false rumour that the U.s.s.R. is ready 
to come to an understanding with Germany and Italy. That 
is the sort of tactics they use, particularly in Berlin, 
to prevent an agreement between London, Paris and Moscow. 
But all that does not change, and will never change, 
Soviet policy, which does not bend to opportunist exigen-
cies, but follows the end of general peace by pacific 
methods.2 
Molotov had just replaced Litvinov, and Soviet policy 
was about to make a complete about-race. On May 20, when 
the German Ambassador to Moscow, Count Von Schulenburg, was 
discussing an economic agreement with Molotov, the latter de-
clared that "the Soviet Government could only agree to a re-
sumption of the negotiations if the necessary 'political bases' 
3 
for them had been eonstrueted. 8 When pressed to be more ex-
" plieit, Molotov was non-committal; the next move was up to 
the GermaDs. tl On May 21, Weizsacker, the German Under-Seere-
tary tor Foreign Affairs, advised Schulenburg: "we must now 
1. G. Gafencu, Last Days of Europe, p. 146. 
2. G. Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign, p. 240, note. 
3· R. J. Sontag and J. s. Beddie (ed.), Nazi-Soviet Relations, 
19~9-1941 (Washington, 1948), pp. 5-7· 
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sit tight and wait to see it the Russians will speak more 
1 
openly." On August 4, Molotov again invited political dis-
cussion, and the Germans, having already decided to march 
into Poland, offered to conclude a non-aggression pact. 
While the Anglo-French mission was engaged in discussions with 
the Soviet Starr, the details of the German Pact were worked 
out. 
2 
The German-Soviet Pact was, as Hitler described it 
to Mussolini, "the most extensive non-aggression pact in 
3 
existence." Both parties agreed "to desist from any aet 
or violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each 
other, either individually or jointly with other powers." 
Neutrality was to be observed if one party became "the object 
of belligerent action by a third power"; it did not matter if 
that party became engaged by its own aggressive action. Both 
parties further agreed to "maintain continual contact with 
one another for the purpose of consultation in order to ex-
change information on problems affecting their common inter-
ests." Any conflicts arising between them were to be settled 
"through friendly exchange of opinion, or, if necessary, 
through the establishment of arbitration co.missions." The 
pact was to run for ten years. 
A Secret Additional Protocol described the German and 
Soviet spheres of influence in Eastern Europe "in the event 
of a territorial and political rearrangement" in the area. 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 7· 
2. Ibid., pp. 76-8. 
3 · ~., P• 81. 
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Finland, Esthonia and Latvia were in the Soviet sphere; in 
Poland, the rivers Narew, Viatula and San divided the German 
and Soviet spheres; "with regard to South-eastern Europe, 
attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in 
Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political 
disinterestedness in these areas." The dividing line between 
the German and Soviet spheres thus ran from the Arctic Ocean 
to the Black Sea. 
Litvinov's indivisible peace had been fiasioned by 
Molotov. The latter explained, in his own dialectical language, 
how the German-soviet agreement, which ushered in a world war, 
served the cause of world peace. The Pact, he told the Su-
preme Soviet, "narrowed down the zone of possible hostilities 
in Europe, and serves thereby the cause of universal peace." 
Moreover, the Pact was expected to yield tangible profits; 
"it must open to us," said Molotov, ttnew possibilities of 
increasing our strength, of further consolidation of our posi-
tions, of further growth of the influence of the Soviet Union 
1 
on international developments." 
The Russo-German coup de theatre opened an irreparable 
breach in the growing coalition against the next German ag-
gression. The Anglo-Franco-Turkish negotiations for a tri-
partite pact had to be resumed in a totally different European 
picture. 
1. v. Molotov, The Meanin of the Soviet-German Non-A ression 
Pact, (New York, 1939 , P· 15· 
-
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b . THE TURKISH ALLIANCE WITH THE WEST 
On September 1st, Hitler attacked Poland, and on Sep-
tember 3z'd, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. 
On September 11, Prime Minister Saydam told the Turkish Na-
tional Assembly: "We are remaining outside the present war; 
between Germany and us there are no direct political differ-
ences." 
Hitler was confident that the Moscow Pact would intim-
idate Turkey into drawing away from the Western democracies. 
In his letter of August 25 to Mussolini, he stated that Ru-
mania could not possibly enter the war, and that "even Turkey 
under the circumstances can only envisage a revision of her 
previous position." Mussolini replied that "the Moscow 
treaty blockades Rumania and can alter the position or Turkey, 
which accepted the British loan, but which has not yet signed 
the treaty or alliance. A new attitude on the part of Turkey 
would upset all the strategic plans of the French and English 
1 
in the Eastern Mediterranean." 
The conjectures of the dictators concerning Turkey 
were wrong. The British and French Ambassadors at Ankara 
and Foreign Minister Saracoglu set to work on the mutual-as-
sistance pact, and the broad terms of the alliance were soon 
agreed upon. While these talks with the British and the 
French were going on, Ankara was also in contact with Moscow; 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 81-2. 
the idea of a pact of mutual assistance applicable to the 
Straits and the Balkans, which had been broached in April 
during Potemkin's visit, was again taken up. The Turks 
wished to find out how they fitted in Moscow's new policy, 
before committing themselves definitively with the West. 
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The Russians kept the Germans informed of the progress 
of their negotiations with the Turks, as required by the Mos-
cow Pact, and the German Foreign Office exerted pressure on 
the Soviets to have them mrevent or at least neutralize the 
alliance of Turkey with the Vest. on September 2, Molotov 
assured Schulenburg that "the Soviet Government was prepared 
to work for permanent neutrality of Turkey," as desired by 
Germany. On September 5, Schulenburg reported to Molotov 
rumors "to the effect that England was putting pressure on 
Rumania to take active part, and was holding out a prospect 
of aid from British and French troops. Since this aid might 
come by sea, it was in the interests of the Soviet Government 
to prevail upon Turkey to close the Dardanelles completely." 
Molotov again assured the German Ambassador "that the Soviet 
Government had considerable influence with Turkey and was 
1 
exerting it in the sense desired by L'the German!l." 
It was no easy matter to define the terms of a mutual-
assistance pact between Turkey and the Soviet Union, when 
both parties were in close relations with states at war. The 
Turks desired "a pact with a restrictive clause whereby Turkey 
in rendering aid to the Soviet Union would be obligated only 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 86-8. 
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to such actions as are not directed against England and 
France." On September 17, Stalin told Schulenburg that the 
Soviet Government, in turn, considered "proposing a clause 
to the Turkish Government to the effect that the Soviet 
Union on ita part would not be obligated to any action di-
rected against Germany." With a suitable pact, thought 
Stalin, Turkey would surely remain neutral. The German For-
eign Office concurred with Stalin, and further suggested 
that the Soviet Government should not be obligated "to action 
1 
against Germany, Italy and Bulgaria." It was becoming in-
creasingly difficult to imagine against which potential ag-
gressor the pact might apply. 
On September 21, Saracoglu left Ankara for Moscow to 
carry on direct negotiations with Molotov. Signature of 
the treaty with Britain and France~as held up; it was hoped 
that Saracoglu would be able to find out what changes had oc-
curred in the Soviet policy towards the Balkans and the Near 
East as a result of the German Pact. It was necessary to 
conclude the Anglo-French Pact in the light of the new Soviet 
relationship. The Turkish Foreign Minister arrived at Moscow 
on September 25, and he was received by Stalin and Molot~v 
2 
on September 26. 
The talks were interrupted at the outset by Ribbentrop's 
flying visit to Moscow, on September 28, for the treaty which 
1. Nazi-soviet Belations, p. 97· 
" " 2. For accounts~ the Saracoglu visit: I. Inonu, article "Tur-
key," 10 Eventful Years, vol. IV, p. 377; G.·Gafencu, Pre-
lude. to the Russian Caapai~, pp. 258-64. ---
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established the German-Soviet border in Poland. From then on, 
the negotiations dragged on, due to German intervention, and 
to the Russians' own hesitation in determining their course 
as a result of their new relationship. On October 2, Hibben-
trop directed Ambassador Schulenburg to recommend to Molotov 
a stern attitude in connection with Turkey. "Please inform 
Molotov, said he, "that according to reports I have received 
the Turkish Government would hesitate to conclude an assist-
ance pact with France and England, if the Soviet Union em-
phatically opposed it... No doubt," he added, "the best so-
. ' 
lution at the moment would be the return of Turkey to a policy 
of absolute neutrality while confirming existing Russian-
Turkish agreements. Prompt and final diversion of Turkey 
from the proJected Anglo-French treaty, said to ijave been 
recently initialed, would also be in keeping with the peace 
offensive agreed upon at Moscow, as thereby another country 
would withdraw from the Anglo-French camp." At the same time, 
Ribbentrop instructed von Papen at Ankara to invoke Russian 
and German displeasure, in order "to forestall the final 
conclusion of the assistance pact between Turkey and the 
Western powers. In this matter," said Ribbentrop, "you also 
might point to the strong Russian aversion to a unilateral 
I 
commitment of Turkey and explain that the conclusion of the 
assistance pact under present war conditions would necessar-
ily be viewed differently by Germany than before the outbreak 
1 
of the war." 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 110-11. 
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As reports reached Berlin that the Turco-Russian pact 
might materialize, Ribbentrop became increasingly apprehen-
sive. On October 7, he sent a "very urgentn telegram to 
. . 
Schulenburg directing him to call on Molotov imaediately 
and to emphasize strongly once more how much we would 
regret it if the Soviet Government were unable to dis-
suade Turkey from concluding a treaty with England and 
France or to induce her to adopt an unequivocal neutral-
ity. 
And Molotov was to be reminded of his obligations towards 
Germany: 
In the event that the Soviet Government itself cannot 
avoid concluding a mutual assistance pact with Turkey, 
we would regard it as a foregone conclusion that she 
would make a reservation in the pact whereby the pact 
would not obligate the Soviet Government to any kind of 
assistance aimed directly or indirectly against Germany. 
Indeed, stalin himself promised this. Without such a 
reservation, the Soviet Government, as has been previ-
ously stressed, would commit an outright breach of the 
Nonaggression Pact concluded with Germany.l 
Schulenburg saw Molotov on October 8. The latter 
stated that he had not conferred with Saracoglu since Octo-
ber 1. •The Soviet Government," he said, •was pursuing the 
. . . 
aim or inducing Turkey to adopt full neutrality and to close 
the Dardanelles, as well as to aid in maintaining peace in 
the Balkans." He believed that "in all likelihood, a mutual 
. . 
assistance pact with Turkey would not be concluded. But un-
der any circumstances the interests or Germany and the spe-
2 
cial nature of Geraan-Soviet relations would be upheld.u 
It does not appear that the Russians objected to the 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 117-18. 
2. !!!!·, P• 120. 
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general principle or an Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty, as did 
the Germans. They were not sure of the true depths or the 
new German friendship, and it was not their special mission 
to remove the diplomatic obstacles in the way or Germany. 
This was the Second Imperialist War, and the longer it lasted, 
the better for the Soviet Union. But the proposed Turkish 
alliance with the West would have a consequence in which the 
Soviets saw a threat to their own interests; a mutual assist-
ance pact to which Turkey was a part would open the Straits 
to the British and French fleets, and the Black Sea area for 
military operations. This is what Soviet diplomacy sought 
to prevent. 
On the day the Turco-Russian talks broke up, Prime 
Minister Saydam told a parliamentary group: 
The negotiations in Moscow failed because the Soviet Gov-
ernment put forth totally new proposals which are incom-
patible with the Straits Convention; nevertheless, our 
relations remain friendly.l 
The Russian account is substantially the same: on October 
31, Molotov accounted to the Supreme Soviet for the failure 
or the negotiations: he denied the allegation 
that the U.s.s.R. has demanded changes in the interna-
tional convention concluded at Montreux and a privileged 
position as regards the Straits... As a :matter of fact 
the subJect at issue was the conclusion of a bilateral 
pact of mutual assistance limited to regions of the 
Black Sea and the Straits. The U.s.s.R. considered first, 
that the conclusion of such a pact could not induce it 
to actions which might draw it into armed conflict with 
Germany, secondly, that the U.s.s.R. should have a guar-
antee that in view or the war danger, Turkey would not 
1. G. J:schke, Die Tabkei in den Jahren 1935-1941, p. 85. 
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allow warships of the non-Black Sea powers to pass 
through the Bosphorus to the Black Sea. Turkey reJected 
both these stipulations of the U.s.s.R. and thereby made 
the conclusion or the pact impossible.l 
It is true that if Turkey felt threatened by war, the 
Montreux Convention left naval traffic through the Straits 
to her entire discretion, and she could refuse passage to 
the warships of the non-Black Sea powers. But to assume 
such an obligation by treaty in favor of the Black Sea powers 
would nullify Article 19 of the Convention, which the Soviets 
had fought so hard to obtain at Montreux, in the days when 
they championed collective security; according to Article 19, 
warships were to be allowed through the straits in execution 
of a autual assistance pact binding Turkey, such as the Bal-
kan Pact, or the contemplated treaty with Britain and France. 
The Soviets did not demand "changes in the international 
convention signed at Montre~x," but they did insist on 11 a 
. . 
privileged position as regards the Straits," which the Turks 
refused to grant. Saracoglu left Moscow on October 17; while 
he was still en route to Ankara, the pact with Britain and 
France was signed by Prime Minister Saydam. 
2 
The Treaty of Mutual Assistance was clearly intended 
to protect the Straits against capture by the Axis Powers, 
and to open them to the Allied fleets in ease of war in the 
Mediterranean area. Britain and France undertook to give 
Turkey all aid and assistance in their power, 1) if the lat-
ter were attacked by a European Power, or 2) if she became 
1. v. Molotov, Russia and the war (London, 1939), p. 16. 
2. LNTI, vol. CC, pp. 167-73· 
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involved in a war in the Mediterranean area as a result of 
some other act of aggression by a European Power. Turkey in 
turR agreed to give Britain and France all aid and assistance 
in her power, 1) "in the event of an act of aggression by a 
European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area" in 
which these two Powers became involved, or 2) if they became 
involved in hostilities as a result of their guarantees to 
Greece and Rumania. In the event of other eases of aggres-
sion by a European Power, the three contracting parties were 
to consult together with a view to common action, and if 
Britain and France became involved in hostilities, Turkey 
was to observe "at least a benevolent neutrality." In a 
Protocol annexed to the ~reaty, it was agreed that the obli-
gations undertaken by Turkey could not compel her "to take 
action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, 
entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union." The Treaty 
was concluded for a period of fifteen years. 
On the day the Treaty was signed, a Special Agreement 
provided for British and French financial assistance to Tur-
key. The alliance with Britain and France was certain to 
have serious repercussions on the Turkish economy. In 1939, 
Germany furnished Turkey with 5~ of her imports, and took 
37~ of her exports. She bought more than half of Turkey's 
chrome exports, and almost half of her tobacco exports. In 
turn, she supplied Turkey with armaments and with over 6~ 
1. LI~S, CC, PP· 172-5. 
1 
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of her iron and steel imports. In 1940, Germany took less 
than ~ ot Turkey's exports, and supplied less than 1~ of 
her imports. She supplied Turkey with 2,543 tons of iron and 
steel, compared with 105,920 tons the previous year. She re-
duced her tobacco purchases by 6~, while she was denied the 
1 
strategic chrome altogether. Britain and France were unable 
to replace Germany in the Turkish foreign trade, which fell 
off 27~ in 1940; they were especially unable to supply the 
strategic needs of their ally. But financial aid would tide 
the Turkish Government over, and prevent the fall of the 
2 
Turkish pound. 
The previous British credit of 10 million pounds 
sterling, and the French credit of 460 million francs (about 
6,700,000 pounds), were upped to a total of 25 million pounds 
sterling. They were intended for the purchase of war material, 
and payable over 20 years, at 4~ interest. A further sum of 
15 million pounds in gold, payable in 20 years at 3~, was 
made available to keep the Turkish currency stable. Finally, 
Britain advanced 2 million pounds on the same terms to clear 
the accounts of Turkish buyers in Britain, and France made 
available 1.5 million pounds in French francs for Turkish 
debits in France. The conditions of repayment of these 
loans were to be determined by a subsequent arrangement, but 
it was already agreed that the 15 million pound loan in gold 
1. The United States bought two-thirds of the chrome exports 
in 1940, and the whole supply in 1941 and 1942. 
2. Trade figures from Istatistik Yilligi, 1942-45 (Ankara, 
1946), PP· 346-7, 349, 365, 373, 380. 
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would be repaid in Turkish pounds, and the money used for the 
purchase of Turkish tobacco or other Turkish products by 
Great Britain. 
The value of the alliance for Britain and France lay 
first of all in Turkey's position on the vital Straits. Her 
army numbered about 180,000 men, and, once engaged in hostil-
ities, she could put as many as 750,000 men in the field. 
Her small Navy and her :first-line Air Foree of some 600 
planes would have to be largely supplemented by her allies. 
It was hoped that the Turks, as well as the Greeks, would be 
able to put new life into the Balkan Entente. 
CHAPTER 2 
NON-BELLIGERENCY, 1939-41 
a. The War in the West 
b. The Axis Seizure of the Balkans 
e. The Pact with Germany 
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a. THE WAR IN THE WEST 
With the failure of the Saracoglu mission to Moscow, 
and the signing of the Turkish pact with Britain and France, 
a unique period in the history of Turkish foreign relations 
came to a close. Molotov made this clear when he told the 
Supreme Soviet on October 31: 
Many things pertaining to the policy of Turkey have now 
become much clearer to us, both as a result of the Mos-
cow negotiations and as a result of recent acts of the 
Turkish Government in the sphere of foreign policy. As 
you know, the Government of Turkey has preferred to tie 
up its destinies with a definite group of European pow-
ers, belligerents in the present war ... Whether Turkey 
will not come to regret it we shall not try to guess. 
It is only incumbent upon us to take note of these new 
factors in the foreign policy of our neighbor and to 
keep a watchful eye on the development of events. If 
Turkey has now to some extent tied her hand and has 
taken a hazardous line of supporting one group of belli-
gerents, the Turkish Government evidently realizes the 
responsibility it has thereby assumed. But this is not 
the foreign policy which the Soviet Union is pursuing 
and thanks to which it has secured not a few successes 
in the sphere of foreign policy.l 
Turkey did not follow the Soviet Union on its new policy 
of opportunistic neutrality. After twenty years of close col-
laboration, Turkey and the Soviet Union were drawing apart. 
And it was feared throughout Southeastern Europe that much 
more, besides the partition of Poland, was included in the 
German-Soviet deal. 
The mutual assistance pact between Britain, France and 
Turkey was concluded in anticipation of Axis aggression, and 
specifically, of Italian aggression in the Mediterranean. 
1. v. Molotov, Russia and the War (London, 1939), pp. 16-17. 
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Now, after the Soviet march into Poland, an attack by Russia 
was not excluded. On November 1, General Orbay, heading a 
Turkish military ~ission to London, conferred with Churchill, 
then First Lord of the Admiralty, and Sir Dudley Pound, the 
First Sea Lord. An oral understanding was reached as fol-
lows: 
In the event of Turkey being menaced by Russia, His 
Majesty's Government would be disposed, upon Turkish in• 
vitatiom and in certain circumstances, to come to the aid 
of Turkey with naval forces superior to those of Russia 
in the Black Sea. • . We [the British Governmeny were not 
now making a promise or entering into any military en-
gagement; and it was probable that the contingency would 
not arise. We hoped that Russia would maintain a strict 
neutrality, or even possibly become friendly. However, if 
Turkey felt herself in danger, and asked for Br.itish naval 
assistance, we would then discuss the situation with her 
in the light of the Mediterranean situation and of the 
attitude of Italy to enter into a formal engagement ... 1 
The possibility of a Russian attack presented itself 
with even greater urgency for Rumania, whose province of 
Bessarabia the Soviets had never ceased considering a part of 
Russia. The British guarantee to Rumania was intended to ap-
ply in case of a German attack; but it was worded in the fol-
lowing general terms: "in the event of any action being taken 
which clearly threatened the independence of ... Rumania." Now 
the Rumanian Foreign Minister inquired whether the British 
guarantee was to be interpreted literally, and apply to a 
Russian attack as well. The British were doubtful that they 
could render effective aid in the event of a Soviet attack, 
or, even worse, in ease of a Joint German-Soviet campaign 
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such as the one in Poland; besides, both Hungary and Bulgaria 
were certain to seize the first opportunity of set~ng old 
scores with Rumania. The British Minister in Bucharest, Sir 
Heginald Hoare, made known the British stand on December 14: 
His Majesty's Government had examined the possibility in 
existing circumstances of fulfilling such an engagement; 
it had come to the conclusion that it would be able to 
hold to the engagement only if Turkey should immediately 
go to the aid of Rumania, and that no opposition were to 
be feared on the part of Italy. If the Rumanian Govern-
ment were able to give an affirmative reply to these two 
questions, His Majesty's Government was prepared immedi-
ately to examine the new situation with the French Govern-
ment, in order to establish what eontributi~n it would be 
possible to make to the defense of Rumania. 
It was obvious that Britain was careful not to draw the Soviet 
Union and Italy into active war on the side of Germany. 
The Rumanian Government inquired of Turkey and Italy 
what attitude they would take if Rumania were attacked by the 
Soviets. Saraeoglu stated to the Rumanian Ambassador that 
11 the existence of Rumania was of eapi tal importance to Turkey, 
the destinies of the two countries were intimately linked, 
and any danger that threatened Rumania would have to be eon-
2 
sidered from the angle or a common danger." The reaction of 
Italy was equally favorable. On December 26, Ciano talked to 
Mussolini about the Rumanian question; the Duee was "even 
ready," says Ciano, "in ease of a Russian aggression, to give 
1. G. Gafeneu, Prelude to the Russian campaign, p. 274. 
2. Ibid., p. 276. Mr. Gafeneu also quotes the Turkish Foreign 
Minister as saying substantially the same to Soviet Ambas-
sador Terentiev: " •.• Turkey was interested in the peace of 
Rumania, and ..• she.intended to respect the engagements in 
relation to the Franco-British guarantee given to that 
country.• (Pp. 276-7.) 
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the Rumanians military support of the kind we gave to Franco 
1 
in Spain." On December 30, the Italian Foreign Minister 
assured Antonescu, the Rumanian Prime Minister, that "should 
Russia attack Rumania and the latter offer armed resistance, 
Italy would not omit to give her assistance with all possible 
2 
means." As it turned out, Soviet action against Rumania did 
not materialize until six months later. In the meantime Ru-
mania, afraid of the Soviet Union, began to turn towards the 
Axis as the lesser of two evils: on March 15, 1940, an am-
nesty was granted the Fascist Iron Guard; on March 20, a 
trade agreement with Italy bound Rumania still more firmly 
to the Axis economy. The events of the following June would 
do the rest. 
The political alliance between Ankara, London and 
Paris necessitated a further orientation of Turkish trade 
towards Britain and France. The fulfillment of existing 
military contracts with Kruppa and Skoda was out of the ques-
tion; Britain and France undertook by the Special Agreement 
of October 19 to furnish Turkey with war materials: "we 
were considering," says Churchill, "what aid we could give 
. 3 
her from our narrow margins." On the other hand, it was 
vital for Britain and France to buy Turkey's strategic mate-
rials, especially chrome, and thus deny them to the enemy. A 
trade mission headed by Numan Menemeneoglu, the Assistant 
1. The Ciano Diaries (New York, 1946), p. 183. 
2. Ciano's Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p. 330. 
3· w. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 551. 
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Foreign Minister, left Turkey on November 20, and spent the 
next six weeks in London and Paris. The negotiations led on 
January 8, 1940 to a Trade and Clearing Agreement and to ar-
rangements for repayment of the Franeo-British~credit and 
loans advanced on October 19. In addition to the 25 million 
pound credit, the 15 million and the 2 million pound loans as 
well were to be repaid over 20 years in Turkish pounds, and 
the money used to buy Turkish tobacco or other Turkish prod-
ucts specified by the Turkish Government. The prospect of 
using Turkish tobacco for such a long period was not appealing 
to the British cigarette makers, but the Secretary of the 
British Chamber of Commerce at Istanbul warned: 
For various reasons which it is unnecessary to record 
here British cigarette manufacturers are not willing to 
use the Turkish tobacco. The friendship and collabora-
tion of Turkey are, however, and will continue to be of 
paramount importance to Great Britain. National inter-
ests should, therefore, now take precedence of private 
interests.l 
On January 5, the Times stated: "England must take, for poli-
2 
tical reasons, all Turkish exports, especially tobacco." 
~he trade and financial agreements of January 8 show that 
Britain had learned what Hitler and Dr. Schacht had known all 
along -- that other countries cannot buy unless they also 
sell. 
Great Britain and France had attempted to bolster up 
the resistance of the Balkan States by the declarations to 
1. The Times (London), Dee. 30, 1939· 
2. Ibid., Jan. 5, 1940. 
232 
Greece and Rumania in April 1939 and by the Turkish Pact in 
October. In February 1940, Turkey tried to organize resist-
ance within the Balkan Entente. Leaving Istanbul on January 
31 to attend the meeting of the Permanent Council, Saracoglu 
stated Turkey's position in these terms: rtYou know that our 
. 1 
country is not neutral, but is outside the war." The sur-
vival of the Entente was in question, as the Balkan Pact was 
due to expire in February 1941, unless renewed at the coming 
session. Turkey and Greece wanted the Entente to continue 
and to be reinforced, while the attitude or ~umania, and es-
pecially or Yugoslavia, was equivocal. Italy, on the other 
hand, asserted that she also was now a Balkan Power, and that 
she wanted no change in the existing treaty engagements of 
the Entente members: on Hitler's suggestion, Italy was try-
ing to put her non-belligerency to some use, by forming and 
leading a bloc or neutral states, in order to counter the 
efforts or Britain and France to organize collective resist-
2 
ance. 
The Permanent Council or the Balkan Entente met Feb-
ruary 2-4. The official communique reflects the two opposing 
tendencies of collective resistance and neutralism. The Turk-
ish and Greek efforts to pledge the Entente to common resist-
ance against any threat appear in Article 3 of the comm.unique, 
in which the Entente members undertook 
1. The Times (London}, Feb. 1, 1940. 
2. Ciano's Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948}, p. 313. 
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to remain united within the framework of an Entente which 
pursues ita own enda and which is directed against no 
one, and to watch in common for the safeguard or the right 
of each to its independence and ita national territory. 
On the other hand, the neutralism of Yugoslavia and Rumania 
was expressed in Article 4, in which the Entente States af-
firmed 
their sincere desire to maintain and to develop friendly 
relations with neighbouring States in a conciliatory 
spirit of mutual understanding and pacificoollaboration.1 
The Balkan Pact was prolonged for another seven-year period 
after February 9, 1941, but resistance in the Balkans re-
mained a matter of the individual resolve or each State. 
With the coming of spring, Hitler was ready for active 
war in the West. On March 18, the German and Italian dicta-
tors met at the Brenner Pass. Hitler announced his decision 
"to pursue the war to the end and to discomfit the enemy." 
He hoped to bring the war with France and Britain to an end 
sooner than they thought. Musaolini promised that Italy 
would lose no time in intervening "as soon as Germany has by 
. " her military operations created what the Fuhrer describes as 
2 
a favorable situation." Hitler occupied Denmark and attacked 
Norway on April 9, and, in May 10, he launched his direct at-
tack against the West by way of the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxemburg. After the Battle of Flanders and the Dunkirk 
evacuation, Mussolini's favorable situation existed and Italy 
entered the war on June 10. 
1. The Times {London), Feb. 5, 1940. 
2. Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, pp. 361-65. 
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The entry of Italy, which extended the war to the Medi-
terranean area, was one of the eventualities which, according 
to the Ankara Pact, was to bring Turkey into the war on the 
side of Britain and France. The fact that the latter was al-
ready defeated, and was about to ask for an armistice, made 
no difference; by the terms of Article 7 of the Pact, the 
provisions of the mutual-assistance treaty were "equally 
binding as bilateral obligations between Turkey and each of 
the two High Contracting Parties." The Turkish Cabinet met 
on June 14, while close contact was maintained with the Brit-
ish Government. It was decided to continue Turkey's present 
stand of non-belligerency, pending further developments. On 
July 11, the British Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, told the 
House of Lords: 
We remain bound to Turkey by the closest ties. It would 
be remembered that on the entry or Italy into the war the 
Turkish Prime Minister declared that Turkey would main-
tain her present attitude of non-belligerency. His 
Majesty's Government fully appreciated the circumstances 
which led to this decision of the Turkish Government, who, 
throughout, have acted in close contact with His Majesty's 
Government. Meanwhile our Treaty with Turkey stands, as 
does the loyal friendship and sympathy between our two 
peoples on which the Treaty is based, and which has rend-
ered it in the past as it also will, I believe, in the 
future, a fruitful basis for constructive cooperation be-
tween us, both as long fS the war continues and in the 
years of peace to come. 
The unoccupied France of Marshal Petain became a total-
itarian state oriented towards the Axis, and pledged to col-
laboration. Britain was determined to resist alone in the 
1. The Times (London), July 12, 1940. 
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British Isles and in the Empire. On July 1, the British an-
nounced that 
they could not allow Syria and Lebanon to be occuped by 
any hostile power or used as a base for attacks on coun-
tries in the Middle East which they have pledged to de-
fend, or to become the sce~e or disorders constituting 
danger to those countries. 
The fall or France had immediate repercussions in 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The Soviet Union, apparently 
caught by surprise by the rapidity of the German success, 
hastened to collect the dividends expected of the German-
Soviet Pact while the Germans were still busy in the West. 
Between June 12 and 16, ultimatums to Lithuania, Latvia and 
Esthonia resulted in outright Soviet occupation or these 
countries and in the desired changes in Government; on July 
14, the three Baltic States voted for admission into the So-
viet Union. But the most pressing objective or the Soviet 
Government was the settlement or the Bessarabian question. 
Article 3 of the Secret Additional Protocol to the German-
Soviet Pact had recognized the Soviet interest in Bessarabia. 
On June 25, Molotov told Italian Ambassador Rosso that there 
were political questions 
which had to be solved without delay •.• The Soviet Union 
would prefer to realize her claims to Bessarabia LBucovin!7 
was not mentione~ without war, but, i£ that was impos-
sible, because or Rumanian intransigence, she was deter-
mined to resort to force.2 
On the following day, the Soviet Government delivered to 
1. s. s. Jones and D. p. Myers (ed.), Documents on American 
Foreign Relations, III, P· 334. 
2. Kazi-soviet Relations, pp. 160-1. 
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Rumania a 24-hour ultimatum for the cession or Bessarabia 
and part of Bucovina; the German and Italian Ambassadors at 
Bucharest advised immediate acceptance or the Russian terms, 
and Rumania yielded. Whereupon, her worst fears of Russia 
being confirmed, she threw in her lot with the Axis Powers, 
and set up a totalitarian form of government. 
There was a general suspicion that the Soviets' Balkan 
ambitions were not limited to the recovery or Bessarabia. 
This was confirmed by Molotov's conversation with Ambassador 
Rosso on June 25, when he stated that the Soviet Government 
regarded Turkey 
with deep,suspicion. This was a result or Turkey's un-
friendly attitude toward Russia and other countries, by 
which Molotov obviously meant Germany and Italy. Soviet 
suspicion of Turkey was intensified by the Turkish atti-
tude in regard to the Black Sea, where Turkey desired to 
play a dominant role, and the Straits, where Turkey 
wanted to exercise exclusive jurisdiction. 
Molotov added that "in the Mediterranean, the Soviet Govern-
ment would recognize Italy's hegemony, provided that Italy 
would recognize the Soviet Government's hegemony in the Black 
1 
Sea." 
Early in July, the Germans supplied fuel for the 
flames by publishing the sixth German White Book, containing 
documents found by the German Army at the French town of La 
Charite. The documents t.plicated Foreign Minister Saracoglu 
in Franco-British plans for an attack on the Baku Oil Fields. 
The existence or the plans was confirmed by Mr. Butler, the 
1. Hazi-Soviet Relations, p. 161. 
237 
British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, though 
involvement of Turkey was denied. Mr. Butler told the House 
of Commons on July 11: 
Ever since the outbreak of war his Majesty's Government have 
had. to guard against this danger [Or Soviet economic or 
military collaboration with Germany against Great BritaiBT 
when·making their military plans. It was natural, there-
fore, that the staffs, who in a totalitarian war have to 
consider all future hypotheses, should consider how to 
counter Russian assistance to Germany. Apart from actual 
military assistance, one of the most valuable forms of 
help which the Soviet Government was in a position to give 
Germany was to supply her with oil from the Caucasus. It 
was thus the duty of the General Staffs to examine whether 
in certain eventualities it would be possible to interfere 
with the output of oil from the caucasian wells. I might 
add that no attempt was made at any time to enlist the 
cooperation or acquiescen!e of either Turkey or Iran in 
their hypothetical plans. 
The Turkish Prime Minister also denied the implications 
of the German White Book, when he told the Assembly on July 12: 
The issue of correct or false documents can in no way dis-
turb the Turkish people and Government. But your Govern-
ment would have sincerely desired that this publication 
should be made without any alteration, for we have such 
confidence in the correctness and clarity of our policy 
that ~uch a publication could only confirm this correct-
ness. 
The Turkish Government adopted a waiting attitude: it tried, 
President In~nG later said, "to convince the Russians of the 
correctness of its policy toward them and the invalidity of 
3 
the published documents, pending further developments." The 
purpose of the Germans was clear; they hoped that an increase 
of the Soviet threat to Turkey would draw that country into 
1. The Times (London), July 12, 1940. 
2. Ibid., July 13, 1940. 
3· Article "Turkey," 10 Eventful Years, vol. IV, p. 377· 
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the Axis, as had just been the caee with Rumania. 
The Russian reaction was tensely awaited. Count 
Schulenburg reported to the German Foreign Office, on July 
ll, that 
the entire political interest in Moscow is now focused on 
events in the Baltic States and what will happen in rela-
tion to Turkey ••• The excite .. nt among Lithuanians, Lat-
vians, and Estonians here is extremely great. This, no 
doubt, applies likewise to Turkey and Iran. Both Ambas-
sadors here assert that neither in Moscow nor in Ankara 
nor in Teheran have any demands been made up to the pres-
ent. However, it is certain that the situation is serious. 1 
The Soviets made no demands on Turkey at the time. 
They wished to press their claims only after a clear under-
standing was reached with Germany. On July 13, British Am-
bassador Sir Stafford Cripps sought out Stalin's views on 
German hegemony, on Russo-British t~ade, and on the Balkans 
and the Straits. In connection with the Balkans, the British 
view was stated as follows: 
The British Government was of the opinion that unification 
and leadership of the Balkan countries for the purpose of 
maintaining the status quo was rightly the task or the 
Soviet Union. Under present circumstances this important 
mission could be carried out only by the Soviet Union. 
And on the subject or the Straits, 
the British Government knew that the Soviet Union was 
dissatisfied with the regime in the Straits and in the 
Black Sea. Cripps was or the opinion that the interests 
of the Soviet Union in the Straits must be safeguarded. 
Stalin declined the British invitation to oppose Germany in 
the Balkans. In his opinion, 
no power had the right to an exclusive role in the consoli-
dation and leadership of the Balkan countries. The Soviet 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 165. 
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did not claim such a mission either, although she was 
interested in Balkan affairs. Regarding Turkey Stalin 
declared that the Soviet Union was in fact opposed to the 
exc-lusive jurisdiction of Turkey over the Straits and to 
Turkey's dictation of eonditions in t~e Black Sea. The 
Turkish Government was aware of that. 
Obviously, the fate of the Balkans and of the Straits 
would be arranged in future German-Soviet conversations, in 
the spirit of the German-Soviet Pact. 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 166-8. 
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b . THE AXIS SEIZURE OF THE BALKANS 
Three months after the defeat of France, Germany was 
forced to postpone her projected invasion of Britain, and the 
Axis Powers were unable to complete their new European order. 
They nevertheless proceeded immediately to draft a new order 
on a worldwide scale. On September 27, Germany, Italy and 
Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact, designed to indicate in 
ge.neral terms their spheres of influence. Japan recognized 
the leadership of Germany and Italy in the creation of a new 
order in Eurepe, while Germany and Italy ~cognized Japan's 
leadership in the creation of a new order in the Greater 
Eastern Asia. The Pact also had the immediate purpose of 
preventing the intervention of the United States in the pres-
ent European and Asiatic conflicts; the three Powers agreed 
to lend one another all aid and assistance in case one of 
them were attacked by a Power not yet engaged in the European 
or the Sino-Japanese wars. 
It was expected that the Soviet Union would adhere to 
the Tripartite Pact. Article 5 of the Pact stated that tne 
new arrangements "did not affect the existing political re-
lation between each of the three parties and Soviet Russia." 
On September 25, Ribbentrop directed Schulenburg to assure 
Molotov that the forthcoming alliance was ''directed exclusively 
1 
against American warmongers." On October 13, the German For-
sign Minister wrote to stalin, formally inviting Molotov to 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 195· 
241 
come to Berlin for discussions. " In the opinion of the Fuhrer, 
wrote Ribbentrop, it appeared 
to be the historical mission of the Four Powers -- the 
Soviet Union., r-Italy, Japan, and Germany -- to adopt a 
long-range policy and to direet. the future development of 
their peoples into the right channels by delimitation of 
their interests on a world-wide scale.l 
The German Foreign Minister did not intend to discuss Balkan 
problems with Molotov, "considering them to be internal ques-
. 2 
tiona for the two Axis Powers." 
Molotov was in Berlin on November 12 and 13. On the 
first day, Ribbentrop pointed out that "both partners of the 
German-Russian Pact had together done some good business. 
This was the most favorable basis for any pact. The question 
now was, whether they could not continue in the future also 
to do good business together." And Hitler believed that "it 
should really be possible to achieve a settlement between the 
3 
two countries beyond the life span of the present leaderiC! '! 
The following day, Hitler drew a picture of things to come: 
"After the conquest of England," said he 
the British Empire would be apportioned as a gigantic 
world-wide estate in bankruptcy of 40 million square 
kilometers. In this bankrupt estate there would be for 
Russia access to the ice-free and really open ocean ..• 
He ~itlei7 wanted to create a world coalition of inter-
ested powers wh~ch would consist of Spain, France, Italy, 
Germany, Soviet Russia, and Japan and would to a certain 
degree represent a coalition.-- extending from North 
Africa to Eastern Asia -- of all those who wanted to be 
satisfied out of the British bankrupt estate .•• It was a 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 213. 
2. Conversation with Ciano, Nov. 4, Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, 
p. 406. 
3· Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 221-6. 
matter of determining in bold outlines the boundaries for 
the future activity of peoples and of assigning to nations 
large areas where they eould find an ample field of acti-
vity for fifty to a hundred years.l 
Molotov appeared to be less interested in the "bold 
outlines" of tomorrow than in the immediate issues of the day, 
such as the presence of German troops in Finland and the Ger-
man-Italian guarantee to Rumania, which was aimed against the 
interests of Soviet Russia, "if one might express oneself so 
bluntly." And there was alao the paramount problem of the 
Straits. The Soviet Commissar asked Hitler "what Germany 
would say if Russia gave Bulgaria, that is, the independent 
country located closest to the Straits, a guarantee under 
exactly the same conditions as Germany and Italy had given 
one to Rumania." Hitler replied that "he had envisaged a re-
vision of the Montreux Convention in favor of the Soviet 
Union"; regarding the guarantee to Rumania, it was intended as 
a protection of the oil fields against a possible British at-
tack; as for a Russian guarantee to Bulgaria, he was unaware 
that Bulgaria had asked for one, and besides, he would have 
"to inquire about the position of Italy." Molotov insisted; 
Russia "wanted to be secure from an attack by way of the 
Straits and would like to settle this question with Turkey; 
a guarantee given to Bulgaria would alleviate the situation." 
He added that "Russia wanted to obtain a guarantee against an 
attack on the Black Sea via the Straits not only on paper, 
but 'in reality,' and believed that she could reach an agreement 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 242-4. 
with Turkey in regard thereto." Hitler remained non-commit-
. 1 
tal; he would have to ask the Duce for his opinion. 
In his final conversation with Molotov, Ribbentrop 
tried once more to bring the Soviet Commissar's attention 
to the great partition of the British possessions; "he could 
only repeat again and again that the decisive question was 
whether the Soviet Union was prepared and in a position to 
cooperate with us in the great liquidation of the British Em-
pire." Molotov remarked that "the Germans were assuming that 
the war against England had already actually been won." As 
he spoke, British planes were over Berlin, and the conversa-
tion was held in the air-raid shelter of tm Foreign Affairs 
Ministry. Ribbentrop nevertheless showed Molotov a draft 
quadripartite agreement intended to add Moscow to the Rome-
2 
Berlin-Tokio Axis. 
Two secret protocols, annexed to a similar draft later 
proposed to the Soviet Government, delimited the four States' 
spheres of influence, and defined the policy of the four 
Powers with regard to Turkey and the Straits. Germany's 
sphere would be in Central Africa, Italy's in Northern and 
Northeastern Africa, Japan's in the area of Eastern Asia to 
the south of the Island Empire, and that of the Soviet Union 
south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the 
direction of the Indian Ocean. With regard to Turkey, the 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 244-6. 
2. Ibid., PP· 253-4. 
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three European Powers were to act together to detach her from 
the British alliance "and progressively to win her over to 
political collaboration with themselves"; they wouTd jointly 
recognize "the extent or Turkey's possessions"; and they would 
work together to replace the Montreux Convention with a new 
agreement granting the Soviet Union "the right of unrestricted 
passage or its navy through the Straits at any time, whereas 
all other Powers except the other Black Sea countries, but 
including Germany and Italy, would in principle renounce the 
1 
right of passage through the Str~s for their naval vessels." 
The customary annoumcement was made after the Berlin 
talks that the "exchange of views took place in an atmosphere 
or mutual confidence and resulted in agreement by both sides 
on all important questions or interest to Germany and the 
2 
Soviet Union." During the talks, however, Hitler had directed 
that preparations for possible difficulties in the East, which 
had been in the planning stage since July, be continued. The 
Germans were putting less and less faith in the German-Rus-
sian Pact, and more and more in the 180 German divisions 
3 
stationed in the East. Their suspicions or the Soviets were 
to be further aroused by the official Russian reaction to the 
proposed quadripartite pact. 
On November 25, Molotov informed Ambassador Schulenburg 
that the Soviets were prepared to adhere to the proposed Four 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 249, 255-7· 
2. Ibid., P• 255· 
It 3· Conversation Fuhrer-Duce, 28 Oct. 1940, Ciano's Diplomatic 
Papers, p. 399 ~ 
Power Pact, subject to the following conditions: 
1. The immediate withdrawal of German troops from Fin-
land; 
2. Recognition of the area south of Batum and Baku in 
the direction of the Persian Gulf as the center of 
Soviet aspirations; 
3· Renunciation by Japan of her rights to coal and oil 
concessions in Northern Sakhalin; and, 
4. A mutual-assistance pact between the U.s.s.R. and 
Bulgaria, and 'the establishment of a base for land 
and naval forces of the U.s.s.R. within range of the 
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term 
lease.' 
These Russian conditions were to be embodied in secret proto-
cols; therefore, 
the draft of the protocol or agreement between Germany, 
Italy, and the Soviet Union with respect to Turkey should 
be amended so as to guarantee a base for light naval and 
land forces or the U.s.s.R. on the Bosphorus and the Dar-
danelles by means of a long-term lease, including -- in 
case Turkey declares herself willing to join the Four 
Power Pact -- a guarantee of the independence and of the 
territory of Turkey by the three countries named. This 
protocol should provide that in case Turkey refuses to join the Four Powers, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet 
Union agree to work out and to carry through the required 
military and diplomatic measures, and a separate agreement 
to this effect should be concluded.l 
On the same day, the Soviets proposed a mutual-assistance 
pact to Bulgaria, aadp!'omised to help the latter obtain an 
outlet to the Aegean through the Greek and Turkish sections 
2 
of Thrace; the Bulgarians refused. 
On December 18, Hitler issued Directive No. 21, order-
ing the German Armed Forces to be "prepared to crush Soviet 
Russia in a quick campaign LPperation Barbaross!l even before 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 258-9. 
2. H. N. Howard, Dept. of State Bulletin, XIX, No. 472, p. 69. 
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the conclusion of the war against England," and setting the 
deadline of May 15, 1941 for the completion of preparations. 
In a letter to Mussolini dated December 31, Hitler explained 
that 
with the danger of internal struggles in a number of Bal-
kan countries, it is necessary to anticipate the worst 
consequences and to hold in readiness the mechanism which 
can prevent them •.• I therefore consider it necessary, 
Duce, to have a German army strong enough to take care of 
any eventuality in the East ••. As a matter of fact, the 
only issues which still divide us ~ermany and Soviet 
Russiy are Finland and Constantinople. Aa to Finland, 
I do not foresee any fundamental difficulties ••• On the 
other hand, it is not in our interest to aban!on Constan-
tinople to Russia and Bulgaria to bolshevism. 
While Germany and Soviet Russia were jockeying for 
position in Eastern Europe, from Finland to the Straits, the 
Axis had taken the military and diplomatic initiative in the 
Balkans. On October 28, Italy attacked Greece from Albania. 
The British reaction was immediate; Wavell's desert offensive 
in Egypt was delayed, and British troops were sent to Greece. 
On November 2 Churchill explained to Eden, who was then at 
Cairo: 
Greek situation must be held to dominate others now. We 
are well aware of our slender resources. Aid to Greece 
must be attentively studied lest whole Turkish position 
is lost through proof that England never tries to keep 
her guarantees ... " 
On the following day he again insisted that 
collapse of Greece without any effort by us will have 
deadly effect on Turkey and on future of war •.. Surely 
effort must be made to2aid Greece directly, even if only with token forces ... 
1. Lettres secretes echangees par Hitler et Muasolini (Paris, 
1946), pp. 168-16. 
2. w. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 536-8. 
The attack on Greece once again raised the question or 
" " Turkey's entry into the war. President Inonu reported to the 
National Assembly on NovemDer 1: 
The course of the war has recently taken on developments 
which have given us new cause for attention. Our friend 
and neighbor Greece, which lies within our security 
area -- a region of vital importance to our peace and 
safety -- has been dragged into the war. We are at pres-
ent examining the new situation jointly with our ally the 
British Government. 
The Turkish President added: 
It is my duty to state, at a time when England is fight-
ing heroically under difficult conditions, that the ties 
of alliance which bind us to her are strong and unshakeF 
able. 
In a few weeks, the Greeks hurled the Italians back 
into Albania, but the danger of a German thrust from the north 
remained. Between November 20 and 25, Hungary 1 Rumania and 
Slovakia adhered to the Tripartite Pact, extending Hitler's 
control to the border of Bulgaria. On November 26, Churchill 
stressed in a message to General Wavell the increased impor-
tance of the Balkan and Middle East theater: "It seems diffi-
cult to believe,n said he, ttthat Hitler will not be forced to 
come to the rescue of his partner, and obviously German plans 
may be far advanced for a drive through Bulgaria at Salonika 
One may indeed see possibility of centre of gravity in 
Middle East shifting suddenly from Egypt to the Balkans, and 
from Cairo to Constantinople." At the same time, Churchill 
outlined for Defense Minister Eden the line of argument to be 
followed by the British Ambassador at Ankara: "we want Turkey," 
" " 1. A. K. Meram, Ismet Inonu ve Ikinci Cihan Harbi (Istanbul, 
19lf.5L P. 59. 
248 
said he, 
to come into the war as soon as possible. We are not 
pressing her to take any special steps to help the Greeks, 
except to make it clear to Bulgaria that any move by Ger-
many through Bulgaria to attack Greece, or any hostile 
movement by Bulgaria against Greece, will be followed by 
immediate declaration ot war... In the event ot German 
troops traversing Bulgaria with or without Bulgarian as-
sistance, it is vital that Turkey should fight there and 
then.l 
Churchill was right in anticipating German interven-
tion in Greece. In his letter to Mussolini, on November 20, 
Hitler promised that he would attack Greece, but pointed out 
that operations would not be possible until March. The Ital-
ian attack, which Hitler had never favored, had drawn the 
British into Greece. And now the Royal Air Force was within 
striking distance or the Rumanian oil fields; the prospect 
was "really terrifying .•. I am determined, Duce," wrote 
Hitler, "to react with decisive forces against a possible 
British attempt to establish an important base in Thrace, and 
I will act in this way, whatever the risk may be .n During the 
winter, German troops would be massed in Rumania. It would 
be necessary to win over Yugoslavia and Bulgaria by promising 
them outlets to the Aegean. "Bulgaria," wrote Hitler, 
. ' 
previously showed little inclination to associate herself 
with the Tripartite Paet, but now she appears totally op-
posed even to the thought or such a step .•• The attitude 
of Turkey is of particular importance, because it will 
influence that or Bulgaria in a decisive manner .•• We 
must try to reach some kind ot an agreement with Turkey, 
in order to eliminate Turkish pressure on Bulgaria.2 
1. w. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 546-7. 
2. Lettres secrftes echangees par Hitler et Mussolini, pp. 
81-92. 
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The Germans soon obtained a means of keeping the Turks 
out of the war. On November 26, the German Foreign Office 
received Ambassador Schulenburg's telegram in which were 
listed the Soviets' conditions for adherence to the proposed 
quadripartite pact, including the demand for land and naval 
bases on the Straits. Hitler later told Mussolini that the 
Russian demands were immediately revealed to the Turks: "The 
telegram from Ambassador von der Schulenburg," he said, "which 
. ' 
the Reich Foreign Minister had brought to their attention at 
the time in its original form, had been very enlightening, as 
it had outlined the claims or the Russians with respect to 
Turkey as they had been presented at that time by Molotov in 
Berlin." Turkey, Hitler predicted, "would never be an enemy 
of the Axis. At most she would remain neutral up to the end 
1 
of the war." Be was right; the Turkish Government began to 
retrench into a position of neutrality. Faced with a Soviet 
threat in the east, in addition to the Axis threat in the Bal-
kans, Turkey resolved to save her forces for the sole defence 
or the homeland against any attacker. 
Bitler's over-all strategy for the winter of 1940-41 
comprised the capture of Gibraltar, an Italian advance to 
Mersa Matruh in Egypt that would permit continuous bombing or 
the Suez Canal, and the Greek campaign early in March. The 
Mediterranean, bolted at both ends, would become "the grave-
yard of the British Navy." However, Franco backed out of the 
Gibraltar operation, and the Italians were pushed back into 
1. Salzburg meeting, April 29, 1942, Dept. or State Bulletin, 
XV, July 14, 1946, p. 60. 
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Libya beyond Benghazi; only the Balkan prospects remained. 
It was rumored in January 1941 that the German troops 
in Bumania were preparing to march into Bulgaria. On Janu-
ary 17, Molotov sternly warned Ambassador Schulenburg that 
the Soviet Government would consider "the appearance of any 
foreign armed forces on the territory of Bulgaria and of the 
Straits as a violation of the security interests of the 
1 
U.s .s .R." The Soviet Government was also anxious to know 
the German answer to the proposals it had made as far back as 
November 25 in connection with its adherence to the quadri-
partite pact. The Germans replied that the Soviet demands 
were being discussed with Italy and Japan, and that further 
talks on the Soviet proposals would be resumed in the near 
future. Actually, the Japanese first learned of the Russian 
demands two months later, when Ribbentrop told Japanese For-
2 
eign Minister Matsuoka about them in Berlin on March 27 and 29. 
Meanwhile, Churchill worked indefatigably to stem a 
further German penetration of the Balkans. German air-force 
ground crews were reported to be already preparing the Bulga-
rian airfields. " " On January 31, he proposed to President Inonu
that you and I should repeat in defence of Turkey the same 
kind of measures which the Germans are taking on the Bul-
garian airfields. My Government wish to send to Turkey 
at the earliest moment when accommodation can be provided 
at least ten squadrons of fighter and bomber aircraft 
apart from the ~ive now in action in Greece. 
1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 270-1. 
2. Ibid., pp. 284, 304-5. Ribbentrop described the Russian 
demands as "unacceptable.. • Germany preferred the Dar-
danelles to.remain in the hands of the Turks. Besides, 
she could not permit a penetration of the Russians into 
the Balkans." 
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The presence of British aircraft in Turkey was expected to 
give the Germans pause. 11We shall place Turkey in a position,n 
wrote Churchill, "once our squadrons are on the Turkish aero-
dromes, to threaten to bombard the Rumanian oilfields if any 
German advance is made into Bulgaria, or if the air personnel 
already in Bulgaria is not speedily withdrawn." Furthermore, 
he added, "nothing will more restrain Russia from aiding Ger~ 
many, even indirectly, than the presence of powerful British 
1 
bombing forces which could attack the oilfields of Baku." 
On February 5, Lord Halifax called on Secretary of 
State Hull to request that the United States support Britain 
in her efforts to organize a joint Turkish-Yugoslav defence. 
Secretary Hull made the American position on the side of Brit-
ain clear to the Yugoslav and Turkish Governments, and called 
their attention to the prospect of Lend-Lease aid. He could 
do little more. Prime Minister Saydam, in turn, could do no 
more than express tthis Government's wholehearted support of 
. 2 
the ideals of the United States and Great Britain." 
The Turkish Government at this time was abandoning at-
tempts to organize a common front. The German revelations 
of Russia's intentions had produced the desired effect. There 
loomed the specter of a Russian attack from the rear, if the 
~!).1 
Turks became engaged with Germany along ~ Thracian border. 
Turkish pressure on Bulgaria ceased, and on February 17 the 
1. w. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 34. 
2. c. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, pp. 928-30. 
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two countries exchanged pledges of non-aggression which re-
moved the possibility of Turkish intervention against Bulgaria. 
On March 1 Bulgaria adhered to the Tripartite Pact and the 
German Army poured in from Rumania. Hitler did not fail to 
give Turkey the usual assurances. In a personal letter to 
" tt President Inonu, dated February 28, he declared that the en-
try of German troops into Bulgaria was not directed against 
Turkey, and that the German forces would leave Rumania and 
Bulgaria as soon "as the British danger was removed, the 
sooner the better. 11 However, he was not sure of the Turkish 
attitude; he told Mussolini that he did not expect trouble 
from that quarter, but, he added, "whatever happens, we are 
' 1 
ready for any eventuality, and ready for everything." 
As the Germans were about to occupy Bulgaria, Britain 
continued in her efforts to form a common front of Turkey, 
Greece and Yugoslavia. On February 26, Anthony Eden, now 
Foreign Minister, and Sir John Dill, the Chief of the Imper-
ial General starr, arrived at Ankara. The Turkish political 
and military leaders discussed the situation "on an extremely 
frank and friendly basil: they would fight if.attacked by 
Germany, but "they felt concerned lest Russians should attack 
2 [the!i7 if Turkey became involved in war with Germany. 11 On 
February 28 Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador to 
Moscow, arrived at Ankara in a special plane provided by the 
1. Lettres secretes echangees par Hitler et Mussolini, pp. 
118-9. 
2. Eden'a report to Churchill, Feb. 28, 1941: w. Churchill, 
The Grand Alliance, p. 97· 
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1 
Soviet Government. Apparently, he was unable to reassure 
the Turks as to Russian intentions; the only result of the 
Ankara talks was the reaffirmation of the pact of 1939· And 
even Churchill later admitted that "it was obviously impos-
sible to consider the treaty we had, made with /!furkeff before 
2 
the war as binding upon her in the altered circumstances." 
At this stage the British Prtme Minister, supported by 
the American Government, tried to "induce the Soviet Govern-
ment to give assurances to Turkey which would assist its gov-
3 
ernment in withstanding German penetration." The Soviets 
did not need much urging, as their Balkan policy was being 
thoroughly revised. The Balkan Peninsula, which they had 
hoped to control, or at least to share, under the terms of 
the German-Soviet Pact, was being overrun by Germany with 
complete disregard for the Kremlin's warnings; for over a 
year, the Soviets themselves had helped to break up the pos-
sible elements of resistance to the Nazis. On March 25 the 
Soviet Government issued a declaration which denied the rumors 
"being circulated in the foreign Press, according to which, 
if Turkey were obliged to go to war, the U.s.s.R. would take 
advantage of her difficulties in order to attack her.n If 
Turkey were forced to go to war, she could rely "on the com-
plete understanding and neutrality of the U.s.s.R." The Turk-
ish Government, in turn, expressed "its sincerest thanks" to 
1. G. Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign, p. 134. 
2. w. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 36. 
3· c. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, p. 931. 
the Soviet Government, and declared that the latter could 
rely upon a similar attitude on the part of Turkey, if it 
1 
should find itself in similar circumstances. The Russian 
guarantee, like the German, was accepted for what it was 
worth. 
The planned German attack on Greece, scheduled for the 
end or March, suffered a last-minute mishap. Yugoslavia ad-
hered to the Tripartite Pact on March 25, but two days later 
an anti-Axis regime was installed by a coup d'etat, and the 
Axis tie was repudiated. The invasion or Greece was delayed 
a few days, while the Germans redeployed their forces for a 
simultaneous attack on Yugoslavia. During the night of 
April 5-6, the Soviets signed a Friendship Pact with the new 
Yugoslav regime: this tardy gesture displeased the Germans 
and helped no one. A few hours later, German troops crossed 
the Greek and Yugoslav borders. The campaign was a short 
one: Yugoslavia collapsed in ten days; the Greek and British 
forces were overwhelmed in three weeks. The Axis Powers con-
trolled all the Balkan countries proper, and their troops 
were along the whole of Turkey's European border. 
Germany's Balkan blitzkrieg coincided with other de-
velopments in the Eastern Mediterranean area which threatened 
the British with the collapse or all their positions in the 
Middle East. The Axis forces in North Africa, now spear-
headed by the Germans, had pushed the depleted British forces 
back into Egypt. On April 3, a pro-Axis regime seized power 
1. G. Gafeneu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign, pp. 140-1. 
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in Iraq, and on May 2, the Iraqis attacked the British troops 
stationed there. On April 17, the Anglophobe Admiral Darlan 
was appointed head of all the French Armed Forces; on May 12, 
at Berchtesgaden, he discussed with Hitler "the assistance 
which France could give in Syria for the support of Iraq and 
the facilities she could provide for German-Italian supplies 
to North Africa"; he further placed the Syrian landing fields 
1 
and gasoline stocks at the disposal of the Luftwaffe. The 
Axis leaders believed in the imminence or total victory, and 
the Italian Ambassador to Berlin quipped: "The war is won • 
. 2 
All we have to do is find a way to stop it." 
In the middle of May, as the Axis Powers prepared for 
a final two-pronged attack on the Suez Canal, Hitler was 
ready to demand of Turkey the price of peace. 
1. Reported by Ribbentrop to Mussolini at Rome, May 13, 1941, 
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. IV, p. 501. 
2. HughG:tb'son (ed.), The Ciano Diaries (New York, 1946), p. 
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c . THE GERMAN PACT 
On May 14, Ambassador von Papen presented to President 
. " " Inonu a personal message from Hitler, and broached the subject 
of a German-Turkish treaty. The Ambassador reported to the 
German Foreign Minister that the President was "willing to 
conclude a convention insuring the restoration of the former 
friendly relations. He assured that, if Germany declared her 
intention not to conclude with any country an understanding 
directed against Turkey, the latter would be willing to engage 
never to undertake anything against German interests and never 
to go to war against Germany." The negotiations with Foreign 
Minister Saracoglu were to begin immediately. And von Papen 
concluded: uThe transit of war materials to Iraq can there-
1 
fore be considered as assured." 
Hitler had ruled out an attack on Turkey, or even an 
attempt to have her fall in line with Bulgaria and Rumania 
into the Axis column. On April 20, he had told Count Ciano 
at Munich: 
1. 
The possibility of attempting the operation by foree can 
be ruled out. Independently of Turkish resistance, which 
would be considerable, the distances would make any mili-
tary operation uncertain and dangerous. Diplomatically, 
too, it seems difficult to draw Turkey into the orbit of 
the Axis, at least within a short space of time.2 
documents secrets du 
2. Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, p. 435· 
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Von Papen was recalled to Germany, and instructed "to 
endeavor to obtain from the Turks permission for the secret 
passage of arms for Iraq through Turkish territory .•. Should 
a large-scale transport of arms reach Iraq it would be pos-
sible to move airborne troops into the regions, who could then 
advance against the British with the material found there and 
who could, under certain circumstances, attack Egypt from the 
1 
East from Iraq." 
The favorable Turkish reaction to the treaty proposal 
encouraged the Germans to up their demands. On May 17, Rib-
bentrop directed von Papen to negotiate towards the following 
ends: 
Simultaneously with the conclusion of an official treaty 
with Turkey, another secret treaty will be concluded --
one which will allow us the unlimited transit of arms and 
war materials through Turkey. It would be well to have 
it understood, by suitable wording, that Turkey cannot 
prevent these war materials from being accompanied by the 
necessary personnel. Actually, this will amount to the 
right of transit for a certain contingent of armed forces, 
under a disguised form. 
Turkey could be promised a border adjustment near Adrianople, 
2 
and some island or other in the Aegean. 
Saracoglu apparently objected to the accompanying per-
sonnel. On May 19, Ribbentrop agreed to let von Papen drop 
the point, "which could be attained later in successive 
stages"; but he urged the utmost speed in concluding the 
1. Reported by Ribbentrop to Mussolini at Rome, May 13, 1941, 
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. IV, pp. 501-2. 
2. La politique allemande, p. 18. 
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treaty. "If we are to keep Iraq, 11 he advised von Papen, "we 
must do it very quickly. The war materials are already arriv-
ing at Constanza." And the German Foreign Minister wanted it 
made clear to the Turks that it was not a question of a few 
carloads of supplies for neutral countries like Iran or Af-
ghanistan. "It is probable," said he, " that as a result of 
the changing situation in the Near East, we will have to send 
large quantities of war materials through Turkey to Syria or 
1 
Iraq.u 
The Turkish Foreign Minister was not in a hurry. He 
informed von Papen that he had only recently told the British 
Ambassador of Turkey's intention to sign a non-aggression 
treaty with Germany, and that he was awaiting the reaction 
of the British Government. Von Papen had "to be patient two 
or three days before the question could be settled." The 
British had reacted vigorously in the Middle East: they had 
seized the upper hand in Iraq, and had begun to bomb the Sy-
rian airfields used by the German Air Force. On May 23, Sara-
coglu was ready to discuss the treaty; instead of showing 
interest in Thrace or in the Aegean islands, the Turks ap-
peared to desire Syrian territory, which was embarrassing to 
the Reich in view of the renewed French tendency towards 
collaboration. Ribbentrop told von Papen on April 26: nour 
present relations with France, and especially our collabora-
tion with that country in Syria, do not allow us to support 
1. La politique allemande, pp. 21-3. 
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any Turkish claim in that region." And he suggested that the 
treaty contain only a general reference to Turkish aspira-
1 
tions in connection with revision of the Treaty of Lausanne. 
It does not seem that the Turks had any serious terri-
torial aspirations, and the whole matter of compensation was 
dropped. The Germans could not make out the intentions of 
the Turks; Bibbentrop told Count Ciano on June 2: 
The position of this country lTurkei7 appeared particu-
larly interesting at the moment of the Iraqi revolution. 
Von Papen considered he could obtain from the Turkish 
Government free passage of arms and perhaps of men. But 
it was a ease of an illusion on the part of the Ambassa-
dor, Papen. In rea]ty the Turkish attitude is still re-
served and, in certain fields, ambiguous.2 
The Turkish attitude must have appeared still more am-
biguous a few days later, when Saracoglu insisted that the 
treaty be so worded as not to require any change in Turkey's 
existing relations with Great Britain. •~bbentrop pointed out 
on June 9 that maintenance of a full-fledged alliance with 
Great Britain was incompatible with the purpose of the in-
tended treaty with Germany. He told von Papen: 
Turkey would have liked to conclude a treaty with Germany 
in order to secure herself against a German attack; at 
the same time, however, she would have wanted to maintain 
the alliance with England, and, obviously, to keep open 
in a roundabout way the possibility of cooperating with 
her politically and militarily. The Turkish Government 
must be made to understand that if it cooperates, even 
indirectly, with England, against whom Germany is engaged 
in a death struggle, she is taking sides with the enemies 
of Germany. By so doing, Turkey would be once more 
1. La politique allemande, pp. 25-6. 
2. Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, p. 442. 
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abandoning the neutrality whose restoration must be con-
sidered as the minimum result or her treaty with Germany 
If one takes into account the present political 
situation, 
added Ribbentrop, 
the interest of Turkey in the conclusion of this treaty 
is far greater than ours. For this reason, the Turkish 
Government would do well to decide finally and quickly 
whetber or not it accepts the treaty we propose.l 
Actually, the Germans were in the greater hurry, and 
needed the treaty more. The Axis threat in the Middle East 
had been removed; the Iraqi revolt had collapsed at the end 
or May, and British and Free French troops had just entered 
Syria to take that route to Suez out of Vichy's control. The 
attention or the German leaders was now focussed on the immi-
nent attack on Russia; mere Turkish neutrality would be wel-
come. On June 13, Ribbentrop authorized von Papen to allow 
the Turkish reservation concerning the Turco-British Treaty, 
and suggested a vague reference to it in the preamble, to 
the effect that "both parties reached an agreement to conclude 
2 
a treaty, while maintaining their existing obligations." 
He found consolation in the thought that the Turkish attitude, 
though still uncertain, showed indications 11 from which it is 
possible to argue that the Turks wish to slide over from the 
position or England's ally to the less dangerous one of de-
clared neutrality. If that should come about, it must be 
3 
considered an extremely important result." 
1. La politique allemande, pp. 27-32· 
2. Ibid., pp. 27-32· 
3· Conversation with Ciano, Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, p. 446. 
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1 
The German-Turkish Treaty of Friendship was signed at 
Ankara on June 18. It was concluded "without prejudice to 
present obligations of both countries." Germany and Turkey 
undertook "mutually to respect the integrity and inviolability 
of their national territory and not to resort to any measures, 
direct or indirect, aimed at their Treaty partner." They 
also agreed "in the future in all questions touching their 
common interests, to meet in friendly contact in order to 
reach an understanding on the treatment of such questions." 
The Treaty was to run for a period of ten years. As a pre-
cautionary joint measure, a declaration was made to the press 
and radio of both countries enjoining them to "bear in mind 
in all they publish and broadcast the spirit of friendship 
and mutual trust animating their nations." 
Four days later, the German Army attacked Soviet Rus-
sia. Turkey immediately declared her neutrality. 
On the day they signed the political Treaty, Germany 
and Turkey agreed to restore normal economic relations. In 
an exchange of notes, both countries agreed to enter negotia-
tions immediately "to promote as far as possible economic re-
lations between Germany and Turkey." 
The Turkish foreign trade had been severely jolted by 
the loss of the German market after Turkey's alliance with 
Britain and France. Britain had increased her Turkish imports, 
but in 1940 she was able to take less than one fourth of the 
1. Text or Treaty, Notes and Declaration: Jones and Myers, 
Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. III, pp. 342-3· 
German purchases of the previous year. Italy also helped 
when she increased her Turkish imports by 50%, as Germany 
had done in 1935-36 when sanctions were imposed on Italy; 
but that was not enough. Trade with Russia and France was 
practically nonexistent due to the former's economic agree-
ments with Germany and to the ~ Freneh. defeat. Germany now 
controlled Turkey's former Balkan and Central European mar-
kets. What was far more critical, Turkey was not able to 
obtain the materials necessary for her defence; her iron 
and steel imports for 1941 were 23,166 tons, compared with 
170,446 tons in 1939· Rising military expenditures further 
accentuated the financial pinch caused by a shrunken trade; 
in 1941 the actual cost of defence amounted to 49~ of the 
total Government expenditures. After receiving the German 
and Russian guarantees, Turkey further increased her defence 
l 
expenditures by 40% in 1942. 
The German-Turkish economic agreement was signed Octo-
ber 9, 1941. Turkey was to supply Germany with raw materials, 
and to receive steel and war materials in exchange. Turkish 
shipments of chrome to Germany were to be resumed only after 
2 
the existing agreement with Great Britain expired in 1943. 
The Turkish trade with Germany never again reached its 
pre-war levels. During the next three years, Germany took 
1. Figures from Istatistik Yllllgl, 1942-1945 (Ankara, 1946), 
PP· 346-52, 365, 411-12. 
2. H. N. Howar.d, "Germany, the Soviet Union, and Turkey during 
World War II," Dept. of State Bulletin, XIX, p. 472-
J 
about 2~ of Turkey's exports, and supplied about 3~ of her 
imports. The total foreign trade was gradually restored. 
From the summer of 1941, it was apparent that the Turkish 
Government, while sympathetic with the British cause, had 
decided upon a neutral political and economic course. 
CHAPTER 3 
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a. The Axis Tide 
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c. The End of an Epoch 
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a. THE AXIS TIDE 
The German attack on Russia brought about the close 
association between the British and the Soviets that Turkey 
had so ardently desired in the summer of 1939· But now the 
prospect of a Soviet-British victory presented a hopeless 
dilemma. Great Britain was still Turkey's best insurance 
against Italian domination of the Mediterranean, but the 
northern neighbor was no longer the friendly Soviet Russia 
of Chicherin and Litvinov. During the past two years, the 
Soviets had seized half of Poland,made war on Finland, ab-
sorbed the Baltic States, annexed Bessarabia and Northern 
Bucovina, and charted the course of their intended expansion 
to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The Turkish lead-
ers knew, as the Germans kept reminding them, that the Rus-
sians wanted to establish land and naval bases on the Straits, 
and to push south of Batum through eastern Turkey. The defeat 
of the Axis Powers would remove the Mediterranean threat, 
but it would also leave the victorious Soviets unchecked by 
any important land power on the Continent. 
It was Britain's difficult task to try to remove Tur-
key's suspicion of Russia's intentions. On August 10, 1941, 
the British and Soviet Ambassadors at Ankara made the follow-
ing joint declaration to the Turkish Government: 
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom confirm 
their fidelity to the Montreux Convention, and assure the 
Turkish Government that they have no aggressive intentions 
or claims whatever with regard to the Straits. His Maj-
esty's Government, as also the Soviet Government, are 
266 
prepared scrupulously to observe the territorial integrity 
of the Turkish Republic. While fully appreciating the 
desire of the Turkish Government not to be involved in 
war, His Majesty's Government, as also the Soviet Govern-
ment, would nevertheless be prepared to render Turkey 
every help and assistance in the event of her being at-
tacked by a European power.l 
The Turkish leaders could note that the Soviet Government had 
not associated itself with the British Government in that part 
of the Declaration which dealt with the Straits. 
In December, Foreign Minister Eden went to Moscow for 
preliminary talks on a treaty of alliance. The Turks were 
afraid that post-war compensations might be promised the Rus-
sians, as had happened in 1915. The Soviets had reluctantly 
subscribed to the Atlantic Charter, in which the signatory 
states declared that they desired "no aggrandizement, terri-
torial or other. tt Stalin insisted on a territorial agreement 
as a condition to any military alliance; be wanted the Russian 
gains during the partnership with Hitler to be recognized, and 
a promise of facilities for bases in Rumania. His concern 
over the changed Turkish attitude made him generous; he pro-
posed the cession to Turkey of the Dodecanese Islands, along 
2 
with some territory in Bulgaria and Northern Syria. Eden 
was not empowered to deal with territorial questions, and no 
agreement was reached at Moscow. Back in London, the Foreign 
Minister tried to allay Turkish suspicions when he told the 
House of Commons on January 8: 
1. L. M. Goodrich (ed.)~ Documents on American Foreign Rela-
tions, vol. IV, p. 6~7. 
2. c. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II, pp. 1166-7. 
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The references to Turkey in our conversations were in all 
respects friendly, and such as the Turkish Government 
themselves would have been glad to hear. Turkey has 
nothing to fear from an Allied victory. Her territorial 
integrity is in no way menaced from that quarter, and t~e 
Anglo-Soviet pledges that we gave to Turkey last autumn 
will be fully honoured. Both the Soviet Union and our-
selves -- I say that deliberately after these conversa-
tions --wish to see Turkey strong and prosperous.2 
The Axis Powers were ready to give Turkey the same 
territories, except the Italian Dodecanese. On August 25, 
1941, Hitler suggested to Mussolini that it might be possible 
to offer Turkey "a slight frontier rectification on Bulgarian 
territory and some future concession in Syria at the end of 
the war." During the winter, Mussolini even advised the Turks 
that he was considering giving them the small island of Cas-
3 
tellorizo off the south Anatolian coast. The idea was novel, 
in that it involved the gift by a state of territory which 
belonged to it. 
In his annual review 6f Turkish policy before the 
. " " National Assembly on November 1, 1941, President Inonu re-
affirmed the permanent principles which guided his government's 
line of conduct; but he was forced to admit that, while the 
principles remained unchanged, their application had to con-
form to "the particular developments of the war, and our 
country's geographic position." The President did not mention 
Soviet Russia, as he had the year before; he recalled Turkey's 
1. On August 10, 1941. 
2. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 377, cols. 
173-4. 
3· Dept. of State Bulletin, XV, July 14, 1946, p. 60. 
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fidelity to the British alliance during the dark days of the 
Battle of Britain. He described German-Turkish relations in 
the following terms: 
During the Balkan campaign, our relations with Germany 
passed through a difficult period ... The exchange of 
letters which took place (between the Ger.man Chancellor 
and me) created an atmosphere of mutual confidence which 
resulted in the Turkish-German Treaty of June 18, 1941. 
I take pleasure in calling your attention to this happy 
outcome. Since then, Turkish-German relations have been 
friendly as they had never been before. The provisions 
of the Friendship and Non-aggression Treaty of June 18, 
1941 are and will remain in force under all conditions. 
The Turkish-German commercial treaty which was recently 
signed and which will soon be submitted to your approval 
should be considered as one of the fruits of this policy 
of friendship and confidence. 
• It " President Inonu concluded with a profession of neutrality: 
"strong, independent, and free in her movements," said he, 
"Turkey appears as a stronghold of peace which threatens no 
1 
one, and a precious bastion of civilization. 11 
No longer could the Foreign Minister say, as he had 
in 1940, that Turkey was "not neutral." Suspicious of Rus-
sia and Italy, friendly with Great Britain and Germany, Tur-
key had friends and enemies on each side. The entry of the 
United States into the war in December completed the dilemma 
of the Turkish position. On January 5, 1942, Ambassador von 
Papen sent to the German Foreign Office a penetrating analy-
2 
sis of the Turkish stand in the global war. ttAccording to 
Turkish opinion," said von Papen, "America alone, among the 
partners in the Anglo-American bloc, appears to be invincible." 
II It 1. A. K. Meram, Ismet Inonu ve Ikinci Cihan Harbi, pp. 70-2. 
2. La politique allemande, vol. I, pp. 51-9. 
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The Turkish Government had hoped for a Russian defeat and a 
compromise peace between the British Empire and the Axis 
Powers. With America in the war, Britain would never compro-
mise, even if Russia should be defeated. An Axis victory in 
Europe was unthinkable, because it meant Italian domination 
or the Mediterranean. An Allied victory, on the other hand, 
would bring about "the total collapse or Europe, seeing that 
neither England, nor the United States would be in a position 
to arrest the territorial expansion or the Russians, and to 
prevent a famished, impoverished and worn-out Europe from 
1 
being bolshevized." 
Von Papen noted among the Turks a stronger desire than 
ever to remain neutral, barring a violation or their sover-
eign rights. "Any attempt aimed at forcing Turkey prematurely 
to take sides," said he," -- such as pressure to enter on our 
side, or to allow us to send arms through her territory 
would certainly lead Turkey to pass to the other side." On 
the other hand, ''no pressure on the part of' the Anglo-Ameri-
cans will make Turkey take the least step against us~ The 
Ambassador urged his Government to fulfill its promise not to 
undertake anything that might jeopardize Turkey's relations 
with Great Britain; the Turks themselves will know what to do 
1. American Ambassador Steinhardt reported a few months later 
that "the Turks rear the Germans and ardently hope for an 
Anglo~American victory while at the same time they mistrust 
the Soviets and are doubtful that the United States and 
Great Britain will be able to restrain a victorious Soviet 
Union from taking the Straits away from them.'' R. E. Sher-
wood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948),.p. 553· 
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"when they are convinced that the British alliance is incom-
patible with their future security as a Nation." 
The pressure put on Turkey by both groups of belliger-
ents served her in one way: she was able to receive military 
equipment from each side, so that she might resist the pres-
sure of the other. Four days before Pearl Harbor, Preside~t 
Roosevelt declared the defence of Turkey to be vital to the 
defence of the United States; the Turks were therefore eli-
gible to receive lend-lease aid. On April 24, 1942, Ambas-
sador Steinhardt wrote to Harry Hopkins that the arrival of 
lend-lease material had greatly strengthened the Allied posi-
tion in Turkey; the Turkish officials, said Steinhardt, "are 
now contrasting the unfulfilled German promises of armament 
with our steadily increasing deliveries.'' The Allies con-
sidered a German attack on Turkey to be probable during the 
summer of 1942, 
when the German offensive in southern Russia either 
stalls or goes through to the Caucasus. On the happen-
ing of either of these two events the Germans will have 
to decide whether to try and go through the difficult 
terrain in Turkey or keep hammering at the Russians ... 
"I am convinced," declared Steinhardt, "that in their present 
1 
frame of mind the Turks will fight if they are attacked." 
At the same time, the Turkish Government used similar 
arguments to obtain arms from Germany. On February 16, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Menemeneoglu made the following one-sided 
proposal to von Papen: the 150-million-mark credit arranged 
1. R. E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 552-3· 
\ 
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by-nr. Funk in October 1938, but which the Turkish Assembly 
had not ratified, would be renewed for the purchase of German 
military equipment; the grant, however, would be based on 
mutual confidence, and should not jeopardize Turkey's rela-
tions with the Allies. "It was in the interest of the Axis 
Powers," argued Menemencoglu, "that Turkey should be as 
strong as possible from the military point of view, so tht 
she might resist any Anglo-American pressure." Von Papen 
urged his government to grant the Turkish request, even 
though there was no political compensation, in the hope that 
it might help to develop closer German relations with the 
Turks, and especially with the Turkish General Staff. The 
Turkish Government pressed for the immediate delivery of 
Krupp anti-aircraft guns ordered before the outbreak of the 
war, and which the Germans had again promised to furnish in 
the economic agreement of October 9, but still undelivered. 
For the political reasons indicated by von Papen, Hitler re-
laxed his embargo on artillery pieces, and in July, author-
ized delivery of the Krupp guns, as well as other arms and 
ammunition; the amount to Germany's credit was to be used 
1 
for purchases of chrome in 1943. 
The critical stage of the war, for Turkey as well as 
for the combatants, was reached in the latter part of 1942. 
In the summer, the Germans launched an all-out offensive in 
Russia; the two southern prongs of the drive were intended to 
1. La politique allemande, vol. I, pp. 71-5, 78. 
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take Stalingrad and the Baku oil fields; the Caucasus was 
to be the starting point of "the great march to the East 
which -- crossing Iran, Iraq, Syria and Palestine -- will 
lead to the conquest of one of the key positions of the Brit-
1 
ish Empire: Egypt.'' The Allies expected the Germans, at 
this point, to try the shorter route through eastern Turkey. 
The Axis Powers, in turn, feared that the Allies might try 
to relieve the Caucasus front by an operation of their own 
from Iran and Iraq; two American divisions were reported at 
Basra. Menemencoglu assured von Papen that if the Anglo-
Americans attempted to open a second front in eastern Turkey, 
2 
"it would certainly mean war." 
The Axis Powers hoped that decisive victories in Rus-
sia and North Africa in 1942 would force the reluctant Turks 
into line. Ribbentrop had told Ciano at the end of April: 
"Turkey nourishes fundamentally hostile sentiments towards 
us, which she succeeds in hiding by the clever use of Orien-
tal hypocrisy ... However, ... after the successes which the 
summer has in store for the Axis armies, Turkey may -- under 
the pressure of events -- take up an attitude favourable 
3 
towards us." In order to give the Turkish Government a 
stake in a German victory, the German Foreign Office sought 
to interest the Turkish leaders in the future of the Turkish-
1. Hitler to Ciano, Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, p. 463. 
2. La politique allemande, vol. I, pp. 86-7. 
3· Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, p. 483. 
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speaking peoples of the U.s.s.R. whom the Germans were about 
to liberate. 
Since the end of World War I, the German capital had 
been the center of the Pan-Turanian movement. Immediately 
after the German attack on the Soviet Union, von Papen was 
instructed to take stock of Pan-Turanian feeling in Turkey; 
he informed Ribbentrop of the existence of Pan-Turanian cir-
cles among retired Army officers and emigres from the Caspian 
1 
regions of Iran and the U.s.s.R. In August 1942, when the 
German armies were nearing Stalingrad and the Caucasus oil-
fields, the time was ripe to approach the government leaders. 
Von Papen asked Saracoglu, the new Prime Minister, "what 
kind of practical cooperation Turkey could furnish, and how 
we could take care of Turkish interests in the conquered 
provinces." The Prime Minister was non-committal; he was 
willing to discuss the questions confidentally~ or to have 
Turkish interests made known through a third party; but the 
Turkish Government would not consider any form of practical 
cooperation, whether military or political. Ribbentrop im-
mediately instructed von Papen not to discuss the subject 
further with the Turkish authorities, and he added: 
We have no reason to give the Turks any assurances, or to 
give them an opportunity to express their wishes since, 
apparently, these questions do not arouse sufficient in-
terest to make Turkey modify her general policy towards 
the belligerent Powers in our favor.2 
1. Letter to Ribbentrop, Aug. 5, 1941, La politique allemande, 
vol. I, PP· 36-41. 
2. Ibid., pp. 107-8. 
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The turning point of the war was at hand. With the 
battle of El Alamein on October 23, and the Anglo-American 
landings on November 8, the Axis threat in North Africa was 
removed. On November 22, the Soviets opened their counter-
offensive at Stalingrad, and the main German drive in Russia 
turned to disaster; the German forces in the Caucasus had to 
be speedily withdrawn. Even in the Pacific, the Japanese 
drive had been halted at Guadalcanal. The Rome-Berlin Axis 
had shot its bolt, and it was only a question of time until 
the United Nations could gather enough strength to close in. 
At the close of 1942, the Allies were ready to seize the dip-
lomatic as well as the military initiative. 
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b. ALLIED PRESSURE 
After the North Africa landings and the German disas-
ter at Stalingrad, the Allied leaders, and Prime Minister 
Churchill in particular, revived the idea of Turkey's entry 
into the war on their side. The Axis Powers, on the other 
hand, had lost all hope or inducing Turkey to collaborate 
with them; they would do well if they prevented her from 
being drawn into the enemy camp. 
As early as November 9, 1942, the day following the 
North Africa landings, Churchill spoke of future campaigns 
with Foreign Minister Eden, Ambassador Winant and General 
Smith. The Prime Minister was thinking of "getting Turkey 
into the war with her forty-five divisions of superior fight-
ing men armed and equipped by the Allies for an invasion of 
the Balkans." He proposed that General Marshall, Admiral 
1 
King and Harry Hopkins come to London for a conference. 
Soon after, he enlarged upon the idea, and informed Stalin of 
his desire for a three-Power conference that would include 
Russia. 
Stalin's reply was favorable, but the military chiefs 
at Washington were not enthusiastic. At a conference which 
President Roosevelt held on November 25 with the Chiefs of 
Staff, "it was agreed that there were many diplomatic ques-
tions involved, and that probably Turkey would not consider 
1. R. E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 656-7. 
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aligning herself with the United Nations until she had been 
given considerable armament and other munitions of war." 
General Marshall doubted that Turkey's entry was worth the 
price: large air and ground forces would be required to oc-
cupy Sicily, Sardinia and Crete, and to clear the Mediter-
1 
ranean for sea traffic in preparation for a Balkan campaign. 
At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Chur-
chill told Roosevelt of his intention to see the Turkish 
President, and obtained permission to speak in the name of 
the United states as well as Great Britain. He overcame 
the objections of the British war Cabinet, and a meeting was 
arranged. The FTime Minister's plan was to prepare the 
Turks for active participation in the war in the fall of 
1943. Meanwhile, he hoped that "by a strained interpretation 
of neutrality similar to that of the United States before 
she came in, they lthe Turk!l may allow us to use their air-
fields for refuelling for British and American bombing at-
2 
tacks on the Ploesti oil-wells." 
~ It " Churchill met President Inonu and Prime Minister Saraeo-
glu at Adana, in Turkey, on January 30. In a prepared state-
3 
ment delivered to the Turkish President, he pointed to the 
danger of a German attack; the Axis Powers had not been able 
to reach the Middle East oil fields by way of the Caucasus or 
1. R. E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 656-7. 
2. Message to Stalin, Feb. 2, 1943, w. Churchill, The Hinge 
of Fate (Boston, 1950), pp. 713-4. 
3· Ibid., PP· 705-9· 
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Egypt, and they might try, with the help of the Bulgarians, 
to force their way through the center by way of Turkey. 
Great Britain and the United States were ready to supply 
modern equipment and trained personnel: at least twenty-
five air squadrons, regiments of anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
artillery, and, if Turkey were attacked, troops from the 
British Ninth and Tenth Armies stationed in Syria. "I know," 
he added, "it is President Roosevelt's wish, as it is cer-
tainly that of His Majesty's Government, that Turkey should 
be a full partner in the Peace Confere~ce where all questions 
of changes in the existing status quo will have to be settled." 
The Turkish leaders expressed their views of the post-
war world for which they were expected to fight. "All Eur-
ope," said Saracoglu, "was full of Slavs and Communists. All 
the defeated countries would become Bolshevik and Slav if 
German~ was beaten." Churchill argued that in that case, ttit 
was better that Turkey should be strong and closely asso-
ciated with the United Kingdom and the United States." If 
the Soviet Union imitated Germany, he (Churchill) would ttar-
range the best possible combination against her." The Adana 
talks resulted in a military agreement which provided for 
the supply of equipment for the Turkish army, and for Brit- -
1 
ish reinforcements in case Turkey were drawn into the war. 
Immediately after his conversations with the Turks, 
Churchill informed Stalin of their apprehension of the 
1. w. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 710-12. 
anticipated power of the Soviet Union. "They would, I am 
sure," he suggested, "be very responsive to any gesture of 
friendship on the part of the u.s.s.B." Stalin replied: 
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We have already made a number of statements, the friendly 
character of which is well known to the British Govern-
ment, some months before the Soviet-German war, as well 
as after its beginning. However, the Turks did not react 
to our steps. Apparently. they were afraid to incur the 
wrath of the Germans. I am afraid that a similar recep-
tion will be accorded to the gesture suggested by you. 
And the Soviet leader pointed to the equivocal nature of Tur-
key's relations with the belligerents: 
On the one hand, Turkey has the treaty of neutrality and 
friendship with the U.s.s.R. and the treaty of mutual as-
sistance against aggression with Great Britain; on the 
other hand she has the treaty of friendship with Germany, 
signed three days before the German attack against the 
U.s.s.R. It is not clear to me how in the present cir-
cumstances Turkey thinks to combine her obligation vis-a-
vis ~he U.s.s.R. a~d Great Britain with her obligations 
vis-a-vis Germany. 
With the German threat considerably reduced, especially in 
southern Russia, the Soviets could afford to be more sparing 
in friendly gestures; they were apparently quite willing to 
let the threat of Soviet might hang over Turkey's future. 
When the American and British political and military 
chiefs met at Washington in May to plan the final blows 
against Italy, Churchill again evoked the great possibilities 
in the Balkans: 
The effects of Italy coming out of the war would be very 
great, first of all on Turkey, who had always measured 
herself with Italy in the Mediterranean. The moment 
would come when a joint American-Russian-British request 
might be made to Turkey for permission to use bases in 
her territory from which to bomb Ploesti and clear the 
1. w. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 714-5. 
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Aegean. Such a request could hardly fail to be success-
ful if Italy were out of the war, and the moment were 
chosen when Germany could take no powerful action against 
Turkey. Another great effect of the elimination of Italy 
would be felt in the Balkans, where patriots of various 
nationalities were with difficulty held in check by large 
Axis forces, which included twenty-five or more Italian 
divisions. 
Churchill's Balkan ideawas included among future possibilities, 
and it was decided, in the final report signed on May 25, "to 
prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of 
1 
Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies." 
The Germans were aware of the Allied opportunity in the 
Balkans. Goebbels wrote on April 29: 
In Croatia practically all German offices are working at 
cross-purposes. In addition the Italians are mixing in, 
whereas the Croatian Government itself is only a foot-
ball in the hands of the Partisans. If an invasion were 
to take place in the southeast, there would be cause to 
fear that large parts of the population would immediately 
desert us. The Balkans are still the powder keg of Eur-
ope. It is to be hoped that the English and Americans 
are not aware of the chances beckoning them there. I am 
more than ever convinced that if they attempt an invasion, 
that's where it will come. 
At the same time, the Turkish attitude was becoming increas-
ingly suspect to the Germans. Saracoglu's speech in the Na-
tional Assembly on March 17 had been warmly pro-British, 
and, as Goebbels noted, "We fared rather badly in it." It 
was feared in Berlin that Turkey might swing over to the 
2 
Allies in the fall. 
In August the British and American top-level leaders 
1. w. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 791, 808-9. 
2. L. p. Lochner (ed.), The Goebbels Diaries (London, 1948), 
PP· 239, 310, 348. 
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met at Quebec to discuss the opening of a major second front 
in 1944. It was decided that the invasion of France would be 
"the primary United States-British ground and air effort 
against the Axis in Europe (Target date, May 1, 1944) . " This 
operation was granted t~priority, and resources were to be 
distributed "with the main object of ensuring the success of 
1 
Overlord" (invasion of Northern France). The Quebec deci-
sion ruled out a major Balkan campaign based in Turkey; it 
was therefore decided that "from a military point of view the 
time was not right for Turk!!JY to enter the war on our side." 
Efforts were to be continued, however, "to equip Turkey and 
increase her military effectiveness, while attempting to re-
duce her assistance to Germany, with particular reference to 
stopping the passage of all German shipping of military value 
through the Dardanelles and the supplying of Turkish chrome 
2 
to Germany." 
Ironically enough, just as the military leaders decided 
against extensive operations in the eastern Mediterranean 
area, the course of events revived the issue. The Italian 
surrender was signed on September 3, and announced five days 
later. Italy's Dodecanese Islands, off the southwestern 
coast of Turkey, were manned chiefly by Italians, with a 
sprinkling of German troops. Churchill's attention turned 
immediately to th$ee islands, 11 so long the object of strategic 
1. w. Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston, 1951), p. 84. 
2. c. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II, p. 1368. 
281 
desire." The opportunity was excellent, as he tells us: 
It seemed to me a rebuff of fortune not to pick up these 
treasures. The command of the Aegean by air and by sea 
was within our reach. The effect of this might be deci-
sive on Turkey, at that time deeply moved by the Italian 
collapse. If we could use the Aegean and the Dardanelles, 
the naval short-cut to Russia was established. There 
would be no more need for the perilous and costly Arctic 
convoys, or the long and wearisome supply line through 
the Persian Gulf. 
The Prime Minister immediately cabled General Wilson at 
1 
Cairo: "This is the time to play high. Improvise and dare." 
By the end of September British troops had taken the 
islands of Cos, Leros and Samoa; an attack on the key island 
of Rhodes had failed, and ·a larger operation would be required 
to complete the conquest of the Dodecanese. Meanwhile Hitler 
decided to recover the lost islands and to hold Rhodes, for 
the same political reasons that prompted Churchill. He told 
his military staff on November 25: "The attitude of our al-
lies in the southeast and Turkey's attitude is determined 
solely by their confidence in our strength. Abandonment of 
the islands would create a most unfavourable impression." 
On October 3, German parachutists retook Cos. German troop 
convoys set out from Greece to strengthen the other garrisons 
2 
and to complete the reconquest. 
Churchill appealed to General Eisenhower for the trans-
port facilities needed for a decisive assault on Rhodes. At 
a conference held at Tunis on October 10 it was decided that 
1. w. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 204-5. 
2. Ibid., PP• 206-9. 
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the equipment could not be spared; the Italian campaign was 
more difficult than anticipated; the Germans had reacted 
vigorously after the Italian surrender, and it had just been 
learned that they intended to make a stand south of Rome. 
The Allied Command would reconsider the question of Rhodes 
1 
after a winter line had been established north of Rome. 
At this point, Churchill received unexpected support 
from a different quarter. The Foreign Ministers of Great 
Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union met at Mos-
cow October 18-30, to consider measures to shorten the war; 
the three points listed by Molotov were the opening of the 
second front, the use of Swedish air bases, and the immedi-
ate entry of Turkey into the war. In connection with the 
third point, the three Powers would jointly suggest the de-
sired action to Turkey; the Soviet Foreign Minister made it 
clear that in his vocabulary, "to suggest" was synonymous 
with "to command." Secretary Hull referred the question to 
President Roosevelt; it was a military matter, and as such 
came within the province of the President and the Chiefs of 
Starr. The President's reply, received October 28, stated 
that 
we did not consider it advisable at this time to induce 
Turkey to declare war. We were straining our resources 
for building up the invasion of northern France and sup-
porting the Italian offensive. We proposed, as an alter-
native, that inquiries be made of the Turkish Government 
for the lease of air bases and transportation facilities.2 
1. w. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 209-19. 
2. c. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II, pp. 1279-80, 
1297' 1301. 
The use of Turkish air bases would enable the British 
to hold Leros and Samos, and probably to capture Rhodes. 
The Soviets wanted nothing short of a Turkish declaration of 
war; they agreed, however, that Britain should request "the 
immediate use of air bases, while Britain and Russia would 
join at a later date in requesting Turkey's entry into the 
war before the end of the year. n A few days after the Moscow 
Conference, President Roosevelt agreed that Britain could 
speak for the United States, as well as for Soviet Russia, 
1 
in the forthcoming talks with Turkey. 
When Eden met Turkish Foreign Minister Menemencoglu at 
Cairo on his way back from Moscow, the islands of Leros and 
Samos were still in British hands. The British Minister pre-
sented all of Churchill's arguments for the use of Turkish 
landing fields and the capture of the Dodecanese Islands. 
Menemencoglu objected that the granting of air bases would be 
an act of war, and that severe German reprisals, against 
which the Turks had no defence, could be expected immediately 
in the form of bombing attacks on Istanbul and Izmir. When 
Eden stressed the advantages to the Allied cause of Turkey's 
entry into the war, including the possible disintegration of 
Germany's Balkan satellites, the Turkish Foreign Minister de-
clared that the badly equipped Turkish army could not make an 
effective contribution. The Turks were apparently unwilling 
to take the risk of war, when the Allies themselves engaged so 
1. c. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II, pp. 1312, 
1369. 
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few men in that area, while the Germans were determined to 
stand fast on the Aegean islands and on the Thracian border. 
1 
Leros and Samos fell to the Germans less than two weeks later. 
At the Teheran Conference, November 28-December 1, 
Churchill relentlessly argued his Eastern Mediterranean plans 
and Turkey's entry into the war, to the point where Stalin 
asked him point blank: "Do the Prime Minister and the Brit-
ish Staff really believe in Overlord?" He did, but he "did 
not consider that the very great possibilities in the Medi-
terranean should be ruthlessly cast aside as if they were of 
no value, merely to save a month or so in the launching of 
Overlord.tt He contemplated launching an amphibious assault 
on Rhodes after the capture of Rome. Roosevelt and the Ameri-
can military chiefs were set against dispersing resources in 
secondary operations; the President stated that "ir he were 
• II II in Inon~'s place, he would demand so heavy a price in air-
planes, tanks and equipment that the granting of these re-
quests would result in indefinite postponement of Overlord." 
Stalin concurred with the Americans; he believed 
that it would be unwise to scatter forces in various 
operations throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. He 
said he thought that Overlord should be considered the 
basis for all operations in 1944 and that after the cap-
ture of Rome the forces used there should be sent into 
Southern France to provide a diversionary operation in 
support of Overlord. 
It may be that, as Churchill suspected, the Russians did not 
1. c;·Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II, p. 1369; 
w. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 334-5, 392. 
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want, for political reasons, that the Anglo-Americans should 
undertake a large-scale Balkan campaign. Nevertheless, Stalin 
was in favor of bringing Turkey into the war 11 by the scruff 
1 
of the neck if necessary." 
In spite of the divergent views of the three heads of 
state, it was agreed at Teheran that "from the military 
point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come 
into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the 
year." The main operation remained Overlord, with a support-
ing operation in southern France. The troops furnished Tur-
key would be limited to twenty air squadrons and three anti-
aircraft regiments. • II II President Inonu was invited to meet 
Roosevelt and Churchill at Cairo, on their way back from 
Teheran; he agreed to the meeting provided he was not being 
called upon merely to be informed of the decisions of the Big 
Three concerning Turkey, but to share in a "free discussion 
2 
as between equals." 
The Turkish President met the Allied leaders at 
Cairo on December 4-6. It was Churchill who pressed the Al-
lied argument, and he was only partly successful. • II II Inonu 
agreed "in principle" to his country's entry into the war, 
but not in the short time desired by the Allies. He required 
that the Turkish Army be furnished sufficient equipment to 
meet a Garman-Bulgarian attack, and then it would be up to 
1. w. Churchill, Closing the Rin~, pp. 344-73; R. E. Sherwood, 
Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 78 -1, 794. 
2. w. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 389-93, 404; c. Hull, 
The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II, p. 1369. 
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the Turkish National Assembly to declare war. It was decided 
that a British military mission would be sent to Ankara, to 
confer with the Turkish military leaders on their armament 
needs. Churchill instructed the British Chief of Staff to 
have the bomber squadrons ready for transfer to Turkey be-
tween February 1 and 15; he still hoped to land a British 
1 
division on Rhodes at the end of February. 
The British mission arrived at Ankara December 28, but 
the talks soon bogged down in an atmosphere of mutual suspi-
cion. The Turks thought that the British were holding out on 
the supplying of the Turkish Army because of prior commitments 
to the Russians and the Greeks. The British in turn suspected 
the Turks of trying to postpone their active participation in 
the war by deliberately demanding quantities of materiel 
which it would be impossible to furnish. The talks finally 
broke down, and on February 6 the British mission left Ankara. 
To mark their displeasure, the British and American Govern-
ments instructed their Ambassadors to cool off in their rela-
2 
tions with the Turkish leaders. 
Great Britain and the United States then took practical 
• II ff 
1. I. Inonu, article "Turkey," 10 Eventful Years, vol IV, p. 
378; w.·churchill,.Closing.the Ring, pp. 415-7· 
2. c. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II, pp. 1370-1. 
Von Papen claims some credit for "enabling Turkey to re-
main neutral." He corroborates the story, contained in L. 
c. Moyzisch's.Operation Cicero, that he had copies of the 
British Ambassador's records of the Anglo-Turkish talks, and 
that by hinting to Menemencoglu that Germany was aware of 
Turkey's preparations for war, he made the Turkish Govern-
ment adopt a more cautious attitude. L. c. Moyziseh, Opera-
tion Cicero (New York, 1950), pp. 135-8, 209. 
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steps to compel Turkey to reduce her trade with Germany. In 
1943 Germany supplied 37~ of Turkey's imports, and took 23~ 
of her exports. She obtained one quarter of Turkey's chrome 
exports, or 13,564 tons, in 1943, while in the first quarter 
1 
of 1944 she secured almost 60,000 tons. On March 2, the 
British stopped sending military supplies to Turkey. On 
April 1, the United States suspended lend-lease shipments. 
On April 14, the British and American Governments jointly 
warned Turkey that if she continued to supply Germany with 
essential war materials, she would be subject to the Allied 
blockade just like the other neutral states. The Turkish 
Government immediately embargoed all chrome shipments to 
the Axis Powers; it further agreed to cut its remaining ex-
ports to the Axis in half, and to grant the Allies the right 
2 
of preemption for the remaining 50 per cent. 
About the first of June the Germans managed to send 
out of the Black Sea through the Straits five army trans-
ports of about 800 tons each and eight gunboats of 40 to 50 
tons each. The British Government expressed its displeasure 
with the Turkish Government's lack of vigilance. On June 15 
3 
Foreign Minister Menemencoglu resigned his post. The inci-
dent had little military significance, but it was unfortunate 
in that it was to supply the Soviets with an argument when 
1. Istatistik Yilligi, 1942-1945, pp. 349, 380. 
2. c. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. II, p. 1372. 
3· H. N. Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union, and Turkey during 
World War II,".Dept. of State Bulletin, XIX, No. 472, p. 
72· 
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they chose to revive their dormant claims to guardianship of 
the Straits. 
After the Normandy landi~ the Allied Powers tried to 
win over the neutral powers to their side, in order to hasten 
the downfall of Germany. In the latter part of June the Brit-
ish, supported by the Americans, proposed to the Turks that 
they break diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. 
The Turkish Government was willing to grant the request, 
provided it received assurances that the Allies would supply 
Turkey's necessary imports and purchase her surplus exports. 
The Soviet Government, however, did not approve of the Anglo-
American proposal, which fell short of the goal set at Tehe-
ran to bring Turkey actively into the war. The State Depart-
ment explained that Turkey's severance of relations was to 
be considered only as a preliminary step to active belliger-
ency. The Soviet Government repeated that the proposed 
action "came much too late and was unsatisfactory. It added 
that there was no essential significance to the discussion 
of half-measures, and that the Soviet Government therefore 
found it necessary to leave the Turkish Government to its 
1 
own devices." Soviet displeasure with Turkey was increas-
ing as victory drew nearer. 
The British and the Americans, on the contrary, pre-
ferred a diplomatic break to an outright declaration of war. 
It would have the same effect, and would not involve the 
1. c. Hull, Th~ M~~o~rs of Corde~J_Hull, vol. II, pp. 1372-6. 
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Allies in military commitments. The British and American 
Governments made a general promise to alleviate any economic 
shocks suffered by Turkey as a result of the break with Ger-
many. On August 2 the Turkish National Assembly broke off 
relations with the Nazis; Prime Minister Saracoglu had ex-
plained to the representatives: 
The decision which you are called upon to make is not a 
declaration of war. It is the attitude to be taken by 
the other side that will determine whether this decision 
will or will not be transformed into a declaration of 
war.l 
The Turkish action involved no risk of German reprisals. 
The Anglo-Americans were overrunning France, while in the East 
the Russians were advancing through Poland. The German home-
land was directly threatened, and the remaining troops in 
the Balkans were incapable of offensive action. By Oetober 
1st the Russians had taken Rumania, and entered Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Yugoslavia. The Balkans were to be a Bussian 
theater of operations, except for Greece, where the British 
landed on October 5· The liberation of the Balkans was to-
tally different from that envisaged by Churchill since No-
vember 1942. The British leader deplored the turn of events 
in the Balkans when he wrote after the war: 
My parleys with Turkey were intended to prepare the way 
for her entry into the war in the autumn of 1943. That 
this did not take place after the collapse of Italy and 
with the further Russian advances against Germany north 
of the Black Sea, was due to unfortunate events in the 
Aegean later in the year .•• Had I been allowed to carry 
out my main theme, the plain purpose of which was clearly 
set forth, I could have had Turkey in the war on our side 
1. Ulus (Istanbul), Aug. 3, 1944. 
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before the end of 1943, without damage to our main plans, 
and with all kinds of advantages to the Allies, and es-
pecially for Turkey. Now in these years after the war 
when we see the United States sustaining Turkey with her 
whole power all has been put right, except that we did 
not have the considerable advantages of Turkish aid and 
all that this implied in the Balkan situation in the 
early months of 1944.1 
Churchill's Balkan plans were wrecked by a series of 
circumstances. First of all, the strong German counter-ac-
tion in the Dodecanese prevented an easy capture of the Aegean 
islands. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, inspired by purely 
military reasons, were opposed to any diversion of supplies 
to that area; their resolution was intensified by the unex-
pected German resistance in Italy, and by the logistic diffi-
culties of Operation Overlord. If the Western Allies had 
liberated a larger part of the Balkan Peninsula, the present 
Soviet threat to the Straits might be that much farther away. 
But it is unlikely that the Soviet attitude towards Turkey 
would be any different today, if the latter had actively par-
ticipated in the war on the side of the Allies. 
Germany was not defeated in 1944, but it was certain 
already that she would be crushed between her Eastern and 
Western foes in the first all-out assault of 1945. On Feb-
ruary 4-11, 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met once 
more to reach agreement on the problems that would arise 
with the defeat of Germany. Two of the questions debated 
at Yalta interested Turkey: the coming United Nations con-
ference, and the eternal question of the Turkish Straits. 
1. w. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 716. 
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Stalin was opposed to the admission of the Turks to 
the conference, and he associated them in the following 
terms With the pro-Axis Argentines: 
I am not for the Argentines. I do not like them; but I 
do desire there should be no logical contradiction. If 
we invite the nations that declared war and also the as-
sociated nations that have broken relations, then there 
is a category of nations like Argentina. This means 
Turkey and some other countries would come. I think the 
nations which declared war would not feel quite at ease 
with those nations that have not declared war, but were 
saving all the time, trying to speculate on who would 
win and who generally were not straight in their behavior. 
Churchill pointed out that some neutral nations, like Turkey, 
had been encouraged to remain neutral. It was decided to in-
clude with the United Nations those associated nations which 
1 
declared war on the enemy by Mareh 1st. 
On February 10, Stalin himself brought up the question 
of the Straits and the Montreux Convention. "The treaty," 
he said, "was outmoded. Japan had played a bigger part in 
drafting that treaty than the Soviet Union, and also the 
treaty was linked with the League or Nations, which was dead." 
Turning from legalistic to strategic considerations, he de-
.. 
clared that it was impossible "to accept a situation in which 
Turkey had a hand on Russia's throat." He added, however, 
that the treaty should be revised "in such a way as not to 
harm the legitimate interests of Turkey." The Soviet leader 
proposed that the question of revision be studied by the 
three Foreign Ministers at their first regular meeting after 
1. J. F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), p. 39; 
E. R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians (New York, 
1949) , p. 341. 
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the Yalta Conference. Stalin's proposal was accepted, and 
it was provided in Article XIV of the Protocol of the Confer-
ence that 
at the meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be 
held in London, they should consider proposals which it 
was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in 
relation to the Montreux Convention. The Turkish Govern-
ment should be informed at the appropriate moment.l 
Turkey availed herself of the opportunity afforded by 
the Yalta Agreement; on February 23 she declared war on Ger-
many and Japan, effective March 1st. She did not engage in 
military operations against the enemy. The theater of war 
had receded away from her borders to Central Europe. The Ae-
gean and the Balkans were once more under Allied control, and 
Allied merchant shipping was passing through the Straits, in 
accordance with the Montreux Convention. Turkey's sole pur-
pose in declaring war was to obtain representation at the San 
Francisco Conference. She had been absent from the great Al-
lied conferences of the past two years, where her interests 
had so often been discussed. In the international organiza-
tion about to be formed at San Francisco, she hoped to win 
the continuing battle for her independence and security. 
After the Yalta Conference, combined Allied pressure 
on Turkey ceased. It was apparent at the Conference itself 
that the Soviet Government was about to apply pressure of its 
own, while Great Britain and the United States were swinging 
over to Turkey's support. 
1. E. R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp. 267-9, 
349. 
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c. THE END OF AN EPOCH 
The intentions of the Soviets in connection with Tur-
key were soon made known. On March 19, 1945, Molotov in-
formed the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow that the Treaty of 
Friendship and Neutrality of 1925, which had been extended 
in 1935 for a ten-year period, would not be renewed in its 
present form when it expired in November. When the Turks 
engaged in conversations with the Soviets towards the nego-
tiation of a new treaty, the latter laid down their condi-
tions: the cession of Kars and Ardahan, and the granting or 
military and naval bases on the Straits. The price of Soviet 
1 
friendship was too high, and the Turks refused. 
Discussion of the Montreux Convention by the Big 
~hree, undertaken at Yalta, was resumed at Potsdam. On 
July 24, Churchill again advocated a revision of the Conven-
tion which would allow Soviet naval and commercial ships 
free passage in war as well as in peace. stalin demanded 
bases on the Straits: "Turkey," he argued, "was too weak to 
give any effective guarantee of free passage, and it was, 
therefore, only right that the Soviet Union should be enabled 
to defend the Straits. 11 President Truman expressed the Ameri-
can view -- the classic view of the large naval powers -- that 
"the Straits should be a free waterway open to the whole world 
and guaranteed by all of us." It was agreed that the three 
1. J. F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 77· 
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governments would enter into direct contact with the Turkish 
Government on the question of revising the Montreux Conven-
1 
tion. 
The Soviets did not immediately take up the question 
of the Straits with the Turkish Government. In the fall of 
centered 
1945 their attention was/on the Iranian province of Azer-
baijan, where an autonomous communist republic had been set 
up, while the occupying Red Army prevented Iranian troops 
from intervening. When the Soviet troops stayed in northern 
Iran beyond the agreed withdrawal date of March 2, 1946, the 
Iranian Government submitted the question to the United Na-
tions Security Council. The Soviet forces withdrew in May, 
and the Teheran Government reasserted its authority over its 
northern province. These Soviet moves in connection with 
Azerbaijan, south of Baku, as well as with Kars and Ardahan, 
south of Batum, show the persistency of Russian aspirations 
towards the Persian Gulf, as outlined to Molotov to the Ger-
man Embassador in November 1940. 
After the evacuation of northern Iran, the Soviet 
leaders once again turned their attention to the Turkish 
Straits. On August 7, 1946, they proposed to Turkey that a 
new regime governing the Straits be worked out by Turkey and 
the other Black Sea Powers, and that the defence of the Straits 
be organized jointly by Turkey and the Soviet Union, in the 
1. H. N. Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits (Washington, 
1947), pp. 36-7. The British version or the minutes refers 
to "conversations" with the Turks as "the next step"; the 
Soviet version mentions 11 direct negotiations" as"the proper 
course» to be followed. 
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interests of the Black Sea Powers. The American and British 
Governments objected that the regime of the Straits was a 
matter of wider international concern, and that Turkey should 
continue to be primarily responsible for the defence of this 
part of her terri tory, with the United Nations representing 
an added guarantee in case of aggression. The Turkish Govern-
ment contended that the Soviet proposal was ''not compatible 
with the inalienable rights of sovereignty of Turkey nor 
with its security." It suggested that the Montreux Conven-
tion be revised by an international conference, as provided 
1 
for by the Convention itself. 
The issue was joined; it was the old Eastern Question 
in modern guise. Some of the actors had changed, but the 
plot remained the same. A unique period in the history of 
Turkish foreign relations had ended. After World war I, 
the Soviets had repudiated the policies of the Tsars, and 
the new Turkish regime had likewise set out on a new course. 
It now appeared that the much-vaunted Turco-Soviet friendship 
of the 1920's and 1930's had been but an extended truce. At 
the end of the war, as Stalin and Molotov strove to outdo 
Catherine and Nicholas, the leaders of the Turkish Republic, 
like the former Sultans, found support among the other great 
Powers. 
The revived Eastern Question was set in the kind of 
a post-war world which the Turks had anticipated since 1941. 
1. H. N. Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits (Washing-
ton, 1947), PP· 47-55· 
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The victorious Soviets were unchallenged by any continental 
power, and half of Europe had gone over to communism. Turkey 
was incomparably stronger than in 1923, but her population of 
less than 19 million, her army of less than one million, were 
no match for the great Soviet mass. Her economic development 
had been arrested during the war years when trade dwindled, 
necessary imports were unavailable, and as much as 60% of 
the national budget had to be spent on national defence. In 
order to stand up to the Soviet threat, post-war Turkey 
needed strong outside political support, as well as military 
and economic assistance. She placed her hopes in the new 
United Nations, and especially in the increasing interest and 
support of the United States. 
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EPILOGUE 
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
The foreign policy of any state is the product of its 
internal development within a given international setting. 
The Turkish Republic bears little resemblance to its parent, 
the Ottoman Empire; and the international picture in 1920, 
especially in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, has little 
I 
in common with that of 1900. It is only natural that the 
foreign policy of the Turkish Republic should have had a 
different orientation from that of the Ottoman Empire. 
The old Empire was an international state, ruled by 
the Turkish element, but comprising a majority of non-Turk-
ish subjects. Its central figure was the Sultan-Caliph, who 
was the head of the State, and the spiritual leader of all 
Moslems, including those outside the limits of the Empire. 
The Sultan pursued an Islamic policy, even after modern 
nationalism had sapped the unifying force if Islam; as late 
as 1914, he called for a holy war against the Allies, but 
the non-Turkish Moslems did not rally to his support. The 
Empire had long ago lost its power to defend its capital 
and the vital Straits against the Russians; it owed its con-
tinued control of this area to the rivalries of the great 
Powers, which it knew how to exploit. The public finances 
and the customs were in the hands of foreigners, like the 
members of the Ottoman Debt Commission and the directors of 
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the Ottoman Bank. The great bulk of the trade was carried on 
by the Greek, Armenian and Jewish minorities; the Ottoman-
Turkish atti:ude towards commerce is well illustrated by the 
remark of a Grand Vizier, who asked a French Ambassador with 
whom he had Just concluded a commercial treaty: "How can 
your master possibly take an interest in such vile negotia-
tions?n Finally industry, which had flourished until the end 
of the 18th century, declined rapidly at the same time when 
it was undergoing such a rapid development in Western Europe. 
The production of Angora wool, cotton, silk, leather and 
ceramics shrank to less than 2~ of its earlier volume. 
Nationals of the capitulatory countries, who controlled the 
Empire's finances and customs, encouraged the trend or the 
Ottoman economy towards the primary occupations of agricul-
1 
ture and pasturage. And agriculture remained primitive. 
The industrial and agricultural census of 1927 reveals the 
pitiful state of the Ottoman Empire's economic legacy. 
The Turkish Republic is a national state. In 1927, 
86~ of the population was Turkish-speaking, 97~ was Moham-
medan; the remnants of the former minorities have the con-
stitutional rights and duties of all Turkish citizens. The 
national ideal has been transferred from Islam to the Turk-
ish nation. The Republic has tried to develop within the 
nation the strength necessary for survival. The public 
finances were freed from foreign control; trade, industry 
1. L'Intervention de l'Etat dans l'Economie de la Turquie, 
Notes Documentaires et Etudes, No. 988, pp. 4-5· 
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and agriculture were developed with the active assistance or 
the Government. The foreign policy is one of independence 
and self-reliance, to the extent compatible with the national 
safety. 
The Republic eliminated from its foreign policy the 
pan-Islamic considerations which had been so pronounced in 
the days of Abdul Hamit and the Young Turks. The loss of the 
Arab-speaking regions of the Empire after the World war did 
not give rise to later claims; at Lausanne, the Turkish dele-
gation showed no interest in the Moslem Arabs. The solidar-
ity of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, sponsored by Soviet 
Russia in 1921, began to develop independently, not as a re-
sult of Islam, but of their parallel efforts at Westerniza-
tion, in which Turkey served as the model. In 1928, the very 
words "Allah" and "Islam" were stricken out of the Turkish 
Constitution. It is significant that Turkey's closest 
friend, from 1930 on, was not an Islamic state, but Christian 
Greece. 
Mustapha Kemal replaced Islam as a national faith by 
Turkish nationalism. The Turks were slower than their own 
subject peoples in attaining national consciousness. Kemal 
set out to instil it with his customary vigor. "Ne mutlu 
tt " •• ('' 'Turkum' deyene! How lucky is he who can say: 'I am a 
Turk!'") is one of his frequent sayings. The virtues of the 
race were extolled. The four-volume World History published 
in 1931 by the Ministry of Education tells the story of man-
kind from the earliest Turkish empires of Central Asia down 
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to the Turkish Republic; the geographic center of the story 
is the Altai Mountains of Asia, the fount of pure Turkish 
stock, whence civilization radiated in all directions. In 
1935 Turkish philologists lent their support to this histori-
cal view with their Gunes-Dil (Sun-Language) theory, which 
purported to show that primitive Turkish was the earliest 
language of man. The present Turkish language is being 
purged of its Persian and Arabic accretions, and pure Turk-
tt tl ish ( oz turkge) words, recovered from old texts and from 
dialects, are substituted. 
The Turkish view of history calls to mind the Aryan 
theory of Gobineau and Chamberlain, and one would expect it 
to be translated into the political field in the form of an 
irredentist pan-Turanianism. Such has not been the case. 
Kemal himself was well aware of the pernicious forms of 
nationalism; he told an American reporter in 1935: "The 
peoples should prevent war by entrusting power to men who 
1 
do not misuse nationalism." The nationalism he preached 
was intended to gird his people for the great task of recon-
struction, and for the inevitable foreign perils ahead; it 
was not meant to nourish expansionist aspirations directed 
at the scattered Turkish-speaking regions of the Balkans 
and of Central Asia. 
In the Balkans, the Greco-Turkish population exchange 
indicates a resolve to consider the Thracian frontier as 
definitive. The Lausanne Convention was followed by agreements 
1 G " " • • Jaschke, Die Turkel in den Jahren 1935~1941, p. 11 
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with other Balkan states providing for the transfer to Turkey 
of Turkish-speaking Moslems who wished to migrate. During 
the first decade of the Republic, almost 250,000 Turks, be-
yond the 400,000 involved in the Greek exchange, were re-
patriated from the Balkan countries, as well as from Russia, 
Syria and Persia. On September 4, 1936, a Turco-Rumanian 
convention arranged for the transfer of some 150,000 Dobrud-
jan Turks in two years. On July 11, 1938, a similar agree-
ment with Yugoslavia provided for the migration of an equal 
1 
number of Turks from Yugoslav Macedonia. 
The Turkish-speaking population of Asia residing out-
side of Anatolia almost equals that of Turkey proper. It 
is concentrated especially in the Soviet Union's Caucasian 
and trans-Caspian republics, and in Persian Azerbaijan. The 
Angora Government abandoned the Young Turk dream of creating 
a vast Turanian state stretching beyond Samarkand. By its 
1921 treaty with the Soviets, it agreed not to encourage 
separatist movements among the Turkish-speaking peoples of 
Russia. In 1926, Kemal's followers negotiated with Great 
Britain the cession to Iraq of a province which they consid-
ered Turkish, in spite of the popular clamor for war. The 
Turkish Government was more reluctant to renounce the Turkish 
regions of Persian Azerbaijan, until the periodic Kurdish 
revolts persuaded it to accept a final border settlement in 
1932. We have seen how Ribbentrop and von Papen tried to 
1. H. W. Hartmann, La Turquie dans le Sud-est european (Athens, 
1939), PP• 18-21. 
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lure the Turks into a Caucasian campaign in 1942 with pros-
pects of a share in the "conquered territories of the East," 
but their efforts found no response. There is one exception, 
however, in this whole record of restraint; in 1938 the Turk-
ish Government yielded to the temptations of the sword-
rattling diplomacy then in vogue, and succeeded in prying the 
Sanjak of Alexandretta loose from Syria. 
The true greatness of Mustapha Kemal lay in the fact 
that, while he was a victorious general and the idol of his 
people, he had no delusions of grandeur. He denounced the 
grandiose schemes of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism, and 
he later recalled: 
I warned the nation that the delusion of considering 
ourselves the rulers of the world must no longer be en-
tertained. Our nation has been dragged into enough 
disasters by the failure to understand our real place 
and position in the world. Let us put an end to this 
tragedy once and for all.l 
The positive goals of Turkish foreign policy are re-
stated by the President every November 1st at the opening 
session of the National Assembly. They are simply the inde-
pendence and security of the nation. The means for attaining 
these ends vary with the times; they may be war or peace, 
isolation or alliance, cooperation with a group of powers or 
a cautious neutrality. But the objectives remain the same. 
Turkey won her political independence by war. At the 
Lausanne Conference she gained almost complete judicial and 
1. M. Kemal, Nutuk, vol. II, p. 201. 
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economic independence. At the time of the Mosul crisis, the 
Turkish leaders did not choose to risk the nation's newly-
won independence in another war. Instead, they took steps 
to preserve it by a series of treaties with their neighbors, 
Bulgaria, Russia, Persia, France, Great Britain, and later, 
Italy and Greece. The State launched large-scale enterprises 
to secure a greater measure of economic autarchy. In 1930, 
the Government wrested control of its finances from the Otto-
man Bank. From 1936 to 1939, the Turkish Government took 
steps to prevent its economy from becoming dependent upon 
the German economic empire. 
The corollary to independence is security. The most 
important factor in the security of Turkey until 1939 was 
the friendliness of Soviet Russia. The Turks were careful 
to cultivate this feeling, without being drawn into the Rus-
sian orbit. They refused to enter the League of Nations as 
long as they felt it was being used by Great Britain and 
France to dominate the smaller powers. They accepted member-
ship when the Soviet attitude towards the League had changed. 
Turkey helped organize the Balkan and Middle Eastern Ententes, 
the types of regional pacts advocated by Litvinov. When she 
assumed military commitments in 1934 towards her Balkan 
allies, and in 1939 with Britain and France, it was stipu-
lated that she would not be expected to engage in any action 
that might draw her into war with the Soviet Union. 
With respect to hostile Italy, Turkey attempted to 
maintain peaceful relations, but when Italian aggressiveness 
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increased, she took a leading part in organizing protective 
measures. In 1928 she signed a Pact of Friendship with 
Mussolini, at the latter's bidding, although she had been 
the butt of his belligerent speeches for over two years. 
In 1934, when it appeared that the Italians were encouraging 
Bulgarian aspirations for an Aegean outlet, perhaps through 
Turkish Thrace, she signed the Balkan Pact, in spite of the 
warnings of the Italian press. After the Italian aggression 
in Ethiopia, Turkey joined the sanctionist powers. In 1937 
she led the small Mediterranean powers in counter-measures 
against Italian submarine piracy. After the outbreak of 
World War II, she signed with Britain and France a treaty 
of alliance according to which her role was to intervene 
if Italy should spread the war to the Mediterranean area. 
The relations of Great Britain and the Turkish Repub-
lic got off to a bad start. They were envenomed for more 
than two years by the drawn-out debate over Mosul. For ten 
years thereafter Turkey remained suspicious and aloof, while 
Britain's interest was centered in other areas. The Italian 
aggression in East Africa in 1935 brought both Powers to a 
realization of their reciprocal interests. They cooperated 
in economic measures against Italy during the Ethiopian war, 
and in anti-submarine defence during the Spanish Civil war. 
Turkey strengthened her economic ties with Great Britain when 
Dr. Schacht's economic empire threatened to absorb the Near 
East. When it appeared that the Axis Powers were determined 
upon war in 1939, Turkey unhesitatingly aligned herself with 
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Britain and France, in spite or the equivocal attitude of the 
Soviets. Even after the defeat of France, the Turkish Gov-
ernment asserted its continued solidarity with that or Great 
Britain. 
The Turco-British alliance relationship was profoundly 
altered towards the end or 1940 when Russian expansionism, 
reawakened by the partnership with Germany, turned towards 
the Straits. In the spring of 1941, Britain's efforts to 
enlist Turkey into a Balkan defense were in vain; the threat 
of Italy, and even that or Germany paled in significance 
compared with the traditional menace from the north. Hitler, 
at least, had no designs upon the Straits. Turkey restored 
friendly relations with Germany, though the latter's bids for 
Turkish military cooperation were turned down. After the de-
feat of Italy, the British were confident that Turkey would 
be willing to enter the war on their side. They round that 
the brave Turk had become the reluctant Turk; as General 
Bradley would put it, he did not want to be involved "in the 
wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the 
wrong enemy." In the eyes or the Turkish leaders, the alli-
ance of 1939 had become incompatible with the independence 
and security or their country. 
After the war, Turkey became one or the many pressure 
points stretching in a semi-circle around the communist world 
from Finland to Korea. Since March 1945, the Turks have 
firmly denied all Soviet demands for territory and for bases. 
As soon as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed, 
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they argued for -its extension to the Middle East, and indi-
cated an eagerness to join. They needed no urging to send 
a brigade to Korea at the outset of the war. 
Throughout the history of their Republic, the Turks 
have proved themselves eager to assume their share of respon-
sibility for the common defence; they have remained faithful 
to their commitments as long as the association continued to 
serve the independence and security of their nation. 
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ABSTRACT 
Turkey emerged from the Lausanne Conference free but 
isolated. The Lausanne Treaty gave her, within her narrowed 
borders, a sovereignty that the later Ottoman Empire had not 
known. The economic and judicial capitulations were abol-
ished. The British, French and Italian zones of influence, 
and the Greek administrative zone were forgotten. But the 
Allied Powers remained hostile; they begrudged the Angora 
regime the treaty revision which it had wrested from them. 
Soviet Russia was friendly, but the much vaunted Russo-Turk-
ish relation was largely a solidarity of outcasts. 
The young Republic's isolation was brought into re-
lief by its first diplomatic crisis. In December 1925, the 
Council of the League of Nations awarded the Mosul Vilayet 
to Great Britain's protege Iraq. There was speculation 
whether the Turks would try to recover the province by force. 
France announced her solidarity with Britain. Greece appeared 
ready for a war of revenge; and Mussolini left his balcony 
to speak from the deck of a battleship. Soviet Russia prom-
ised neutrality, nothing more. 
The Turks resolved to reach definitive settlements 
with all their neighbors. They negotiated with Britain and 
France the final demarcation of the Iraqi and Syrian fron-
tiers. They organized with Persia a system of border control. 
They settled with Bulgaria the property claims of their 
respective nationals. And they worked with Greece towards a 
final settlement of the questions arising from the mass ex-
change of populations. 
A vague Italian threat continued until the end of 
1927, when Mussolini, in a sudden fit of statesmanship, de-
cided that the Turks were his friends. He desired to combat 
French influence in the Balkans, and to isolate Yugoslavia, 
in order to press home his Dalmatian claims. His efforts 
to win over Rumania had not been successful, and he decided 
to enlist Turkey and Greece alongside of Bulgaria and Al-
bania. His friendly advances were well received, and 
treaties were signed with both countries in 1928. 
The Italian treaty augured for Turkey a more Western 
policy. The Italian Government lent its good offices in the 
final settlement of the Greco-Turkish property questions; a 
definitive agreement was reached in June 1930, and in Octo-
ber Greece and Turkey signed a treaty of friendship. At the 
same time, Turkey strengthened her ties with Persia and 
Afghanistan, independently of the Soviet Union. In 1929, 
the Soviets renewed their treaty of neutrality with Turkey 
for only two years. 
While France and Italy were competing for hegemony in 
the Balkan Peninsula, a native movement for Balkan organiza-
tion came into being. Four yearly Balkan Conferences met 
from 1930 to 1933 to study the means of federating or even 
uniting the Balkan States. The meetings were unofficial, 
but it was hoped that the governments would take action along 
the lines suggested. Actually, the Balkan Conferences re-
vealed the irreconcilable differences between Albania and 
Bulgaria on the one hand, and Yugoslavia, Rumania and Greece 
on the other. The Turkish delegation occupied a middle 
position between the two groups. The Balkan Governments 
took no action on the recommendations made; however, the 
Conferences provided a preview of the stand taken subse-
quently by each State. 
Turkey became a member of the League of Nations in 
July 1932. The feelings of suspicion which the young Repub-
lic had entertained, especially after the League Council 
awarded Mosul to Iraq, had largely disappeared. Moreover, 
membership in the League no longer risked jeopardizing Tur-
key's relations with the U.s.s.R.; Soviet hostility towards 
"the triumphal chariot of Western imperialism" was fast sub-
siding, as a ·result of the Japanese aggression in Manchuria 
and the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany. 
With the rise of Hitler, the Soviet Union assumed a 
position of leadership in the organ~zation of collective se-
curity. Stalin and Litvinov became anti-revisionists, and 
they urged other states to band together on a regional basis 
for the defence of the status quo. In February 1934, Yugo-
slavia, Rumania, Greece and Turkey joined in a Balkan Pact 
which pledged its members to a common defence of their Bal-
kan frontiers against a Balkan aggressor. Bulgaria refused 
to be a party to an organization whose purpose was the 
preservation of the status quo; Albania was not invited, for 
fear of offending Italy. The following year, Turkey, Iraq, 
Persia and Afghanistan agreed to form a similar Middle East-
ern Entente, as soon as Persia and Iraq could settle their 
frontier dispute. 
The Italian conquest of Ethiopia and the German re-
militarization of the Rhineland revealed that the principle 
of general security embodied in the League of Nations was 
still just a principle. The states of Europe sought other 
means to ensure their safety; some tried to win the good 
graces of the dictators; Others strengthened their alliance 
relationships. Rumania and Yugoslavia retrenched into a 
neutralist policy intended to placate the Axis; Turkey and 
Greece drew closer together, and cooperated with Great Brit-
ain. The Balkan Entente became an empty form, like the League 
of Nations. 
The neutralization of the Balkan Entente was furthered 
by the German penetration of the Balkan economies. Dr. 
Schacht's Balkan campaign was intended to bind the Balkan 
economies indissolubly to that of Germany. His efforts 
were especially successful in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Ru-
mania. Turkey welcomed an expanded German trade; she was 
able to obtain the machinery needed for her industrial pro-
gram, and to dispose of her surplus tobacco and wool at high 
prices. ·She was careful, however, not to let her economy 
become a satellite in the German economic empire; large 
State contracts were awarded as much as possible to British 
and Czech firms. The Turkish Government was determined to 
remain outside the Axis orbit; this attitude did not prevent 
it from obtaining from the anti-revisionist Powers the right 
to remilitarize the Straits, nor from securing from a harried 
France the cession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta. 
Hitler and Mussolini again delivered their one-two 
punch in the spring of 1939; the Germans absorbed the rem-
nant of Czechoslovakia, and the Italians annexed Albania. 
Great Britain and France immediately began to organize a 
common front against the Axis. They gave guarantees of mili-
tary support to Poland, Rumania, Greece and Turkey. It was 
agreed that they would conclude a formal pact of mutual as-
sistance with the Turks as soon as the role of the Soviet 
Union in the common defence could be determined. The role 
picked by Russia was revealed in the Non-Aggression Pact 
with Germany, and in the accompanying economic agreements; 
the Soviets were confident that they could sit out the Sec-
ond Imperialist War, and do whatever profitable business 
they could on the sidelines. 
After the outbreak of the war, Foreign Minister Sara-
coglu spent three weeks in Moscow to assess the new Russian 
policy, and to try to conclude a mutual-assistance pact 
with the Soviets. The talks failed, but Turkey immediately 
threw in her lot with Great Britain and France anyway. It 
was understood, however, as it had been in the Balkan Pact, 
that she would not be compelled to any action which might 
involve her in war with the U.s.s.R. 
The defeat of France in 1940 had immediate repercussions 
in Eastern Europe. The Soviets hurried to collect, before it 
was too late, the dividends earmarked for them in the part-
nership agreement with Germany; they annexed the Baltic 
States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and they prepared 
their claims for military bases on the Straits. Dismembered 
Rumania threw herself into Hitler's arms. Turkey declared 
her fidelity to the British alliance, unt:n the day she 
learned from the Germans of the Russian designs on the 
Straits. From then on, she shrank from war with the Axis; 
she was convinced that the greater danger to her independ-
ence lay elsewhere. The British tried in vain in the spring 
of 1941 to enlist Turkey's cooperation in a Balkan defence. 
In the summer, the Turks signed a treaty of friendship with 
Germany. 
In 1941 and 1942, the Germans attempted to secure 
Turkey's collaboration with promises of territorial gains. 
First, they requested permission for the transit of arms to 
Syria for a Middle East campaign against the British; the 
following year, they tried to interest the Turks in a Cau-
casian campaign against the Russians. Both attempts failed; 
the Turks did not want to harm the British, whom they liked, 
and they refused to provoke the Russians, whom they feared. 
In 1943 and 1944, it was the turn of the Allies to 
bid for Turkish military support. The Turkish Government 
leaders hedged; they argued that the Turkish Army was insuffi-
ciently equipped, which was true. But there were other 
considerations; the Allies themselves did not choose to launch 
a major campaign from the Eastern Mediterranean, in conjunc-
tion with Turkey. The main reason was probably that the 
Turks did not want to dissipate their strength in operations 
against Germany, then become a ready prey for the Soviets. 
By the middle of 1944, Great Britain and the United 
States were content with Turkey's diplomatic and economic 
break with Germany; but the Soviet Union, with victory 
near, showed signs of increasing hostility. At Yalta, and 
still more at Potsdam, the Western Allies swung over to the 
defence of Turkey, while the Soviet Union formally put forth 
her demands for bases on the Straits. 
In the split world of today, Turkey's attitude is un-
equivocal. She has firmly rejected all Soviet demands; she 
has given unqualified support to the United Nations. She 
has sent a relatively large number of troops to Korea at 
the outset. She has appealed for membership in the Ameri-
can-sponsored treaty structure. or all the nations aligned 
on the side of the United states, she is the least ambigu-
ous in her attitude. She can be expected to persevere in 
this attitude as long as her association in the joint defence 
does not, as happened with the British alliance during the 
last war, run counter to the two basic goals of her foreign 
policy: the independence and security of the nation. 
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